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Abstract  
This thesis consists of essays on the financial performance of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States’ (CIS) banking systems.  
Chapter 2 presents a historical overview of the financial sectors development in transition 
countries and the CISs in particular. It shed light on key issues of the massive changes in the 
financial systems of the former soviet bloc countries and their influence on the countries’ 
banking system landscape nowadays. This chapter aims to contribute to the better understanding 
of the transition processes from momobank system to two-tier banking system in the CIS 
countries by providing theoretical background and empirical evidence of transition processes. 
After more than 20 years of transition the financial systems in the CIS countries have features to 
different extents, which are the legacy of the former system of finance. Nevertheless, overall the 
banks in the CISs were transferred into commercial banks and adopted the concept of 
conventional banking though to different degrees across countries.  One of the most important 
transformations in the CIS banking sectors is the ownership of banks, which were fully state-
owned during the soviet times; and privatisation and liberalisation completely reshaped the 
ownership structure in the CISs. Moreover, the changes in regulation and supervision have 
critically transformed banks’ risk-taking behaviour, which is also one of the major concerns of 
our study. 
Chapter 3 examines bank performance in terms of technical efficiency with particular attention 
to the impact of bank ownership and risk-taking behaviour and addressing environmental effects 
on banks technical efficiency in the CISs. Our findings provide empirical evidence that 
ownership structure matters for the CIS banks efficiency. Using state-owned banks as a 
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benchmark we found that while private banks are less technically efficient than state-owned 
banks in the CIS countries as well as banks with foreign majority ownership, the CIS-owned 
banks are more efficient than other banks in the region. Risks-taking behaviour has different 
impact on performance in the CIS countries. This research has found positive association 
between capital, credit and market risk and performance, while negative association between 
liquidity risks and bank performance in the CISs.  
Chapter 4 examines cost and profit efficiency incorporating important variables, which are 
considered critical for differences in efficiency, as in Chapter 3. We include ownership type, 
risk-taking behaviour and different environmental factors to estimate reliable cost and profit 
efficiency measures. Different concepts of efficiency introduced in this study extend our analysis 
of bank efficiency, and offer a comprehensive study of the CIS banks performance. We found 
that privately owned banks are less cost efficient than state-owned banks. Although foreign 
banks are more profitable than state-owned banks, they are as cost efficient as state-owned 
banks. The CIS-owned foreign banks are less cost efficient than other banks in the CIS countries. 
There are different impacts of risk-taking behaviour on bank cost and profit efficiency in the CIS 
countries. Banks with lower capital risk are more cost efficient. Higher credit risk taking is 
associated with lower profitability of banks. While banks with lower liquidity risk are more 
profit efficient, they are less cost efficient. Higher market risk is associated with less cost 
efficiency. Finally, there is a convergence in cost and profit efficiency scores of banks across the 
CIS countries indicating a process of re-integration among CIS financial systems. 
Chapter 5 explores the impact of competition on the stability of banks in the CIS countries. We 
found that competition is good for stability and verified the competition-stability nexus for the 
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CIS countries. This study also concluded that the improvement of legal rights of borrowers and 
lenders and bank supervision in the CISs would contribute to banking system stability.  
Our concluding policy recommendation is that policymakers need to design regulations that 
would ensure stability and market discipline without impeding competition and efficiency of 
banks in the CISs. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis consists of essays on the performance of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ 
(CISs) banking systems. In the 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union, economists started 
using the term ‘transition economy’ to label the economic systems of the former Soviet Union 
and other post-communist countries, which were transforming their plan-based economies to 
market oriented ones (Megginson, 2005). We follow this terminology and refer to all countries 
that have undertaken these transformations as transition countries/economies.  
Despite the growing literature on transition countries, and the interest of policy makers and 
practitioners, there is currently a dearth of literature and of empirical studies specifically 
addressing financial sector performance in the CISs. The banking sector is the most important 
form of financial intermediation in the CIS countries as capital markets are underdeveloped or 
non-existent (Berglof and Bolton, 2002; De Nicolo et al., 2003). Comparatively developed 
organised capital markets are in Russia and Kazakhstan. Banking in the CISs has been 
experiencing drastic changes over the past two decades. It has undergone complicated processes 
of privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation as well as many financial crises. In this regard, a 
number of issues in the banking sectors of the CISs are worth of investigating for both academics 
and policy makers. Particularly, the main concern of this study is to analyse efficiency, 
competition and stability of banking sector in the CIS countries. 
Chapter 2 presents a historical overview of the financial sectors development in transition 
countries and the CISs. The objective is to shed light on key issues of the massive changes in the 
financial systems of the former soviet bloc countries and on the way in which the changes have 
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affected the present banking system landscape in these countries. The Chapter aims to contribute 
to the better understanding of the transition processes from monobak system to two-tire banking 
system in the post-soviet countries by providing theoretical background and empirical evidence 
of transition processes in these countries. It is also crucial for understanding of financial system 
functioning in the CIS economies nowadays. Despite the long period passed since the transition 
started, the financial systems in most of the transition countries have features, which are the 
legacy of the centrally planned economy. 
One of the most important changes in the CISs banking sectors is the ownership of banks. Banks 
were fully state owned during the soviet times, and were subject of privatisation later on from the 
early 1990s, which completely reshaped the ownership of banks in the CISs. The CIS countries 
chose different ownership structures according to their economic situation, the availability of 
funds in the countries and institutional development. State capital prevails in the Russia, 
Belorussian, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan banking systems. Russia has developed more 
advanced market mechanisms, while Belorussian, Uzbekistan and Turkmen banking sector 
mostly replicates the finance of soviet times. Domestic private banking dominates in Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Ukraine. Countries, such as Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova, are 
lack of domestic finance and have chosen the strategy of attracting foreign capital. While the 
state ownership share decreased in Azerbaijan, Belarus and Moldova for the period 2005-2013 
and Armenia totally privatised former state-owned banks (Banks of the CISs, 2008-2014), after 
the world financial crisis 2007-2009 there was an increase in state ownership both on a country 
level as in Russia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, and on a regional level.   
The world financial crisis caused the banking sector’s growth rate to slow down all over the 
region. Banks experienced a liquidity crunch as they couldn’t refinance borrowing from 
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international markets (Mitra et al 2010). There was an overall decline in financial intermediation 
after the crisis in all the regional countries involving a decrease in lending to households and 
enterprises, an increase in interest rates and a deterioration of banks' portfolios.  
There is a trend of financial reintegration among the CIS countries. Because the banking sector is 
the most developed sector of the financial system, the most intensive integration within the CISs 
is in the banking sector. According to many experts, financial cooperation among the CIS 
countries was very weak for many years (Petrov, 2011).  The increased integration process 
started in the pre-crisis period of 2007-2009. It was due to economic growth in the CIS countries 
and to legislation to liberalise finance, which eased the access of foreign financial institutions to 
the markets in many CIS countries. The other reason was to promote economic and political 
influence in the region by Russia.  
Overall, the banks in the CISs were transferred into commercial banks and adopted the concept 
of conventional banking though to different degrees across countries. There were achievements 
of the banking sectors in the CISs. Banking sectors were the most dynamic sectors in the CISs, 
and had very high growth rates, which exceeded GDP growth before the world financial crisis of 
2007-2009. The banking sectors slowly recovered after the crisis. The other positive 
achievements were introduction of International standards of financial statements, Basel 
standards in the most of the CIS countries, and liberalisation of the banking sectors, which 
allowed foreign banks entry to the markets and increased competition and services quality and 
diversification.  
Chapter 3 examines bank performance in terms of technical efficiency in the CISs with particular 
attention to the impact of bank ownership and risk-taking behaviour and addressing 
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environmental effects on technical efficiency. It seeks to answer specific questions including: 
How do bank ownership characteristics affect bank technical efficiency? How does bank risk-
taking behaviour affect bank efficiency in the CISs? While focusing on these issues, this study 
also controls for the effects of other environmental factors, such as the 2007-2009 global 
financial crisis, GDP growth, and entrance into the customs union agreement.   
The CIS countries appeared to provide fertile testing grounds for the analysis of the impact of 
ownership on efficiency because of the presence of sufficiently large numbers of each type of 
bank such as state, private and foreign banks. The changes in regulation and supervision have 
critically transformed banks’ risk-taking behaviour, which is another concern of our study. We 
investigate the influence of different bank level factors such as capital, credit, liquidity and 
market risks on bank technical efficiency. We also include other bank level and environmental 
variables into the model to account for cross-country differences and to mitigate the bias in 
efficiency scores estimation (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
The objectives of Chapter 3 are three-fold. The first is to estimate consistent technical efficiency 
measures for the CIS banks under the influence of different bank level and environmental 
factors. The second is to investigate the links between bank performance and internal bank level 
factors such as capital, credit, liquidity and market risks, which are likely to influence the 
differences in efficiency. The third is to provide information and insights for financial sector 
authorities and practitioners on banks’ ownership structure, which influences performance in the 
CISs; analysing risk-taking behaviour, which places banks closer to or farther from the best-
practice performer, would shed light on managers’ strategies and help them to correct business 
policies and to improve their own performance. 
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This Chapter contributes to the debates on financial sector performance in transition countries, 
particularly the CIS banking sector. It also contributes to literature by investigating the impact of 
CISs ownership in the region on bank efficiency. The CIS banking sector technical efficiency 
measures are derived from a common stochastic frontier for the CIS countries, which to our 
knowledge has not been done before. Secondly, it measures the impact of different ownership 
structures (state, private domestic, and foreign ownership and ownership based in other CIS 
countries) on technical efficiency. The changes in regulation and supervision have critically 
transformed banks’ risk-taking behaviour, therefore this Chapter also considers the influence of 
capital risk, credit, liquidity and market risks on technical efficiency. The impact of 
environmental factors such as the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, GDP growth, and custom 
union entrance on technical efficiency is also measured. Methodologically this chapter estimates 
technical efficiency employing a hyperbolic distance function offered by Cuesta and Orea 
(2002), which assumes simultaneous change in input and output, and which is modified by 
estimating time-varying hyperbolic technical efficiency in our study.   
Chapter 4 examines the cost and profit efficiency of the CIS banks and investigates the impact of 
banking sector ownership and risk-taking behaviour on bank cost and profit efficiency. Different 
concepts of efficiency introduced in this study extend the analysis of bank efficiency, and offer a 
comprehensive study of the CISs banking performance. The cost and profit concepts are based 
on economic optimisation as a reaction of bank management to market prices and competition 
(Berger and Mester, 1997). The estimation of cost and profit efficiency allows us to further 
extend the analysis and investigate the process of integration in the banking sector of the CISs by 
testing for convergence in bank cost and profit efficiency. 
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This Chapter specifies research questions as follows: How do bank ownership characteristics and 
risk-taking affect banks cost/profit efficiency? To what extent has financial integration taken 
place in the banking sectors in the CIS countries in terms of cost/profit efficiency scores 
convergence? 
Thus the objectives of this Chapter are: first, to extend the analysis of the CISs banking and 
implement a different concept of efficiency namely cost/profit efficiency for a comprehensive 
analysis of banks performance; second, to analyse the influence of different types of ownership 
and risk-taking behaviour on banks cost/profit efficiency; third, to assess the integration of banks 
among the CISs by measuring the convergence in cost and profit efficiency scores convergence; 
finally, to provide information for policy makers and/or financial sector authorities in the CIS 
countries on the banking sector policies in terms of better services and financial reintegration of 
their banking sectors.   
This Chapter contributes to the literature by estimating cost and profit efficiency of the CISs 
banks with cost-minimisation and profit-maximisation behavioural settings by incorporating 
relative prices, which represents a more demanding criterion than technical efficiency on its own. 
Cost and profit efficiency indicates the ability of managers to respond effectively to changes in 
the relative prices (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Secondly, in the same way as in Chapter 3, 
estimates are derived taking into account the impact on cost and profit efficiency important 
variables, such as ownership type, risk-taking behaviour and different environmental factors. 
Thirdly, following the specification for panel data analysis by Canova and Marcet (1995), this 
Chapter proceeds to the estimation of β- and σ-convergence of cost and profit efficiency scores, 
and further analyses integration processes in banking sectors of the CISs.  
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Chapter 5 investigates the impact of competition on the stability of banks in the CIS transition 
countries. There is no clear consensus in the literature on possible impacts of competition on 
stability. Some literature argues that competition makes for financial stability (Beck et al., 2004; 
and Allen and Gale, 2004), while other literature conjectures that there is a trade-off between 
competition and stability (Carletti and Hartmann, 2002; Beck et al., 2013). In this regard, the 
research questions that this Chapter addresses are: Is there a trade-off between increasing 
competition and stability in the CIS banking systems? Do we need to promote competitive 
dynamics to improve financial stability? What forms of regulation enhance financial stability?  
The objectives of the Chapter are first to explore relationship between stability and competition 
in the CIS countries; second is to analyse the influence of environmental factors such as legal 
rights and supervision on financial stability in the CISs; finally to provide information for policy 
makers and financial sector authorities on whether the CIS countries need to encourage 
competition to maintain financial stability.  
Chapter 5 contributes to the literature on competition and stability by explicitly concentrating on 
the competition and stability nexus in transition countries. Our research attempts to revisit these 
two competing views and empirically investigates whether competition is good or bad for 
stability. Moreover, this Chapter examines the influence of regulation and supervision practices 
on stability in the CISs countries and elaborates further on related policy issues. For our analysis, 
we combine data on bank and country levels to explore the factors of banking sector policies that 
influence banks’ stability outcomes. Further our research benefits from dynamic panel data 
analysis, which provides comparisons across-country and across-time.  
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis with a review of the main findings discussed throughout the 
thesis and a discussion of policy implications.   
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Chapter 2 
Banking in Transition Economies: Historical 
Survey 
Preamble  
This chapter is a literature survey and historical overview of the financial sectors development in 
transition countries including the CISs
1
. It starts with the analysis of the state of the finance in 
the soviet era with monobank financial system, covers processes of creation of two-tier banking 
system and financial liberalisation in the post-soviet countries with an overview of transition 
theories, and proceeds with a discussion of banking sectors in the CIS countries. The present 
study aims to contribute to the better understanding of the transition processes in the post-soviet 
countries by providing empirical evidence of banking sector development in the post-soviet 
countries. 
2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to introduce some of the major issues related to banking in 
transition countries and chronicle the massive changes in the transition countries and their 
influence on the financial systems landscape in those countries nowadays. Market reforms in the 
CISs resulted in the creation of two-tear banking systems out of monobank systems and the 
reforms were enshrined in legislation concerning central bank and commercial credit institutions. 
                                                          
1
The CIS countries are the former Soviet Union Republics, which included as of 2013 Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
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We examine the development of transition countries in several stages. Section 2.2 sets the stage 
by providing an overview of historical development of banking in the former Soviet Union and 
creation of monobank financial system, which is included here for the following reason. It is 
crucial for understanding of financial system functioning in the former Soviet Union economies 
nowadays. The historical analysis of the financial system developments provides the basis to 
understand the main features of banking in transition. Despite the long period of reformation the 
financial systems in most of the transition countries (particularly in the former Soviet Union 
countries) have features, which are the legacy of the centrally planned economy. The section is 
complemented with a historical overview of banking in other ex-soviet countries where 
necessary.  
Section 2.3 gives a retrospective analysis of financial reforms and transition of the monobank 
system to two-tier banking system in the former Soviet Union with a short review of the reforms 
in other ex-soviet countries. We start with the literature survey of theoretical grounds for 
financial sector reforms by providing key theories on the relationship between liberalisation of 
the financial sector and economic growth. However, the main emphasis is on the transformation 
of one-tire banking system to two-tier banking system in the period before and after the change 
of political regimes.  
Section 2.4 reviews the banking sectors of the CIS countries after the completion of main 
banking reforms (2005) to the present in figures. Financial systems in the CIS countries reflect 
various economic and political paths, yet share common properties. The banking sector is the key 
form of financial intermediation in the CIS countries as fledgling capital markets are 
underdeveloped or non-existent. Comparatively developed organised capital markets exist in 
Russia and Kazakhstan. The divergence in the development of financial sectors of the CIS 
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countries after the demise of the Soviet Union is rooted in the innate differences of the economic 
and real sector development in particular countries. Banking in the CISs can be distinguished as 
most developed, medium developed and underdeveloped based on assets per person and assets to 
GDP criteria
2
. The banking sectors even in the countries with the most developed banking 
sectors remain underdeveloped. The indicators of financial intermediation are still lower than in 
developed countries. For example, the regional unweighted average of total assets to GDP ratio 
is about 56% and the bank credits to GDP ratio is about 36%. In most developed economies, 
assets and loans exceed 100% of GDP.  
The CIS countries differ in their ownership structure. State-owned banks dominated the banking 
sectors of Belarus, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in 2013, and while there was a net 
increase in state ownership between 2005-2013 in Russia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, there was 
a reduction in state ownership in Azerbaijan, Belarus and Moldova, whereas Armenia totally 
privatised its banking sector. Armenian, Moldovan and Kyrgyz banking sectors are dominated by 
foreign capital from the CISs region and from outside of the region. 
From the other side, there are big achievements of the banking sectors in the CISs. The banking 
sector was the most dynamic sector in the CIS countries, and had very high growth rates of its 
assets and credits to the economy before the world financial crisis 2007-2009 and slowly 
recovered after that. Liberalisation of the banking sectors allowed foreign banks entry to the 
markets, which increased competition and the quality of services, and diversified banking 
services. Most of the CIS countries introduced international standards of financial statements, 
                                                          
2 
The first group consists of Russian, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine banking systems, the second group includes 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, and the last group is represented Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. 
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which contributed to transparency and a better monitoring of risks. Introduction of Basel 
standards had a positive impact on capitalisation of banking sectors of the CISs (Kazakov, 2007). 
Section 6 examines re-integration of finance in the CISs. The on-going processes of financial 
integration among the CIS countries, mostly initiated by the private sector, were enhanced by 
economic growth in the pre-crisis period of 2007-2009; and financial liberalisation facilitated 
further integration among the CIS countries. Later, financial integration was politically supported 
in understanding of financial institutions’ role in re-integration in the region, and the official 
programmes were signed. Documents support the creation of a common financial market for the 
CISs within the Eurasian Economic Community (2007-2010) and aim at currency and financial 
cooperation as a priority within the strategy of economic development till 2020. Integration in 
the banking sector is the most intensive as this segment of the financial system is the most 
developed one in the CIS countries.  Section 7 concludes the chapter. 
The discussion is supported by statistics and an analysis of banking sector performance in each 
country to compare the CIS countries banking systems development. The data includes the 
banking sectors of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The main data source for this chapter is the websites of 
Financial and Banking Council of the CISs
3
, World Bank Financial Indicators and websites of 
some commercial banks. The data are also available at National banks of Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine, Central banks of Armenia and Russia’s websites. The data are 
not representative for Uzbekistan though the main indicators are available on a yearly basis. The 
data used in this chapter are different from the Bankscope database we used for empirical studies 
                                                          
3 
The website available in Russian: http://www.fbc-cis.ru/ 
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in two ways. On one hand, they are stronger in terms of whole banking sector coverage, while 
the Bankscope presents only banks, whose data were provided to it. On the other hand, the data 
represent only key banking sector indicators, though with more precision but aggregate at the 
country level: such as assets, capital, credits, non-banking sector funding, and number of banks 
in each country, while the Banksope database provides data at a bank level in each county. 
However, for our comparative analysis of banking sector development in the CIS countries, the 
more precise aggregate data are preferable.  
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2.2. Finance in the former soviet bloc countries  
This section adopts a historical perspective to analyse financial system developments in the CIS 
countries. It looks at earlier periods of formation of the financial systems under the soviet rule in 
the USSR, discusses the main principles of the monobank financial system in the USSR and 
because of the similar features, it only touches main financial developments in other soviet bloc 
countries where relevant.   
2.2.1. Establishment of the Soviet financial system  
The financial system of the USSR was the totality of the various subsystems of financial 
relations in which funds of monetary resources were formed and utilised in a planned way. This 
general summary of the financial system in the USSR was given by the professor of Moscow 
Financial Institute Allakhverdyan (1966).  
Although the creation of a new financial system in the beginning of the USSR was characterised 
by lack of theoretical background and was a result of trial and error method, there were two main 
features of financial policy and system in that period. The first is that the financial system should 
cope with inflation. Second, it should supply the real economy with finance after the physical 
output was planned. This was because of the prioritisation of the physical output over financial 
variables (Gregory and Tikhonov, 2000).  
The systemic review of the finance in the USSR is facilitated by the textbook “Finance and 
Credit of the USSR” by Lavrov (1972). The textbook provides a historical overview of the 
creation of the financial and credit system since 1917 and new principles in organisation of the 
finance-credit activities in the USSR in the late 1960s. 
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The principles of the new financial credit system of the USSR were grounded in the documents 
of the Communist party and reflected the fundamentals of collectivist policies. The first 
measures in the financial sector of the Soviet power in 1917 were the takeover of the central 
bank – Gosudarstvennyi Bank (later Gosbank), nationalisation of private banks and creation of 
single Narodnyi Bank (People’s bank).  
 During the establishment of the Soviet state and transition from capitalism to socialism, besides 
nationalisation of the banking system other measures, allowing accumulation of savings, were 
undertaken. These were the expropriation of private property such as plants, factories and land, a 
state monopoly on trade and the nullification of all external and internal governmental debts of 
the Tzarist times. As in the Tzarist times Russia was mostly an agricultural country, the 
accumulation and centralisation of finance and savings was crucial for the industrialisation plans 
of the Soviet state (Lavrov 1972). 
1920s. There is a substantial literature describing money and credit in the period of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921-1928. This literature was reviewed by Davies in his work 
“Short-Term Credit in the USSR: Some Post-War Problems” (1953). The main characteristic of 
that period was that before 1928 the USSR adopted the relatively loose New Economic Policy. 
While agriculture, retail trade, service sector, food and light industry were in private property, 
the government retained control over the heavy industry, transport and banking sectors, 
wholesale and international trade. The NEP was withdrawn in 1928 with the introduction of the 
First Five-Year Plan 1928-1933. The Plan’s first aim was to accumulate resources to improve the 
industrialisation of the USSR, where heavy industries lagged behind the other industrialised 
countries, and there was the need for the defence industry to be built.  
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Although the central emission and control of money and credit was an official policy from the 
beginning of the Soviet state, in practice money and credit were increasing faster than was 
planned by the officials. Quite the opposite, the centralised control in the 1920s was 
characterised as “dictatorship of finance” and not as a regime in which finance followed planned 
physical output. Enterprises were involved in issuing commercial credits to one another which 
led to soft budget constraints for insolvent enterprises, and commercial banks could monetise 
those credits if Gosbank refused to do so (Gregory and Tikhonov, 2000).  
The achievement of the NEP was that economic activity increased during that period after the 
civil war and foreign intervention. Financial policy and creation of new cooperative, communal 
municipal banks and specialised banks such as the Central Agricultural Bank, the Bank of Long-
term Credit to Industry, during the period of the NEP improved finance of enterprises by 
reestablishment and development of long-term banking credits for capital formation (Lavrov, 
1972). 
The centralised soviet financial system included all Soviet Socialist Republics after their status 
was established by about 1922. The centralised budget of the USSR consisted of union budgets 
of the Soviet Republics and each Republic was given some part of resources for socio-cultural 
needs (Lavrov, 1972). This redistribution was in favour of the centre, while in other republics 
reigned starvation and poverty.  
1930s. However, the credit reforms of 1930-1932 led by the Stalinist wing of the communist 
party banned commercial credit and established direct banking transactions on the basis of 
principles of urgency, payback and purposive character of a credit; the transactions among 
enterprises were required on a cashless basis or in accounting money (Gregory and Tikhonov, 
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2000). The credit reforms were conducted during the First Five-Year Plan 1928- 1933 and were 
one component of it
4
.  
The reforms aimed to restrict credit expansion by making Gosbank the sole bank of issue. 
Gosbank had functions of an administrative-command centre to impose hard budget constraints 
to prevent the abuses by enterprises during the previous period, when they could easily get credit 
for their sales without control including mutual settlements
5
. There had to be financial planning 
for credit as for physical output. Although, the aim of the reform was to control excessive 
expansion of credit on free basis by enterprises themselves and by banks other than the Gosbank, 
the big scale of credit issues to finance the planned industrialisation in the country by the 
Gosbank led to inflation and increased prices in the USSR during the reforms. 
Also the credit reforms had to ensure that credit covered the physical output and that enterprises 
were efficient. In practice the reforms didn’t solve the problems. The financial indiscipline 
remained, although illegally, after the reforms were introduced (Gregory and Tikhonov, 2000).  
2.2.2. The role of finance in the planned economy: the monobank 
system 
Here we discuss the main features and principles of the banking system in the Soviet Union and 
because they were mostly similar in all soviet bloc countries, we will refer to differences only 
where relevant. Regarding financial reforms in transition counties, we distinguish between 
                                                          
4 
The First Five-Year Plan October 1928 - October 1933 was accomplished pre-schedule before January 1933. The 
nest Five-Year Plan was developed for 1933-1937 years and approve by the All-Union Communist Party of 
Bolsheviks in 1934. 
5
 Payments between enterprises for goods they purchase from each other issuing notes that should be cashed later 
with the central bank.   
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banking system developments in the CEE countries and the former Soviet Union countries due to 
their great differences both geographically and in the level of transition
6
.  
The subordinate role of the financial system to planned physical output was instigated during the 
first five-year plan in the 1930s in the USSR and from the end of the 1940s in the Eastern 
European countries. It was passive banking with two types of money developed under the 
system: money for accounting and cash money for exchange. The passive banking means that the 
finance was following physical planning. Accounting money served as the unit of account for 
transactions between enterprises and government and among enterprises themselves for mutual 
clearance. Money, which was used by the population for purchases of goods and services and 
salary payments, had within certain limits the functions of store of value and medium of 
exchange. Separation of cash money and accounting money helped to control planning as 
consumers’ spending decisions could not influence production. The role of banks in such a 
system was channelling credits from the central bank to enterprises. 
Credits for enterprises were planned by the central government. Interest rates for the loans were 
not determined by the credit and capital markets in the context of central bank policy as in the 
western market economies but were also set by the authorities (Barisitz, 2008). Enterprises had 
to open their bank accounts in the regional branches where they were located. All transactions 
between enterprises and the state and among enterprises themselves had to be carried out through 
these accounts in credit and debit form (cashless) and all enterprises’ cash revenues had to be 
deposited in these accounts. Thus, when the credit was given to an enterprise by the central 
government, it was given as an order to produce and it was mostly cashless. When an enterprise 
                                                          
6 
The division has its roots in the EU influence on economic development and the EU membership perspective for 
the CEE countries, while the CIS countries financial system development remains specific for these countries’ 
situations (Barisitz, 2008; Mitra et al., 2010). 
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produced its ordered output, the output was again centrally collected and redistributed among 
regions (Republics in case of the USSR), and it was usual for this redistribution to be 
disproportional in favour of the centre. This is important for understanding of the central 
government ‘credits’ to the Republics in the former Soviet Union, which were not money but 
orders to produce and cashless.  
The monobank financial system in the soviet bloc countries took the form of interdependent 
functional financial units. This was a one-tier banking system because all the financial activities 
were vertically dependent. There were four main functional units. The central bank was 
responsible for overall control of the financial system and also was a provider of all loans to 
enterprises. Depending on the country, the state banks other than central banks could perform the 
function of a loan provider to enterprises
7
. The bank for foreign trade was engaged in foreign 
exchange transactions under strict rules, facilitating of foreign trade, and managing foreign debt. 
Foreign trade itself was the monopoly of the state. The other financial unit of the system was 
banks dealing with peoples savings.  
The shortcomings of planned economy 
There were shortcomings of the planned economy and monobank system. Within the monobank 
system banks could totally control all the transactions and had a role of supervision of the 
performance of enterprises in accordance with the central plan. The control of the enterprises 
resulted in disciplinary measures, rather than bankruptcy, against those enterprises which did not 
meet the planned output or credit plan. Though these disciplinary measures resulted in 
administrative sanctions, in the end enterprises were provided with new credits under the strong 
condition to fulfil the plan, which led to a soft budget constraint. 
                                                          
7
 In the USSR the specialised banks were created on the bases of the central bank divisions to credit enterprises. 
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Inefficiency of enterprise control resulted in systemic violations of planned output. The real 
amount of output was concealed from authorities as well as needed supplies available in storage. 
The biased information provided by the enterprises to the authorities led to imbalances in the 
planning. Premiums received by the enterprises for their plan fulfilment, which did not match the 
real production output, were spent for goods and services. According to Hayek (1990), the biased 
information between enterprises and central planners and lack of incentives to reveal information 
was the most important cause of underperformance of the planned socialist economies compared 
to the market economies. In turn, Manove (1973) argues that the problem of information in 
planned economies could be seen as delays of information to be incorporated into the central 
planning. For example, the current production may reveal the shortage of a particular input good 
in production of the final good. However, the information of the shortage could be collected and 
updated only for the next production period plan. These imbalances in the planning and non-
price rationing of intermediate goods production led to shortages and delays in the Soviet 
economies.  
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2.3. Reforms of the monobank financial systems  
This part continues a discussion of the financial system developments in the post-soviet 
countries. We review the relationship between liberalisation of the financial sector and economic 
growth. Further we reflect early reforms in transition countries such as beginning of creation of 
two-tier banking systems and proceed with reforms of the financial system after the change of 
political regime. 
2.3.1. Financial sector liberalisation literature survey 
The ultimate goal of financial system reforms is economic development and growth. Theories 
and empirical works advocate positive relationship between financial development and economic 
growth (Levine, 1997). Financial development in turn has a positive association with financial 
liberalisation. Liberalised and deregulated financial system with positive real interest rates would 
stimulate savings and thus there would be more funds for investment, which in turn enhances 
economic growth (McKinnon, 1973), and the growth of industries that relies on external finance 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  
Liberalisation strategy that leads to financial deepening and thus advances economic welfare is 
important (Shaw, 1973).  Although the positive corollary between financial development and 
long-run growth exists, the critical issues such as financial panics and recessions occur (Levine, 
1997). Measures for strengthening regulation of the banking system to prevent boom-bust cycles 
are also advocated in the mainstream economics (Goodhart, 2007). Stiglitz et al (1993) supported 
government intervention in the financial markets in the form of regulatory interventions, 
financial repression, and direct credits. This attitude comes from the point of view of market 
failures.  
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There is no doubt that financial liberalisation in the post-soviet counties needed to be done; the 
challenge is the sequence and the limits of the liberalisation of financial sector. Since, if the 
financial sector remains inadequately supervised, it can become unstable and lead to financial 
crisis. This has never been more apparent than during the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009.  
Banking sector is one of the most important financial intermediation in the world. From 
Schumpeter's (1912) point of view, the banking system has the function of credit creation, which 
makes the banking system the engine of the economy, and by that credit creation function the 
banking system makes the economic growth possible (1912). The Schumpeterian model is a pure 
bank model.  His theory of instability is a business cycle theory, so that there will always be a 
downturn.  When new investments come on stream, the production of new products starts and 
old industries stop producing. This is a creative destruction process, which is good for 
development. This business cycle can be associated with financial crisis. Thus, his position is 
that the financial crisis is a result of the business cycle. Therefore, with a good policy of state 
intervention and regulation and economic performance there will be no crisis but only an 
economic downturn.  
Liberalisation of banking markets should increase the supply and improve the allocation of funds 
for investment. The impact of financial liberalisation on the supply of funds is theoretically 
ambiguous (Leaven, 2003). On the macro level McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) analyse the 
influence of interet rate liberalisation, which is the key component of financial reforms, on 
household savings. They state that under the repressed finance artificially low interest rates 
would increase after liberalisation. Increased interest rates on deposits would raise household 
savings providing more funds available for investment. On the other hand, Van Wijnberger 
(1983) argues that, if time deposits are closer substitutes for existent informal market’s loans 
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than for cash, the impact of an increased deposit rate on the amount of loanable funds should be 
negative given that banks are subject to reverse requirements. Devereux and Smith (1994) 
demonstrate that precautionary savings may decrease due to improved international risk sharing 
as a result of financial liberalisation. Consequently, overall funds available for investments are 
reduced. 
The allocation of funds for investment after financial liberalisation is also theoretically 
ambiguous (Leaven, 2003). Financial reforms should improve the allocative efficiency of 
savings. Interest rate ceilings under the repressed financial systems lead to distortion of credit 
allocation and to underinvestment in risky yet high expected return projects (McKinnon, 1973; 
Shaw, 1973). The liberalisation also alters directed credit programs and thus leads to an increase 
in the pool of funds allocated to risky investment projects because of risk sharing improvement 
(Obsfeld, 1994). Financial liberalisation leads to efficiency gains because financial 
intermediation is increased by the formal financial sector. Banks and capital markets are better in 
allocation of investment funds as a result of economies of scale in information gathering and 
monitoring, which should lead to a reduction of cost of capital (Leaven, 2003). At the same time 
Gertler and Rose (1994) argue that a general rise in interest rates in a number of countries due to 
financial liberalisation led to an increase in the cost of capital for borrowers, reducing efficiency. 
Leaven (2003) empirically found that financial liberalisation in developing countries have been 
inconclusive showing that financial liberalisation increases financial constraints for large firms 
but small firms gains form financial liberalisation. However, a positive correlation between 
financial liberalisation and improvements in allocative efficiency of investment was found by 
(Galindo et al., 2002), although not for all countries.  
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Financial reforms for the whole financial sector advocated by the mainstream economics include 
liberalisation of domestic finance and trade, and liberalisation of capital account and exchange 
rates. However, there is no consensus about capital account liberalisation. The sequencing 
approach propagates deliberate and gradual liberalisation of capital account after domestic 
financial sector is restructured and made “sound”. On the other hand, further capital controls 
have many proponents such as Stiglitz (1993), Rodrik and Subramanyan (2009), and 
Eichengreen and Adalet (2005).  
Potential benefits of capital controls are as follows.  Capital controls can dampen boom-bust-
cycles of capital flows, prevent financial crises, support intermediate exchange rate regime with 
stable but adjustable exchange rate, enable more monetary policy autonomy, and lower country 
risk premium. Capital controls can protect weak financial sector, buy time for gradual 
improvements, which is characterised as ‘third line’ of financial sector defence, while the first 
protection line is when banks protect themselves, and the second line is prudential supervision 
and regulation (Priewe and Herr, 2005). According to Priewe and Herr (2005) other policies such 
as prudential regulation and supervision of financial sector such as full hedging of external debt, 
rapid financial sector reforms especially quick cleaning of balance sheets, or foreign exchange 
reserves to safeguard exchange rate stability are unable to substitute for capital controls.  
Although there are potential disadvantages of capital controls, nevertheless macro level benefits 
offset downsides. They offer a scheme of sequencing of capital controls and capital account 
liberalisation. There should be in place preconditions for full capital account liberalisation such 
as macroeconomic stability, trade liberalisation, full convertibility of currency, domestic 
financial liberalisation, ‘sound banking’ (which includes capital adequacy requirements, prudent 
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supervision and regulation, disposal of bad loans, good auditing standards, etc.), privatisation of 
majority of banks and international taxation agreements.  
The McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) gave start for theoretical and empirical works on 
financial liberalisation by their seminal work. According to Fry (1989) several developing 
countries adopted the McKinnon-Show approach of financial liberalisation. The lessons of 
reforms showed that the theoretical frame is lack of important prerequisites for successful 
financial liberalisation such as macroeconomic stability and adequate prudential regulation and 
supervision of the banks. It is admitted by McKinnon (1986) that successful liberalisation is not 
simply a question of removing all regulations. Fry (1989) concluded that price stability, fiscal 
discipline and policy credibility were the key factors that led to Asian successes in financial 
liberalisation; at least four prerequisites should be in place for success: “macroeconomic 
stability, fiscal discipline, improved legal, accounting and regulatory systems for the financial 
sector, and a tax system that does not discriminate excessively against finance”.  
2.3.2. Early reforms in transition countries: creation of two-tier 
banking systems  
2.3.2.1. Reforms in the CEE countries  
The awareness of existing problems in Soviet economies led to a number of reforms of finance in 
the soviet bloc countries. Barisitz (2008) gives an overview of reforms in different post-soviet 
countries, which we incorporate into our theme. Reforms were introduced in East Germany in 
1963 following reform recommendations by Liberman Y. The reforms of 1967-68 in 
Czechoslovakia were stopped by invasion of armed forces of the Warsaw Pact in August 1968. 
Economic reforms in Hungary known as the “New Economic Mechanism” were introduced in 
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1968. All these reforms were partial and some of them were cancelled in the late 1970s. The only 
banking system which differed from other planned economies was the Hungarian system. Banks 
could select their clients though based on the central government planned goals. Another country 
which differed by its quasi-market orientation was Yugoslavia, which diverted from planned 
economy in the 1950s. However, the central government had different means to exercise control 
over enterprises and banks in exchange for protection from bankruptcy and competition. Further 
reforms attempting to decentralise the banking system were undertaken in the 1980s. Hungary 
decentralised its banking system in 1987 and Poland did so in 1989.  
The main feature of the reforms was creation of a two-tier banking system. This process took the 
form of changes in legislation of the central bank and the financial sector regulation. It permitted 
the separation of commercial banking from the central monetary authorities and brought 
commercial banks under the jurisdiction of special financial institutions still owned by the state. 
The central banks continued to be in charge of the planned financing in some of the soviet 
countries while in others the central banks mainly became responsible for monetary policy and 
supervision of the banking sector.  
2.3.2.2. Reforms of the financial sector of the USSR 
The financial system, which was formed in the beginning of the Soviet state, remained as a 
“standard system” for the further existence of the Soviet Union (Garvy, 1977)8 although some 
reforms were undertaken in the period before the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
                                                          
8 
George Garvy was a vice president and senior adviser of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. He produced the 
scientific analysis of the Soviet financial system. His work “Money, financial flows, and credit in the Soviet Union” 
of 1977 represents the Soviet credit and banking system of the USSR and is based mainly on the sources from the 
Soviet Union. 
26 
 
In 1965 reforms of the financial system in the Soviet Union were led by Alexei Kosygin – the 
Prime Minister of the USSR. Central financial planning was not completely removed but 
enterprises were given more freedom in managing their finance and working capital. The 
banking system was not changed but its role in channelling finances to the enterprises was 
increased (Garvy, 1977). However, the stagnation of the economy in the Soviet Union continued 
and partial reforms could not resolve all the problems. This led to the next wave of reforms in the 
Soviet Union’s financial system.   
The Soviet Union started reforms of the banking system during ‘perestroika’ led by M. 
Gorbachev in 1987. By the Decree of July 17th 1987
9
, the government of the USSR started 
reformation of the banking system in order to improve the economic situation in the country. The 
USSR financial system was represented by three nation-wide state owned banks: Gosbank of the 
USSR (the State Bank of the USSR), Vneshtorgbank (Foreign trade bank) and Stroybank 
(Construction bank) of the USSR. The main goal of the banking system reforms were 
transformation of banks onto a commercial basis and creation of a two-tier banking system.  
Six banks as specialized institutions were formed on the basis of the three state owned banks. 
Gosbank of the USSR – State Bank of the USSR – was still responsible for overall control of the 
financial system. Promstroibank of the USSR – Industrial Construction Bank of the USSR was 
giving credits to industries, construction, communications and transport sector. 
Vnesheconombank of the USSR – the Bank of Foreign Economic Activity of the USSR, which 
was formed out of the Vneshtorgbank, served transactions in foreign currency and was given 
more functions later on. Agroprombank of the USSR – Agricultural Industry Bank of the USSR 
                                                          
9The Decree Number 821 of July 17th 1987 “On development of the banking system in the country and 
strengthening of their influence on the increasing of the economic effectiveness” 
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was specialised in giving loans to the agricultural sector, including collective farms (kolkhoz) 
and soviet farms (sovkhoz). Zhilstroibank of the USSR – Housing Construction Bank of the 
USSR gave credits to the housebuilding sector, trade and light industry. Sberbank of the USSR – 
Saving Bank of the USSR was formed out of the people’s savings, which were put in the state 
saving branches all over the country (Barisitz, 2008). But still those banks served mainly as 
channels for distribution of direct credits. 
An element of the market relations introduced in the mechanism of the banking system of the 
soviet countries was the permission to open private banks. Many smaller commercial banks were 
created, which represented the elements of market economy in the financial system of the USSR. 
One of the examples was the first of its kind cooperative bank in the USSR founded in Chimkent 
city (South Kazakhstan) in 1988.  The reformation of the financial system led to an increase in 
the number of banks and their specialisation.   
2.3.3. Reforms of the financial system after the change of political 
regime 
Transition of the financial sector in the CIS and CEE countries after changes of the political 
regimes was swift and incisive, taking into account dramatic changes in socio-economic 
structures in those countries. The transition of the banking system took place in an environment 
of economic turmoil. The recession of the transition period and breaking of trade ties both within 
the post-soviet bloc among member-countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
and among former Soviet Republics of the USSR, badly influenced banking as well.  
According to Baristitz (2008), there were two main reform stages in the CEE and CIS countries 
during the first decade of transition in the 1990s. The first reform wave was characterised by 
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restructuring banking systems from the soviet monobank system to a two-tier banking system, 
from planned credits and price control to price liberalisation and market based selection of 
banks’ clients.   
The banking sector in the CEE and CIS countries followed a more or less similar path till the 
mid-1990s. The structural reforms of the economic institutions did not achieve the critical mass 
needed for macro stabilisation except in Hungary and Poland.  The financial sectors were still 
underdeveloped. 
In the beginning of 1990s, banking sectors also inherited poor performing loans to enterprises, 
which were not viable or solvent, and could not trade their products and did not pay their debts. 
This in turn exacerbated solvency problem of incumbent banking firms. Although, there were no 
longer centrally determined credit plans that banks had to follow, banks had no expertise and no 
experience in market-oriented skills and corporate governance. Banking regulation was very 
loose and underdeveloped, even didn’t exist in some areas. This regulatory environment allowed 
the easy creation of private banks, which increased considerably in number during this period. 
Moreover, the underdeveloped legal framework for the financial sector increased opportunities 
for corruption, fraud and insider lending in the financial sector (Heffernan, 2005) .In fact, 
financial institutions in transition countries did not perform the functions of banks as they do in a 
market economy, but functioned as “pocket banks” or “agent banks” for their owners or firms. 
Banks were managing and making transactions with their owners’ wealth. They were mostly 
small, sometimes owned by the state-owned enterprises, state agencies or by specialised banks 
(Tompson, 2004). Thus, the financial systems of the soviet countries during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, represented a mixture of the state commercial banks under weak regulation, private 
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banks pursuing their own goals, and central banks in some cases still responsible for central 
planning transactions.  
However, the measures of the first wave did not get rid of all the features of the soviet financial 
system such as refinancing of state owned enterprises, favoured projects or the government 
interference (Barisitz, 2008). These features are characterised as soft budget constraints in 
economic literature (See Kornai, 1979, 1980, 1986).  
High inflationary pressure, slow structural transformation and accumulation of bad loans in these 
countries together with external shocks because of broken links between countries during the 
first transition period, resulted in financial crises in some of the countries and in the permanent 
threat of financial breakdown in the others. This led to the second wave of financial sector 
reforms in these countries. Many small banks went bankrupt first, but at least one large financial 
institution went bankrupt in each of the countries. The reduction of the number of the financial 
institutions increased confidence in the sector as it showed that the times of ‘wild capitalism’ in 
the financial sector had gone.  This was the main period in which privatisation of the local banks 
in the Eastern Europe took place, with foreign banks taking big stakes. It changed banking in 
those countries and linked them to the Western European banks in the EU.  
The following consolidation of financial institutions in the end of 1990s, which had increased in 
numbers because of the high profit opportunities, by tightening of monetary policy and 
introduction of rules for banks, did not lead to the abolition of directed credits or state owned 
banks, which dominated the financial sector.   
The triggers to the banking reforms of the second wave in Russia and Bulgaria were the financial 
crises of 1998 and 1996-1997 respectively, which were the most severe among the post-soviet 
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countries. Other countries such as Belarus, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia and 
Ukraine also had financial crises though less severe. The main consequences of the crises were 
that financial sectors were more strictly supervised, although financial institutions began to hold 
a larger proportion of their assets in safe government securities and as deposits with the 
monetary authorities. This is not true for Belarus as the command regime and directed credits 
remained in this country. It is also not fully true for Russia. The crisis of 1998 in Russia was due 
to the state’s default on its debt to its creditors including banks. 
The two reform waves are common to most of the post-soviet countries except Poland and 
Kazakhstan, where the changes and reforms were continuous; and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia
10
 where the reforms started to take place later in the 2000s after a series of wars and 
when more pro-reform governments came to power.  
Among CEE countries Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovak republic were the leaders in 
economic and financial reforms. The acceptance of the Central European countries into the EU 
accelerated their reforms in the financial sector. The acceptance of the former USSR Baltic states 
into the EU also accelerated the financial sector integration; the countries experienced both the 
good and bad sides of this integration.  
To sum up the above, those countries which were closer to Western Europe and started their 
reforms of the financial sector prior to the transition of political regimes, that is the CEE 
countries, were earlier and to some extent more successful in their financial institutions 
                                                          
10 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was formed in February 1992 in the place of former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. The FRY consisted of Serbia (including Kosovo and Vojvodino) and Montenegro. The 
FRY was transformed to the more loose state union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. After referendum on 
independence of Montenegro on May 21, 2006, its independence was recognised internationally by Serbia, EU 
members, and United Nations Security Council. 
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transformation than the CIS countries (Barisitz , 2008). But the financial crisis of 2007-2009 
covered all the transition countries because of almost similar causes although on different scales. 
The developments in the CISs banking sectors, which represent two-tire banking systems, are 
analysed in the following section. 
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2.4. The CISs’ banking sectors  
2.4.1. General developments in the CISs banking systems 
During the transition the CISs national financial systems were recreated. The banking system in 
the Soviet Union was not only segmented functionally as was described above, moreover it was 
centralised in Moscow. After the break down of the single system, financial systems of the CISs 
were created from scratch. In this regard the financial systems of the CISs have structural 
similarities but also have some differences in terms of the scale and maturity of the key 
segments.  
The divergence in the development of financial sectors of the CIS countries started after the 
demise of the Soviet Union. Although the financial system was the same in all the CIS countries, 
the starting points in terms of economic development for each country were not similar. Because 
financial sector development depends on a sound real sector in transition countries (Barisitz, 
2008) the different economic situation of the real sector in particular countries led to a 
considerable divergence in financial developments.  
The banking sectors of the financial systems of the CIS represent the centre of their financial 
systems as capital markets are underdeveloped or non-existent (Berglof and Bolton, 2002; De 
Nicolo et al., 2003). This is the legacy of the planned economy and the undeveloped institutional 
infrastructure for capital markets.  
Based on the criteria of assets per capita the banking sectors of the CIS counties can be split into 
three groups. Developed banking sectors have 2500 and more US$ per capita on average over 
the period 2007-2014. Banking sectors with medium level of development have between 500 and 
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2500 US$ per capita and less developed banking sectors have no more than 500 US$ per capita 
(Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1: Banking system assets per person, US$, 2007-2014 
 Country/Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 1st half 2014 Average 
by 
country 
Russia 5774.4 6679.2 6815.1 7764.8 9043.7 11383.2 12252.4 12611.6 9040.6 
Kazakhstan 6272.1 6277.9 4840.7 5005.6 5218.5 5479.0 5911.3 5477.4 5560.3 
Belarus 2091.1 3023.6 3099.5 4607.9 3253.8 3922.6 4361.5 4467.3 3603.4 
Ukraine 2552.0 2732.5 2392.9 2579.0 2888.0 3092.6 3515.1 2169.2 2740.1 
Azerbaijan 927.2 1463.6 1623.4 1839.7 1976.4 2417.9 2759.4 2862.9 1983.8 
Armenia 826.1 1121.4 1182.2 1448.3 1807.3 2061.9 2438.0 2401.8 1660.9 
Moldova 789.8 1053.7 910.1 977.2 1143.8 1357.8 1639.6 1602.7 1184.4 
Uzbekistan 267.6 316.8 373.6 442.7 513.2 605.1 659.1 674.1 481.5 
Kyrgyzstan 224.9 261.9 100.7 228.3 260.4 303.0 392.5 404.9 272.1 
Tajikistan 229.9 245.4 150.5 203.5 244.7 276.0 322.9 303.0 247.0 
Average by 
year 
4049.1 4617.8 4528.3 5125.3 5815.8 7130.2 7706.6 7635.3 
  
Source: World Bank- Total Population (in number of people), Banks of the CISs (2008 - 2014), in Russian, own 
calculation 
The most developed banking systems based on the above criteria are in Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Ukraine and Belorussia. The banking systems of these countries share some common features. 
Firstly, development of assets and volume in the banking systems make it possible to service 
large national clients. Second, there is diversified retail banking for domestic consumers. 
Thirdly, the main part in these countries is played by state or foreign banks, although there are 
large non-state national banks as well.  
The banking sectors with a medium level of development are in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova 
and Uzbekistan. Banking sectors in these countries are quite developed in spite of the size of the 
economies. Azerbaijan’s banking system benefits from the high trust placed in the banking sector 
by the population and the high GDP growth that can increase the position of Azerbaijani banking 
sector among the CIS countries. The Armenian banking sector lacks domestic resources and will 
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not grow much, remaining an importer of capital. The banking system of Moldova benefits from 
the trust of the population and the introduction of international standards. The banking sector of 
Uzbekistan has similarities with the Belorussian banking sector, where the direct influence of the 
government on the banking sector persists. 
And the weakest banking sectors in the CIS are in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The small 
population and economic size as well as low trust in the banking sectors will leave these 
countries’ banking sectors with little growth.   
2.4.2. Financial crisis of 2007-2009 
As is well-known, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 started as the subprime crisis in the US, 
which stopped investors’ capital inflow and threatened a collapse of the dollar (Eichengreen, 
2009; Wolf, 2009). The financial crises in the USA became a global financial crisis and touched 
financial sectors of transition countries as well. The crisis from developed economies was 
transmitted to transition countries through the channels of exclusion from international financial 
markets resources, external debt due for payment and decrease of trade volumes and remittances.  
The transition countries became financially integrated into the world finance and this made it 
possible for banks to borrow abroad and caused credit booms domestically, which were 
characterised as extensive credit growth (Mitra et al 2010). The credit growth was also possible 
due to insufficient regulation and supervision in the transition countries. The credit growth was 
of two kinds: wholesale finance on the world markets and western banks credits. For 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine the source was wholesale funding for banks as credits raised on 
world markets. 
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Before the crises the CISs banking sectors experienced a high rate of growth. The annual growth 
of total assets in banking sectors from 2006 to 2007, calculated as total assets of ten largest banks 
in each country, was more than 50% and credits grew by 72%
11
. The credit growth was possible 
because there was both demand and supply for it. The demand side for the transition countries 
depended on increased consumption by households to catch up with the Western standards. The 
source of supply was different in different countries. Supply of credits in the CIS countries had 
its growth rate peak in 2006 (88.6%). 
The crisis caused the banking sector’s growth slowdown or even negative growth rates in some 
of the countries. The crisis caused the most severe damage to the banking sectors of Russia 
(12.1% of reduction of banking sector’s assets growth), Kazakhstan (21%), Ukraine (12.8%) and 
Moldova (13.7%). Banks experienced a liquidity crunch as they couldn’t refinance borrowing 
from international markets. The after crisis consequences were a decrease in lending to 
households and enterprises by the banking sector, an increase in interest rates and a deterioration 
of banks' portfolios as bad loans increased by two to three times (in Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Moldova and Ukraine) (Mitra et al., 2010). However, resource rich countries such as Kazakhstan 
and Russia had more space for rescuing the banking systems due to stabilisation funds formed in 
those countries.  
Thus, for the CIS countries, in order to limit the risks of crisis transfer from the world financial 
markets, measures such as capital account control and prudential regulation, would promote the 
strength of financial institutions and should lessen the risk of crisis transmission through 
appropriate monetary and fiscal policy (Mitra et al 2010). 
                                                          
11
 Please, see Appendix A, Table A.1 
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2.4.3. CISs’ banking sectors in figures, 2005-2014 
As was mentioned above, before the 2007-2009 world financial crisis the banking sectors of the 
CISs had a very rapid growth (2005-2007). The banking credits as a share of GDP significantly 
increased in all the countries. The growth rates of the banking sectors of the CISs were higher 
than the GDP growths of those countries (Figure 2.1and 2.2). Though the crisis led to the decline 
of this ratio, the general progress is still obvious.   
Figure 2.1: Banks’ credits to GDP, 2005-2011 (%) 
 
Source: World Bank, Financial Development and Structure Dataset (updated Nov. 2013) 
Azerbaijan’s banking sector had the highest growth rate among the CIS countries. The absolute 
growth of bank credit was fastest in Azerbaijan, if we take into account the GDP growth rate, 
which grew faster than in other CIS countries (the annual growth rate of GDP was 34% in 2007, 
Figure). The Ukrainian banking sector was growing fast against moderate GDP growth and 
placed itself among the leaders of the banking sectors of the CISs by the banks’ credits to GDP 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Armenia 6.92 7.76 10.28 15.05 22.06 24.73 29.9
Azerbaijan 7.9 8.88 10.87 13.18 17.87 16.67 16.5
Belarus 13.03 15.98 19.4 22.44 30.97 35.69 33.19
Kazakhstan 27.58 36.85 47.71 48.26 50.6 41.05 34.87
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Moldova 20.76 23.66 29.46 34.47 36.32 32.12 31.59
Russian Federation 22.55 26 31.49 35.7 44.94 40.66 40.8
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indicator. The banks credit to GDP ratio was 44.19%, which was the second for the CISs after 
Kazakhstan for the period 2005-2007. After the economic growth slow down, this indicator was 
76.66% not least because of the GDP growth drop in Ukraine. 
The indicator was the highest before the crisis for Kazakhstan and peaked at 47.71% in 2007. 
The indicator increased to 48.26% and 50.6% in 2008-2009 respectively, mainly because of the 
decrease in the GDP. Although the financial crisis led to the decrease in the credit share of GDP 
indicator, this ratio stays high comparative to other countries’ indicators.    
The world financial crisis 2007-2009 caused a decline in banking sector growth in the CISs. 
Moldova, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were the most vulnerable to the crisis among relatively 
Figure 2.2: GDP growth by country (left) and regional average by year (right), % 
 
  
Source: World Bank, Financial Development and 
Structure Dataset (updated 01/07/2015) 
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developed banking systems in the CISs, where banks assets decreased substantially by 9.8%, 
22.7% and 6.5% in 2009 respectively
12
. Crisis caused a decrease in loan issues to enterprises and 
individuals and a deterioration of portfolio quality. Average for the CISs countries total assets 
and credits and their growth rates of 10 largest banks in each country are presented in Figure 2.3; 
this shows a dramatic drop in assets’ and credit growth rates in the region during the crisis. 
However, CISs banks were not participating in trading ‘toxic’ bonds, which led to less losses 
compared to the Western financial institutions.   
After the crisis 2007-2009 the CISs banking sectors slowly turned to a recovery trajectory. 
Nevertheless, the growth rates of the banking sectors are much lower than before the crisis, as is 
shown in the Figure 2.4 for the 2007-2014 period; a sharp decline in assets and equity growth 
during the crisis reversed in 2010, though the growth was unstable. While Uzbekistan’s assets  
Figure 2.3: Average assets and credits, bln. US$ (left) and their growth rate (right), 2005-
2009 
  
Source: Informational and analytical bulletin: Banking systems of the Commonwealth 2005-2009, Financial  
and banking council of the CISs, 2010. In Russian, own calculations 
and equity growths (to previous year) stayed almost unchanged during the crisis years and 
immediately after that, assets and equity growths remained negative in 2010 and in 2011 
                                                          
12 
For data tables for the period before crisis from 2005-2009 by country see Appendix A, Table A1, Panel C.  
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respectively for Kazakhstan and Belarus. The regional asset growth slowed down after the crisis 
but stayed in positive numbers. However, the equity growth remained unstable after the crisis, 
althogh the growth went to positive numbers for most of the countries in 2012-2013. While the 
growth returned negative in the first half of the year 2014, these are not data for the whole year 
(See tables with breakdown of assets and equity and their growth rates by country in Appendix 
A, Table A2).   
Overall, although the growth rates of total assets and equity slowed down, they continued to 
increase in absolute terms. However, the data indicate that in some countries national markets 
almost exhausted their extensive growth opportunities for national banks. Banks started to look 
for other markets to grow. Kazakh and Russian banks began their expansion into the CIS 
countries from about mid-2000s and 2010 respectively. We will discuss intraregional integration 
of the CISs banking systems later in this chapter.  
Figure 2.4: Total assets and equity in the region: amount in mln. (left), growth rate % 
(right) 
 
Source: Banks of the CISs (2008 - 2014), in Russian, own calculations 
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Financial intermediation 
The banking sectors even in the countries with the most developed banking sectors of the CIS 
remain underdeveloped. Table 2.2 summarises the financial intermediation indicators of the CIS 
countries at the beginning of 2014, which permits comparisons of financial development and 
depth of financial intermediation across countries. The ratio of total assets of the banking sector 
to GDP is still less than in the developed market economies. On regional average it is about 56% 
of GDP. While the ratio is about 91% of GDP in Ukraine (mostly due to the drop in Ukrainian 
GDP) and 84% in Russia, which have more advanced banking sectors than the rest of the CIS, 
this ratio is slightly more than 30% in less developed banking sectors of the CISs.  Next to 
Ukraine and Russia the highest assets to GDP ratio are in Moldova (75.5%) and Armenia 
(67.4%) and the lowest in the region belongs to Tajikistan (31.2%).  Taking into account that the  
Table 2.2: Financial intermediation indicators by country, as of 01.01.2014 
Countries  GDP, mln US$ Assets/GDP Credits/GDP Deposits/GDP Capital/GDP 
Russia 2,194,346.1 86.0 48.6 48.4 10.6 
Kazakhstan  223,234.2 45.7 38.4 28.1 6.0 
Ukraine 175,000.0 91.4 65.1 47.8 13.8 
Azerbaijan 79,008.8 32.9 22.9 14.3 5.5 
Belarus 71,214.0 58.0 39.0 32.7 8.1 
Uzbekistan 41,238.9 48.3 29.2 28.7 7.2 
Armenia 10,764.0 67.4 41.1 35.7 10.4 
Tajikistan 8,488.4 31.2 17.0 65.0 30.5 
Moldova 7,725.5 75.5 40.7 47.2 11.3 
Kyrgyzstan 7,115.8 31.5 15.5 19.2 5.3 
Average for the region 281,813.6 56.8 35.7 36.7 10.9 
Source:  Banks of the CISs (2014), in Russian, own calculations   
GDP of Armenia and Ukraine dropped by more than 14% in 2009 and the GDP growth was slow 
after the crisis 2007-2009; the next countries, which have higher ratio, are Uzbekistan (48.3%) 
and Kazakhstan (45.7%). Nevertheless, the indicator is significantly lower than for developed 
countries, where it is over 100%. The other indicator of the financial depth of the banking sector 
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is the bank credits to GDP ratio, which is about 36% for the region. The banking sector credits 
relative to GDP ratio was higher in Ukraine (65.1%), Russia (48.6%), Armenia (41.1%) and 
Moldova (40.7%). However, again because of the drop in the GDP of Ukraine and Armenia, 
these places are taken by Belarus (39%) and Kazakhstan (38.4%).  The deposits to GDP ratio is 
37% for the region. The highest ratio is in Tajikistan (65%), which is a surprise as the country is 
one of the poorest among the CISs, and lowest ratio is in Azerbaijan (14.3%). This indicator is 
relatively high in Russia (48.4%), Ukraine (47.8%) and Moldova (47.2%). In developed and rich 
countries the deposits usually exceed 100% of GDP. The last illustrative ratio used here is the 
share of total banking capital in GDP. Regional average number is 10.9%. Again the highest 
indicator is for Tajikistan (30.5%), next are Ukraine (13.8%), Moldova (11.3%) and Russia 
(10.6%). The lowest ratio has Kyrgyzstan (5.3%). Overall, the indicators of financial 
intermediation are still lower than in developed countries. 
The sustainable growth of banking sector and its intermediation functions are curtailed for 
reasons, which are common to many of the CIS countries. To name the main factors, there are 
the lack of domestic funds, insufficient regulation and supervision and inefficient management of 
banks. At the same time access to the world finance may be associated with the risks of financial 
crisis like the recent one; regulation and supervision of banking sector should be tuned so as not 
to suffocate competition and growth, and to enhance efficiency of banks. The development of the 
banking systems in the CISs depends on how the above mentioned problems will be addressed 
by financial system authorities and policy makers in these countries.   
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Number of commercial banks in the CIS region  
On 01 January 2014 there were 1,212 commercial banks active in the CIS countries, compared 
with 1,252 on 01 January 2013, a net decrease of 40 units (-3.2%). In relative terms, the decrease 
was noticeable in Russia (-4.1%), Ukraine (-3.9%) and Uzbekistan (-3.7%). In absolute terms, 
Russia (-35) and Ukraine (-7) contributed to the net decrease, while there has been an increase in 
the number of banks in Tajikistan by 1 bank (6.3%) and Kyrgyzstan  by 2 banks (9.1%) (Figure 
2.5 and Table 2.3, Panel A, B, C), which shows the growing capacity of the financial systems in 
these countries.   
Considerable reduction in the number of banks in the CISs took place during the crisis years 
2009 (-74) and 2010 (-56) over the region. The total number of financial institutions in the CISs 
continued declining after the crisis 2007-2009 and the reduction reached -194 in absolute terms 
or -13.8% in 2014 compared with the number of banks in 2009.  
Figure 2.5: Number and percentage changes of banks in the CISs 
  
Source: Banks of the CISs (2008 - 2014), in Russian, own calculations 
Compared with the situation on 01 January 2007 before the world financial crisis, when there 
were 1,492 banks in the CISs, there has been a net decrease of 280 banks (-18.8%) by 2014, 
despite some additions of banks during the period (15 banks) in the region. In relative terms, the 
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Table 2.3: Banks in the CISs: 2007-2014 
Panel A: Number of active banks                
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Russia 1,092 1,058 1,007 955 922 897 859 824 
Ukraine 173 184 182 176 176 176 180 173 
Kazakhstan 35 37 38 39 38 38 38 38 
Belarus 27 31 31 31 31 32 31 31 
Azerbaijan 46 46 46 45 44 43 43 43 
Uzbekistan 29 30 30 32 30 29 27 26 
Moldova 16 16 15 15 15 14 14 14 
Armenia 22 22 22 21 21 22 22 22 
Tajikistan 11 12 13 14 15 16 16 17 
Kyrgyzstan 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 24 
Total by year 1,492 1,480 1,406 1,350 1,314 1,289 1,252 1,212 
Panel B: Change in units of banks 
  Year to year  
Over the 
period 
Before the crisis After the crisis  
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2007-2014 2007-2009 2009-2014 
Russia -34 -51 -52 -33 -25 -38 -35 -268 -85 -183 
Ukraine 11 -2 -6 0 0 4 -7 0 9 -9 
Kazakhstan 2 1 1 -1 0 0 0 3 3 0 
Belarus 4 0 0 0 1 -1 0 4 4 0 
Azerbaijan 0 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 -3 0 -3 
Uzbekistan 1 0 2 -2 -1 -2 -1 -3 1 -4 
Moldova 0 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 -2 -1 -1 
Armenia 0 0 -1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Tajikistan 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 6 2 4 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 
Total by year -12 -74 -56 -36 -25 -37 -40 -280 -86 -194 
Panel A: Percentage change in number of banks, % 
Year to year  
Over the 
period 
Before the crisis After the crisis  
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2007-2014 2007-2009 2009-2014 
Russia -3.1 -4.8 -5.2 -3.5 -2.7 -4.2 -4.1 -24.5 -7.8 -18.2 
Ukraine 6.4 -1.1 -3.3 0 0 2.3 -3.9 0 5.2 -4.9 
Kazakhstan 5.7 2.7 2.6 -2.6 0 0 0 8.6 8.6 0 
Belarus 14.8 0 0 0 3.2 -3.1 0 14.8 14.8 0 
Azerbaijan 0 0 -2.2 -2.2 -2.3 0 0 -6.5 0 -6.5 
Uzbekistan 3.4 0 6.7 -6.3 -3.3 -6.9 -3.7 -10.3 3.4 -13.3 
Moldova 0 -6.3 0 0 -6.7 0 0 -12.5 -6.3 -6.7 
Armenia 0 0 -4.5 0 4.8 0 0 0 0 0 
Tajikistan 9.1 8.3 7.7 7.1 6.7 0 6.3 54.5 18.2 30.8 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.1 9.1 0 9.1 
Change in the CISs -0.8 -5 -4 -2.7 -1.9 -2.9 -3.2 -18.8 -5.8 -13.8 
Source: Banks of the CISs (2008 - 2014), in Russian   
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number of banks has decreased mostly in Russia (-24.5%), Moldova (-12.5%) and Uzbekistan 
(10.3%) over the whole period. In absolute terms, Russia (-268), Azerbaijan (-3) and Uzbekistan 
(-3) contributed to the net decrease, while there has been an increase in Tajikistan (6) and 
Belarus (3).  
Overall, there is a tendency to banking sector consolidation in the region via mergers and 
acquisitions or reorganisation of some banks into other monetary financial institutions. This 
tendency is supported by financial authorities in some countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan 
and Russia. 
Foreign banks 
On 01 January 2014 there were 134 units of non-domestic banks with the foreign ownership 
share more than 50% resident in the CIS countries including banks originating in other CIS 
countries. These banks accounted for 11.1% of all CIS countries banks. 75 of these banks 
(28.9%) were located in Russia. Armenia, Tajikistan and Belarus had the largest number of 
foreign banks as a proportion of the total number of banks, at 68.2%, 29.4% and 25.8% 
respectively. For these three countries, the head offices of the majority of foreign banks were 
located in another CIS country.  
Overall, the number of foreign banks with >50% ownership has declined after the crisis from 139 
units in 2010 to 134 units in 2014 (Table 2.4, Panel A; Figure 2.6) although their share increased 
from 10.3% to 11.1% (Table 2.4, Panel C).  The same tendency is seen for all banks with foreign 
ownership participation regardless of their share in capital (Table 2.4, Panel B; Figure 2.6). This  
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Table 2.4: Foreign banks in the CISs, including banks from other CISs countries 
Panel A: Number of foreign banks 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 1st half of 2014 
  All >50% All >50% All >50% All >50% All >50% All >50% All >50% 
Russia 221 76 226 82 220 80 230 77 244 73 251 76 238 75 
Ukraine 53 17 51 18 55 20 53 22 53 22 49 19 51 19 
Kazakhstan 18 … 18 … 18 … 18 … 19 … 17 … 17   
Belarus 20 14 22 14 23 14 23 14 23 8 22 8 22 8 
Azerbaijan 23 7 23 7 23 7 23 7 22 6 22 7 22 7 
Uzbekistan 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 … 4 … 5 … 
Moldova … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 
Armenia 21 … 20 13 21 13 21 13 20 15 20 15 19 15 
Tajikistan … … 12 3 13 4 13 5 14 6 14 5 13 5 
Kyrgyzstan … … … … … … … … 10 5 10 5 10 5 
Total 361 115 377 138 378 139 386 139 410 135 409 135 397 134 
Panel B: Share of total amount of foreign banks in banking sectors of the CISs, % 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Russia 20.9 22.4 23.0 24.9 27.2 29.2 28.9 
Ukraine 28.8 28.0 31.3 30.1 30.1 27.2 29.5 
Kazakhstan 48.6 47.4 46.2 47.4 50.0 44.7 44.7 
Belarus 64.5 71.0 74.2 74.2 71.9 71.0 71.0 
Azerbaijan 50.0 50.0 51.1 52.3 51.2 51.2 51.2 
Uzbekistan 16.7 16.7 15.6 16.7 17.2 14.8 19.2 
Moldova ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Armenia 95.5 90.9 100.0 100.0 90.9 90.9 86.4 
Tajikistan ... 92.3 92.9 86.7 87.5 87.5 76.5 
Kyrgyzstan ... ... ... ... 45.5 45.5 41.7 
Total in the CISs 24.4 26.8 28.0 29.4 31.8 32.7 32.8 
Panel B: Share of foreign banks with >50% ownership in banking sectors of the CISs, % 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Russia 7.2 8.1 8.4 8.4 8.1 8.8 9.1 
Ukraine 9.2 9.9 11.4 12.5 12.5 10.6 11.0 
Kazakhstan ... ... ... ... ... ... 0.0 
Belarus 45.2 45.2 45.2 45.2 25.0 25.8 25.8 
Azerbaijan 15.2 15.2 15.6 15.9 14.0 16.3 16.3 
Uzbekistan 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.3 ... ... ... 
Moldova ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Armenia ... 59.1 61.9 61.9 68.2 68.2 68.2 
Tajikistan ... 23.1 28.6 33.3 37.5 31.3 29.4 
Kyrgyzstan ... ... ... ... 22.7 22.7 20.8 
Total in the CISs 7.8 9.8 10.3 10.6 10.5 10.8 11.1 
Source: Banks of the CISs (2008 - 2014), in Russian, own calculations 
tendency is due to the pace of domestic financial institutions consolidation, which exceeds 
changes in foreign ownership.  
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Figure 2.6: Number of foreign banks in the CISs 
 
Source: Banks of the CISs (2008 - 2014), in Russian, own calculations  
Ownership 
There are considerable differences in the ownership structure among the banking sectors of the 
CIS countries. The analysis is based on the share of foreign assets in the banking systems of the 
CISs countries, which were presented in the analytical bulletin ‘Banking systems of the CISs-
2012’ (2012) issued in Russian. For some countries the data on foreign banks’ share in the total 
banking capital are presented over the period 2009-2014 where available in Table 2.5. The 
highest share of foreign capital as an average over the period 2009-2014 is in Armenia (75.09%) 
and Moldova (74.41%). 
Table 2.5: Share of foreign capital in the banking systems of the CISs, % 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average by 
country 
Ukraine 36.7 35.8 40.6 41.9 39.5 34 38.08 
Belarus 16.96 27.25 24.22 14.54 19.61 19.56 20.36 
Moldova 74.05 77.6 76.96 73.96 71.7 72.2 74.41 
Armenia 70 71.4 78.9 80 75.68 74.6 75.09 
Tajikistan  … 30.8  …  … 28.6 34.4 31.27 
Kyrgyzstan  …    …   36.1 36.5 36.30 
Average by year 49.4 48.6 55.2 52.6 45.2 45.2  
Source: Banks of the CISs (2008 - 2014), in Russian 
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Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan due to oil export revenues could create large national banking 
holdings private and state respectively. However, while Kazakh banks are among leaders of the 
CIS banks, the banks of Azerbaijan do have not enough access to the financial resources, which 
have accumulated in the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan. The only state bank of Azerbaijan 
accounts for 36% of capital of the banking system (Banking systems of the CISs -2012, 2012). 
Ukraine’s banking system is dominated by foreign and private national banks. After the inflow 
of the foreign capital into Ukraine in 2005-2008, the process of outflow of foreign capital started 
after the crisis 2008-2010. It was being replaced by Russian and other CIS countries' capital still 
before the outbreak of the armed conflict in 2014 (Table 2.5).  
Armenia and Moldova choose to put emphasis on attracting foreign capital into the banking 
systems due to limited domestic resources. Foreign capital in the Armenian banking system 
amounts to 75.1% and in the Moldovan system 74% (Table 2.5). However, taking into account 
the limits of banking systems funding, the level of the financial intermediation is quite good 
considering credit to GDP ratio, which was 41.1% (Armenia) and 40.7% (Moldova) in 2014, 
which is higher than regional average (See Table 2.2). This also shows a correct choice of 
development strategy for the banking systems in these countries.  
The weakest banking sectors are in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Foreign capital dominates in the 
Kyrgyz banking sector, mainly from Kazakhstan (60%), while in Tajikistan the private domestic 
banks play the main role in the banking sector and foreign capital amounted to 30% in 2012.  
The state banks dominate banking systems in Belarus, Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In 
2013 state-owned banks had quite significant market shares in Turkmenistan (97%), Uzbekistan 
(96%), Belarus (63%) and Russia (55%) (Table 2.6). Russia gave its banks more freedom that 
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helped them to build a strong banking sector. However, market mechanisms have not prevailed 
in other countries in the same way as in Russia. Thus, the role of government is much higher in 
Belorussia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan where banks play the role of agents of the government 
(especially in Turkmenistan).  
Table 2.6: State ownership share in the CISs banking sector, % 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Change in 
pp 2005-
2013 
Armenia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Azerbaijan 58.3 58.3 42.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 -24.3 
Belarus 74.0 74.0 75.2 75.2 79.0 71.0 67.0 65.0 63.0 -11.0 
Kazakhstan 0.5 0.5 0.2 6.0 14.6 18.8 23.1 23.1 20.0 19.5 
Kyrgyzstan 16.0 16.0 4.8 4.8 10.2 10.3 20.3 20.3 20.3 4.3 
Moldova 13.6 13.6 0.0 2.4 2.4 7.4 12.5 12.5 12.5 -1.1 
Russia 46.4 44.7 45.4 46.4 54.6 46.0 52.0 53.0 55.0 8.6 
Tajikistan 4.6 4.6 9.7 10.8 11.9 12.9 14.0 14.0 14.0 9.4 
Turkmenistan 97.1 97.1 97.1 97.1 97.1 97.1 97.1 97.1 97.1 0.0 
Ukraine 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 18.0 18.0 6.0 
Uzbekistan 94.3 94.4 94.5 94.6 80.1 94.9 95.5 95.7 95.9 1.6 
Average by year 37.9 37.7 35.4 35.6 37.2 37.9 39.3 39.3 39.1 1.2 
Source: Barth et al. (2007, 2009, 2013), Banks of the CISs (2010), in Russian 
Among the CISs only Armenia totally privatised formerly state-owned banks and has no state 
ownership in its banking sector. There was a net increase in averaged regional level of state 
ownership from 37.9% in 2005 to 39.1% in 2013 (Table 2.6). While there was a net increase in 
state ownership in Kazakhstan (19.5pp), Tajikistan (9.4pp) and Russia (8.6pp), the state 
ownership share decreased in Azerbaijan (-24.3pp), Belarus (-11.0pp) and Moldova (-1.1pp) for 
the period 2005-2013 (Table 2.6; see also Appendix A, Table A3 for percentage change).  
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Concentration 
As for the concentration ratio of the banking sectors in the CISs over the period from 2005 to 
2013, measured as the share of the total assets of the three largest banks in a country’s banking 
sector, the regional tendency is towards a reduction in this indicator too (Figure 2.7). Over the 
period 2005-2013, concentration ratio dropped by 13.3% for the region. The main contributors to 
this drop were Ukraine (-49.9%), Uzbekistan (-27.4%) and Kazakhstan (-25.9%). There was a 
net increase in concentration in Russia (81.4%) and Tajikistan (0.8%) (See Appendix A, Table 
A4). 
Figure 2.7: Bank concentration ratio, average for the region, 2005-2013, % 
 
Source: World Bank Financial Indicators (August 2014), Bankscope (2015).  
Table 2.7 has the indicator breakdown by country and its averages by year and by country. The 
highest concentration averaged over the period has been in Tajikistan (86.4%), Kyrgyzstan 
(78.9%), Belarus (77.9%) and Uzbekistan (73.9%). The least bank concentration has been in 
Russia (29.9%), Azerbaijan (46.9%) and Moldova (48.1%). The decline in concentration against 
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consolidation process suggests that consolidation has not involved many mergers among very 
large banks.  
Table 2. 7: Three banks concentration ratio by country and year 
Countries/Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
by country 
Armenia 68.5 63.1 57.0 47.8 42.5 42.5 40.1 42.5 56.0 51.1 
Azerbaijan 42.3 40.8 44.7 39.14 39.9 43.6 64.4 57.5 50.0 46.9 
Belarus 84.5 73.5 86.3 81.8 81.9 78.3 78.7 67.9 68.0 77.9 
Kyrgyzstan 80.2 86.3 79.5 83.1 86.3 86.3 70.5 69.3 69.3 78.9 
Kazakhstan 60.7 66.6 62.7 58.0 62.3 58.8 52.6 52.0 45.0 57.6 
Moldova 51.6 51.4 42.2 45.1 46.8 48.0 52.2 52.0 44.0 48.1 
Russia 25.1 22.9 22.2 28.9 29.4 27.7 31.7 34.9 45.7 29.9 
Tajikistan 86.3 86.3 86.3 86.3 86.3 86.3 86.3 86.3 87.0 86.4 
Ukraine 60.1 56.6 51.2 54.2 51.9 55.6 58.0 35.5 30.1 50.4 
Uzbekistan 71.6 76.5 77.2 86.3 82.4 75.7 78.8 65.3 52.0 73.9 
Average by year 63.1 62.4 60.9 61.08 60.9 60.3 61.3 56.3 54.7 60.1 
Source: World Bank Financial Indicators, Bankscope (own calculations). Note: The list of banks by country and 
their ranks by total assets for the beginning of 2014 is in Appendix A, Table A5. 
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2.5. Financial integration in the CISs 
2.5.1. Collapse of the common finance in the CISs 
2.5.1.1. Crisis of the rouble zone 
Before looking at the reintegration processes of finance in the CISs it is useful to consider the 
processes that led to a collapse of the common finance in the region. After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 there was a considerable deterioration of economic links among agents that 
previously operated under the single planned system. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the 
economic and financial disintegration of the rouble zone, of credit and financial relations, and of 
payment and price formation mechanisms among the former Soviet Union countries.  
The Gosbank of the USSR was the sole bank of issue of currency on the territory of the USSR. 
The rouble was the currency of all republics of the USSR. It was 10% in the form of cash other 
money was in the form of correspondent accounts of the enterprises all over the USSR (Krotov, 
2011). The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the disintegration of the rouble zone
13
. 
However, the disintegration of the rouble zone started in 1990, even before the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (Dabrowski, 1995a; 1995b).  
The Declaration on independence of Russian Federation of 12 June 1990 signed by the Russian 
Parliament became the main crack in the disintegration of the USSR. Although it didn’t 
influence the fiscal and monetary policy, it pushed other republics to sign similar declarations of 
independence. That was the first stage of the rouble zone disintegration. 
                                                          
13
 For more details on the rouble zone disintegration see Dabrowski (1993, 1995a, 1995b), Hernandez-Cata (1993), 
Granville and Lushin (1993), IMF (1994). 
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The newly established Central Bank of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (CBRF) 
in December 1990 started to take administrative control over all regional branches of the 
Gosbank of the USSR
14
 in all regions of the Russian Federation. The CBRF offered more liberal 
licensing for commercial banks then the Gosbank of the USSR. That led most of the commercial 
banks to reregister with the CBRF. The CBRF’s autonomous credit emissions for enterprises did 
not follow the instructions of the Gosbank of the USSR. That was a very expansionary monetary 
policy. Similar independent actions took place in fiscal policy, where the Russian Federation 
stopped transfer taxes to the Soviet budget, which started to have huge deficit. The Gosbank 
increased emission of money to finance the deficit, which led to an uncontrolled money supply.   
In November 1990 the CBRF took over the functions of the Gosbank of the USSR including 
emission and exchange rate policy. In between there were political events such as August Coup 
(19–21 August 1991). In September 1991 during the meeting of all republic heads of central 
banks (republics, whish were former members of the USSR) there was an understanding that the 
Gosbank of the USSR should be changed but the meeting led to no agreement on how the system 
should operate.   
However, in November 1991 unilaterally the CBRF was prescribed to take over all the functions 
of the Gosbank of the USSR on running and managing the material and technical base and other 
resources of the Gosbank of the USSR, the network offices, enterprises and organisations till 
January 1
st
 1992 bypassing the interests of other former republics of the USSR (Krotov, 2011).  
On December 8th, 1991 the agreements of the Belavezha Accords signed by Belorussia, Russia 
and Ukraine concerned the dissolution of the USSR and the creation of the CIS. The provision of 
                                                          
14
 The governor of the Gosbank of the USSR and then of the CBRF was V. Geraschenko in 1989-1991 and 1992-
1994. 
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the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federated Republic of 20
th
 December 1991 
ordered to create a commission on liquidation of the Gosbank in twenty four hours and on 
December 20
th
 1991 the Gosbank of the USSR ceased to be. The second stage of the rouble zone 
collapse started.  
The monopoly of Russia on money issue, which started in the first half of 1992 led to money 
shortage and surrogates in other CIS members.  Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Azerbaijan 
avoided the restrictions and constraints by issuing surrogates.  
The accrued credit imbalances in favour of the Russian Federation during soviet times from the 
common USSR budget allowed the Russian Federated Republic to build a superior production. 
An adjustment of the accrued imbalances began through increased imports from Russia. The 
‘technical credits’ for importing goods from Russia were given by the CBRF to the national 
central banks of the CISs, which transferred those credits to domestic enterprises to finance their 
imports. This system was preserved as it was profitable for Russian export enterprises and also 
because Russia wanted to retain its influence in the now independent countries.   
In July 1992 the CBRF set limits for ‘technical credits’ and introduced the requirement of daily 
monitoring of the national banks’ correspondence accounts with the CBRF. The result was to 
import from Russia using accounting money. In case of a deficit in correspondent accounts, the 
accounts were balanced by exports from the newly independent states to Russia, in this case the 
delivery brought no payment to the enterprise concerned. At the same time, if technical credit 
limits were exceeded, Russian exports to the countries concerned were refused.  The surpluses on 
bilateral accounts between Russia and the national central banks were not allowed to be used for 
trading with third parties.   
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Rationing of cash delivery to the states led to the big shortage of cash and money surrogates. The 
shortage of cash was increased due to cash payments for imports from Russia under the 
conditions of limited ‘technical credits’.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the financial policy of Russia, described above led to the 
second stage of the collapse of the rouble zone in the mid 1992 and then to the final collapse in 
1993.  
In July 1993 the final crash of the rouble zone occurred when Russia started creation of a new 
rouble zone. There were no statements about what was new about it. Old banknotes had to be 
exchanged for new ones and the use of earlier issued notes was prohibited. This was the 
culmination of the money supply deficit in the national states. 
Russia was transferring a certain amount of the new banknotes to other states. Dabrowski states 
that “in essence the leadership of the CBRF wanted to throw the other states of the CIS on their 
knees in order to make them more willing to submit to re-join the rouble area (with new 
banknotes) on the conditions set by the CBRF” (Dabrowski, 1995b). One of the requirements 
was Russia’s demand to deposit 50% of reserves (gold or foreign currency) of the states with the 
Russian central bank. That demand was refused (Rashid, 1994).  
The only remedy left was the introduction of national currencies.  
2.5.1.2. Introduction of national currencies  
The national currencies were introduced by the states spontaneously to overcome the increased 
problems between 1992 and 1993. The countries introduced their currencies on an urgent basis in 
many cases with little understanding of how to do it and experienced hyperinflation, deficits, 
economic slumps, exchange rate turbulence, and huge economic shocks (Bartholdy and Szegvari, 
1993, Rashid, 1994).  Here we consider the case of Kazakhstan, where a national currency was 
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introduced in 1993, as an example. There are some studies that covered the topic. Bartholdy and 
Szegvari analysed economic developments in the CIS countries including the currency 
introduction (Bartholdy and Szegvari, 1993).  
The introduction of currencies in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan was ‘at breakneck 
speed, when the Central Asian countries were squeezed out of the rouble zone’ (Rashid, 1994). 
Uzbekistan left the rouble zone and introduced its own currency, the som, in July 1994.  
The national currency tenge was introduced in the autumn of 1993 in Kazakhstan. The period 
before the introduction of the national currency 1992-1993 led to a liquidity crisis in Kazakhstan 
and introduction of the national currency in 1993 led to further financial crises. There was a 
hyperinflation in the following years. These crises led to even deeper recession in the Kazakh 
economy (Appendix D, Table D2).  
The Decree number 1399 signed by the President ‘On introduction of national currency in the 
Republic of Kazakhstan’ of 12th November 1993 held that the national currency – the tenge – 
should be introduced into circulation on 15
th
 November 1993 at 08.00 of local time. Since 18
th
 
November 1993 the tenge should be the only legal means of payment. The tenge must be 
accepted in all types of payments by all natural persons and legal entities disregarding the form 
of ownership as well as by banks for deposits and accounts without any restrictions. The Decree 
came into force upon signature.  
The Resolution of the Governmental Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan on introduction 
of the national currency number 2 ‘On plenipotentiary representatives of the Government 
Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan for introduction of the national currency’ was 
adopted on 12
th
 November 1993. It specified imposing fines: 
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- In case of mismatches of price scales expressed in the national currency and rouble banknotes 
issued in1961-1992 at the exchange rate of 1 tenge for 500 roubles during the period of parallel 
circulation of the tenge and rouble banknotes issued in1961-1992;  
-In case of rejection to sell goods for the tenge; 
- In case of selling goods for foreign currency, including roubles of the Russian Federation 
issued in 1993, by organisations that do not have licenses for foreign currency transactions. 
- In case of wilful suspension of work of the retail trade, paid services sector, transportation and 
communication services as well as in case of changes in their scheduled work.  
The currency was pegged to dollar at 1.5 tenge per dollar initially. It was allowed to float unlike 
in other Central Asian countries, where their new currencies had a fixed exchange rate. On 10
th
 
February 1994 the official exchange rate was 8 tenge per dollar though the exchange rate was 12 
tenge per dollar in the black market (Rushid, 1994).   
After introduction of the national currency, improvements of legislation on currency regulation 
and currency control were undertaken in order to support sustainability of the national currency.  
There was substantial deficit of foreign reserves at the beginning of national currency 
introduction. In order to form a liquid currency market in Kazakhstan and support the national 
currency convertibility, the Decree ‘On urgent measures for currency market development in the 
Republic of Kazakhstan’ was signed by the president of Kazakhstan. The Decree specified that 
starting from 1
st
 January 1994 the export-import tariffs should be paid in the national currency by 
legal entities. The new regulation required to surrender 50% of enterprises’ revenues from their 
exports excluding enterprises with foreign capital already established by that time. The revenues 
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in foreign currency were transferred through the banks registered on the Kazakh Interbank 
Currency Exchange
15
.  
The transfer of customs charges from foreign currency to the national currency, changes in the 
order of selling of foreign currency and retail trade in foreign currency had increased the 
liquidity of the exchange market and demand for the tenge (NBK, 2005).  
To promote a wide use of the national currency in international clearance and payments the 
following measures were undertaken. In February 1994, the restrictions on exports of goods 
bought for the tenge in Kazakhstan by legal entities were cancelled; domestic enterprises were 
allowed to export freely their products with an exception for goods subject to licensing or 
assigned to quotas and products of national heritage.  
2.5.2. Re-integration of banking systems in the CISs 
There were also simultaneous attempts to settle the problems by the CIS states before they were 
squeezed out of the rouble zone and introduced national currencies. The situation in finance 
among the CIS countries was changing over time and with stabilisation of the economies in the 
countries. In May 14, 1993 the CIS countries expressed their willingness for a stepwise 
movement to economic union in the signed agreements (Armenia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine). Then the Treaty on the 
                                                          
15 
On November 15, 1993 Kazakhstan introduced the national currency – tenge. On the second day after this event – 
on November 17, 1993 – the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan and twenty three leading commercial 
banks of Kazakhstan made the decision on founding the currency exchange. The previously existed Centre of 
Interbank Currency Transactions (the Currency Exchange) was the structural subdivision of the National Bank. The 
main objective set for the new exchange was the organisation and development of the national currency market due 
to introduction of tenge. As the legal entity the exchange was registered on December 30, 1993 under the name 
Kazakhstan Interbank Currency Exchange with the closed joint-stock company business form. Thus, nowadays 
existing Kazakhstan Stock Exchange was formed on November 17, 1993. On March 3, 1994, the exchange was re-
registered under the name Kazakhstan Interbank Currency Exchange. Available: http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Kazakhstan_Stock_Exchange. Accessed on 02.10.2012.  
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creation of the Economic Union of the CIS countries was signed in September 1993, which 
contemplated cooperation in the financial sector.  
The Interstate Bank (Mezhgosudarstvenny Bank) was created in December 1993 for the purpose 
of clearing interstate payments. The bank became a specialised institution for the Payment 
Union, which was created in 1994. The development of payment and clearing system among the 
CIS countries was spontaneous and initially it was based at the level of enterprises and banks in 
the form of barter and clearings (Glazkova, 2006).  
However, any creation of the supranational institutions for financial integration represented a 
politically determined development, which was not related to the international economic and 
financial climate in the CIS. According to the many experts, the financial cooperation of the CIS 
countries was very weak for many years. It was lagging behind the economic and trade 
developments (Petrov, 2011).   
The increased integration process started in the pre-crisis period of 2007-2009. It was due to 
economic growth in the CIS countries and on legislation to liberalise finance, which eased the 
access of foreign financial institutions to the markets in many CIS countries. Moreover, regional 
agreements such as the Eurasian Economic Community carried documents containing a 
programme for the creation of a common financial market for the CIS countries in 2007-2010, 
and the Strategy of economic development till 2020, which aimed at currency and financial 
cooperation as a priority.  
The integration developments were more intensive in the banking sectors, which were the most 
developed segments of the financial systems. Banking sector integration was in the form of 
expansion of the CISs’ banks to the other regional countries. Although in the beginning of 2000s 
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almost all banks in the region were operating in their national territory, after the mid-2000s many 
large financial institutions were operating in different CIS countries simultaneously. 
In the mid-2000s national markets almost exhausted their capacities for domestic growth of 
national banks and pushed them out to look for other markets. However, the level of the banking 
sector development in the CISs, even where the sector is relatively developed, does not permite 
competition on an equal basis with the financial institutions in developed countries. Thus, the 
CISs region became one of the most attractive locations for the CISs banks expansion, where 
banks can compete and realise their economies of scope and scale. The priority for cross-border 
entry is into the CIS countries with a relatively lower level of financial intermediation. As was 
mentioned above, the Kazakh banks started their cross-border expansion first from the mid-
2000s, later on this policy became part of the strategy of other CISs banks. The main players are 
Russia and Kazakhstan, which own the largest share of all assets in other countries of the CISs 
(Table 2.8).    
Foreign assets increased more than 3 times for some banks between 2010 and 2013. Banks 
strengthened their market positions in the region and now play an increasingly important role in 
the banking systems of the recipient countries. For example, they account for more than 15% of 
all banking assets in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan, as well as more than 10% - in Ukraine and 
Armenia (Kondratov, 2014).  
Russia invests mainly in Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Armenia while Kazakhstan banks 
invest primarily in its branches in Russia and Central Asia. In general, most investments in 
banking in the CIS countries, over 70%, are accounted for by Ukraine and Belarus. 
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Table 2.8: CISs’ banks with the largest assets in the region countries (2010, 2013) 
Bank 
Country of 
origin 
The CIS 
country 
recipient 
Assets in the 
country of origin, 
bln. US$ 
Assets in other 
CIS countries, bln. 
US$ 
Increase in 
foreign 
assets, % 
   
2010 2013 2010 2013 2010-2013 
Bank VTB Russia 
Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, 
Belorussia, 
Kazakhstan, 
Russia, 
Ukraine  
87.9 142.01 4.7 18.6 295.74 
Vnesheconom Bank Russia 
Belorussia, 
Russia, 
Ukraine 
60 81 4.6 18.6 304.35 
Sberbank Rossii Russia 
Belorussia, 
Kazakhstan 
Russia, 
Ukraine 
234 447.17 4 18.2 355 
Alfa-Bank Russia 
Belorussia, 
Kazakhstan, 
Russia, 
Ukraine 
19.3 43.04 4.2 14.9 254.76 
BTA Bank Kazakhstan 
Armenia, 
Belorussia, 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, 
Ukraine 
13.3 1068 2.4 2.4 0 
Kazkommertsbank Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, 
Tajikistan 
15.9 16.7 1 2.1 110 
Bank Moskvy Russia 
Belorussia, 
Russia, 
Ukraine 
26 45.5 0.9 0.9 0 
Gazprombank Russia 
Armenia, 
Belorussia, 
Russia 
55.2 91.1 0.8 0.8 0 
Privatbank Russia 
Russia, 
Ukraine 
10.8 18.62 0.6 0.6 0 
International Bank of 
Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan, 
Russia 
13.4 7.5 0.5 0.5 0 
Source: Interfax-CEA (Centre of economic analysis) 
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However, the highly uneven distribution of investments in banking sectors of neighbouring CIS 
countries by countries of origin and recipient countries reflects only a slight integration of 
banking sectors of the CISs. While Russian and Kazakh banks actively expand in the CISs 
region, other CISs countries are mainly recipients of foreign CISs banks. Thus, the share of 
foreign CISs assets in the total banking assets of the region is about 3% (Kondratov, 2014). 
Mutual expansion of the CISs financial institutions is constrained by the weakness of other than 
Russian and Kazakh financial institutions in the CISs, which don’t have enough resources to 
enter the markets of their neighbours, as well as conditioned by the absence of regional legal and 
institutional mechanisms facilitating penetration of banks into each other’s markets, particularly 
protection against political risks. Nevertheless, the CIS banking systems actively integrate into 
the global financial markets particularly the most developed ones. 
Despite the increased financial integration in the CIS before the crisis 2008-2010, there are many 
factors that slow down the integration. The main are as follows: differences in the financial 
sectors developments; divergence of interests of the individual countries; restrictions on capital 
movements in many CIS countries, which undermine investments in those countries; concerns 
that Russia, which continues to dominate in the post-soviet region, would impose its interests 
when implementing integrational projects in the region. On the other hand Russia is concerned 
that other centres like European Union and China might increase influence in the region and 
could contribute to an acceleration of disintegrational tendencies. Russia sees the increased 
presence of the financial institutions from the third countries in the region as undesirable because 
Russia consideres that they are less interested in integrational projects in the CISs. At the same 
time, Russia’s goal of domination in the region would suppose a major role in financing 
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integrational projects, which could be costly, and this decreases Russia’s interest in these 
initiatives (Kondratov, 2014).   
Along with that, there are some factors that should contribute to financial integration among the 
CISs. There is growing trade cooperation among countries and mutual penetration of businesses 
(though mostly from Russia’s side), which in turn require interconnection among national 
financial markets and institutions. There are several organisational structures present in the 
region. To name the main: the Customs Union Treaty signed among Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia signed in 2007 and then the Customs Union came into effect in 2010 by common external 
tariff adoption and abolishment of the customs clearance among the member-countries in July 
2010. New regional agreement, the Treaty on Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) of Belorussia, 
Kazakhstan, and Russia was signed in May 2014, indicating further integration processes among 
the CISs; Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are observers. The Treaty on EEU will come into 
effect in January 2015. 
The financial and banking integration in the CISs is far from exhausted. The CIS countries seek 
for more efficient financial cooperation, which is a precondition for recovery of economic ties, 
enhancement of trade links and investments. In this regard, better regulation and supervision 
standards in individual countries, a higher quality of banking sector services, and convergence in 
banking sector efficiency and development would contribute to the movement of the national 
banking capital and elimination of any entry barriers. All this should be done for mutual benefit 
and not in the interests of one particular country.   
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2.6. Conclusion 
This Chapter focused on issues related to banking in transition countries. The objective was to 
shed light on several key issues pertaining the massive changes in the financial systems of the 
former soviet bloc countries and their influence on the countries’ banking system landscape at 
the present time. 
The chapter has tracked massive changes in the banking sectors of the post-soviet countries, 
which put the end to the centrally planned finance or monobank financial system and introduced 
market based commercial banking or two-tier banking system. We start from the overview of the 
establishment of the plan-based finance in the Soviet Union. The financial system formed in the 
beginning of the Soviet state remained as a “standard system” for the period of the soviet rule 
with minor reforms.  The main features and principles of the banking system established in the 
Soviet Union were closely copied in all other soviet bloc countries. It was a monobank financial 
system, which is a one-tier banking system with vertically dependent financial activities.         
We continued by chronicling the vast financial reforms in the former soviet bloc countries. The 
post-soviet countries had undergone non-homogeneous processes of transition, which can be 
explained by the differences in the initial economic conditions and diverse policies. However, 
the post-soviet countries’ banking systems, particularly those of the CIS countries, share 
common properties and, despite the long period of transition (more than 20 years), the financial 
systems in the CIS transition countries to different extent have features, which are the legacy of 
the soviet time finance.   
Next came a survey of banking sectors of the CISs countries and their analysis in figures. Not 
surprisingly, banking sectors are the key financial intermediation in the CIS countries, although 
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they can be distinguished into the most developed, medium developed and underdeveloped 
groups. The first group includes Russian, Kazakh and Ukrainian banking systems, while the last 
group presents Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. However, even in Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine, the banking sectors remain underdeveloped compared to the western 
countries.  
We note a continuous consolidation of the banking sectors in the CISs. There has been a net 
decrease in the number of commercial banks in the region. Compared with the situation in 2007, 
when there were 1,492, there has been a net decrease of 280 banks by 2014 (when there were 
1,212), which accounts for 18.8% of banks in the region. In relative terms, 24.5% of banks were 
closed in Russia, 12.5% in Moldova, 10.3% in Uzbekistan, and 6.5% in Azerbaijan. 
Considerable reduction in the number of banks in the CISs took place during the crisis years and 
the number continued declining after the crisis. On 01 January 2014, the net decrease was 40 
units (-3.2%) relative to the previous year. However, we observe a steady increase in the number 
of banks in Tajikistan by 4 banks and Kyrgyzstan by 2 banks after the crisis, which shows the 
growing capacity of the financial systems in these countries.  The consolidation in number of 
banks takes place against drop in concentration by 13.3%, which is the regional tendency over 
the period from 2005 to 2013. This could be explained that the decline in concentration has 
occurred despite the consolidation process, which suggests that consolidation has not involved 
many mergers among very large banks.  
The ownership structure in the CISs banking sectors differs across countries. While the state 
ownership share decreased in Azerbaijan, Belarus and Moldova for the period 2005-2013 and 
Armenia totally privatised former state-owned banks, Belarus, Russia, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan have chosen dominance of state ownership in banking sectors, and after the world 
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financial crisis 2007-2009 there was an increase in state ownership both on a country level as in 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, and on a regional level. Foreign capital, including the CISs 
intraregional investments, dominates in Armenia and Moldova, which had chosen this emphasis 
due to limited domestic resources. Ukraine’s banking system was dominated by private domestic 
and the foreign capital from outside the region in 2005-2008, nevertheless after the outflow of 
foreign capital due to the world financial crisis, it was replaced by the CISs countries’ capital. 
The Kyrgyz banking sector is dominated mainly by Kazakh capital.   
The world financial crisis caused the banking sector’s growth rate to slow down all over the 
region. Banks experienced a liquidity crunch as they couldn’t refinance borrowing from 
international markets. There was an overall decline in financial intermediation after the crisis in 
all the regional countries involving a decrease in lending to households and enterprises, an 
increase in interest rates and a deterioration of banks' portfolios. Destabilised financial 
intermediation drew attention of the policy makers to the issues of insufficient regulation and 
supervision, which were at the core of the crisis, especially in those transition countries with a 
less developed legal environment for financial sectors. We will refer to this issue in our empirical 
study on stability. 
We conclude our historical review of the CISs banking by examining re-integration of finance in 
the CISs; there is a trend of financial integration among the CIS countries. The integration in the 
banking sector is the most intensive as this segment of the financial systems is the most 
developed one in the CIS countries. Mainly because the level of the banking sectors development 
in the CISs does not permit competition on an equal basis with the financial institutions in 
developed countries, the CIS region became one of the most attractive locations for the CIS own 
banks expansion, where banks can compete and realise their economies of scope and scale. The 
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priority for cross-border entry is towards those CIS countries with a relatively lower level of 
financial intermediation. 
To all this it should be added that there were achievements of the banking sector in the CISs. 
Banking sectors were the most dynamic sectors in the CISs, and had very high growth rates of 
their assets and credits to the economy before the world financial crisis 2007-2009 and slowly 
recovered after that. The positive change was that liberalisation of the banking sectors allowed 
foreign banks entry to the markets, which increased competition and services quality, and 
diversified banking services. Most of the CIS countries introduced international standards of 
financial statements, which contributed to transparency and a better monitoring of risks. 
Introduction of Basel standards had a positive impact on the capitalisation of banking sectors of 
the CISs (Kazakov, 2007).  In general, the banks in the CISs were transferred into commercial 
banks and adopted the concept of conventional banking though to different degrees across 
countries.  
The analysis of records of the banking sectors in the CISs prompt us to study, whether the 
liberalisation and financial reforms led to creation of a workable and stable financial structure, 
which is efficient and competitive in quickly changing environment. Financial liberalisation 
together with deregulation and integration of the CISs’ banking sector, both into the world and 
regional financial markets, have substantial implications on competition and stability. While 
theory and empirics point to the presence of links between competition and stability in banking 
sectors, the theoretical literature and empirical studies produce different findings. Efficiency, 
competition and stability is a subject of our empirical investigations in the following chapters.   
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Chapter 3 
Technical efficiency of the CISs banks 
Preamble 
This chapter examines bank performance in terms of technical efficiency in the CIS countries 
with particular attention to the impact of bank ownership and risk-taking behaviour and 
addressing environmental effects on efficiency. This chapter introduces various efficiency 
concepts, including cost and profit efficiency in the Literature review part, to demonstrate their 
advantages and disadvantages. However, we make an accent on technical efficiency, which is the 
base for our main empirical analysis of this chapter. Technical efficiency indicates whether a 
bank produces maximum amount of output employing minimum amount of inputs. The 
advantage of technical efficiency is that it can be measured without the need for price 
information because it doesn’t set objectives to measure cost-minimisation or profit-
maximisation behaviour. Instead, it measures whether managers organise production so that a 
bank would operate on its production frontier.  
3.1. Introduction 
The CISs banking system went through a profound reforms since the beginning of 1990s due to 
transformation from passive banking, when finance was following physical planning, and 
monobank system where all the financial activities were vertically dependent and totally owned 
by the state, to two-tear market based banking system. One of the most important changes in the 
CISs banking sectors is the ownership of banks.  
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This Chapter examines whether banks’ technical efficiency varies with different ownership 
structures, which provides information to policy makers on ownership policies. Due to moderate 
levels of foreign banks entry and not all banking system privatisation the CISs countries turn out 
to be fertile testing grounds for the analysis of ownership impact on efficiency because of 
sufficiently large number of each group of banks such as state, private and foreign. Another 
interest of this Chapter is banks’ risk-taking behaviour, which critically transformed due to 
changes in regulation and supervision during the transition. The risk-taking effect examines 
whether banks’ technical efficiency varies with different risk factors such as capital, credit, 
liquidity and market risks. This would inform bank managers on bank risk-taking strategy. We 
also include other bank level and environmental variables into the model to investigate their 
effect on technical efficiency. Besides, inclusion of environmental variables accounts for across 
countries differences. Accordingly we formulate our research questions.  
This chapter seeks to answer specific questions on banking in the CISs. Particular research 
questions include: How do bank ownership characteristics affect bank technical efficiency? Do 
foreign banks outperform their domestic counterparts? Does the performance of foreign banks 
from the CISs differ from other banks performance? How does bank risk-taking behaviour affect 
bank efficiency in the CISs? While focusing on these issues, this study also controls the effects 
of other environmental factors, such as the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, GDP growth, and 
entrance into the custom union agreement.   
The objectives of this chapter are three-fold. First is to estimate consistent technical efficiency 
for the CISs banks under the influence of different bank level and environmental factors (a). 
Second is to examine the impact of bank ownership (b) and risk-taking (c) behaviour on bank 
performance measured by technical efficiency. Third is to provide information and insights for 
69 
 
financial sector authorities and practitioners on banks’ performance driving forces in the CISs 
countries that can be used for regulation and supervision reforms and policies.  
We discuss the objectives stated above in more details. (a) This research estimates technical 
efficiency using the stochastic frontier approach for the transition CIS countries, which to our 
best knowledge has not been done. Defining the production frontier for the banking sectors of the 
CISs countries is a valuable exercise because most of the cross-country studies on bank 
performance in transition countries focus on the CEE countries. Among the bank efficiency 
studies, the common frontier was estimated for Eastern Europe, for instance in Fries and Taci 
(2004), Bonin et al. (2005a, 2005b), Rossi et al. (2005) and Yildirim and Philippatos (2007). 
These countries have to a certain extent similar environment because they went through similar 
privatisation processes and opening up to foreign banks entry, while the latter took the large part 
of their banking sector’s share. The other studies applied a common frontier to estimate 
efficiency for 15 European Union countries (Hollo and Nagy, 2006). The advantage of 
estimating common frontier is that cross countries frontier allows for a batter comparison across 
countries because bank efficiency in each country would be compared against the same norm 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Though some studies include a few CIS countries clustered with 
the CEE countries estimating a common frontier, results from these studies may not be 
representative of the CIS countries as there is a great divide in the development of financial 
sector between the CEE and the CISs countries (De Nicolo et al., 2003)
16
. The model is applied 
to ten CIS countries because the transition from planned to market based economies 
                                                          
16
 Barisitz (2008) also distinguished between banking systems of the CEE countries and the former Soviet Union 
countries. He argues that this division has its roots in the EU influence on the CEE countries’ economic 
development (like EU membership perspective and integration, and geographic proximity), while the CIS countries 
financial system development remains specific for these countries’ situations. Other authors like Mitra et al (2010) 
share these views. 
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encompassed similar banking sectors’ institutional, structural and managerial transformations. 
Therefore, common frontier estimation for the CIS countries’ bank efficiency analysis separate 
from the CEE countries may be more reasonable.  
(b) The CISs countries choose different ownership structures according to their economic 
situation, availability of funds in the countries and institutional development. State capital 
prevails in the Russia, Belorussian and Uzbekistan banking systems. Russia has developed more 
advanced market mechanisms, while Belorussian and Uzbekistan banking sector mostly 
replicates the finance of soviet times. Domestic private banking dominates in Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Ukraine.  Countries, such as Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova, are 
lack of domestic finance and have chosen the strategy of attracting foreign capital. The 
discrepancies in the ownership structures resulting in differences in bank efficiency in the CISs 
countries are informative for countries’ financial authorities for implementing effective 
regulation reforms. 
(c) As stated before, the changes in regulation and supervision have critically transformed banks’ 
risk-taking behaviour. Additionally, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 hit the banking sectors of 
the CISs countries and indicated that high risks had accumulated in the banking sectors. The risk-
taking behaviour’s influence on banks performance has mostly been studied for the developed 
countries of Europe and the US. However, there has recently been a comparative study for the 
BRICs, which includes Russia. It was concluded that the performance of BRICs banks was 
jeopardised by the acceptance of too much credit, market and overall risks (Zhang at al., 2013). 
To this end, this chapter contributes to the literature by estimating common frontier for the CISs 
banks (1) and analyses the CISs bank performance by gauging the impact on technical efficiency 
of ownership structure – state-owned, private domestic, foreign-owned banks, and CISs-owned 
71 
 
banks; and risk-taking behaviour – capital risk, credit, market, and overall risks; and 
environmental factors, such as the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, GDP growth, and custom 
union entrance (2). This chapter employs stochastic frontier approach introduced by Aigner et al. 
(1977), and contributes to the methodology (3) by estimating technical efficiency using empirical 
model, which is based on the Berger et al. (2005) method, one-step estimation technique and a 
hyperbolic distance function offered by Cuesta and Orea (2002), which assumes input and output 
change simultaneously, and which we modified by estimating time-varying hyperbolic technical 
efficiency.  
The period under consideration is between 2005 and 2012. Before this period the most reforms in 
transition of the banking sectors to a market basis had been undertaken in the CIS countries. 
During this period of time banking sectors of the CIS countries remained the dominant providers 
of financial intermediation and were subject to the global financial crisis of 2008-2010, which 
exposed weaknesses of the transition reforms in financial sectors of the countries. The next 
Section surveys literature pertaining technical efficiency and estimation technique, and 
relationship between efficiency and ownership, and efficiency and risks. Section 3 covers 
methodology and data description. Section 4 presents results from empirical model estimation, 
and Section 4 concludes and provides with policy remark.  
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3.2. Literature review 
In this part we survey literature on methodology and variables we used in both empirical 
chapters on technical and cost/profit efficiency. This chapter introduces various efficiency 
concepts, including cost and profit efficiency, and discuss their advantages and disadvantages 
making accent on technical efficiency. Technical efficiency indicates whether a bank produces 
maximum amount of output employing minimum amount of inputs.  
3.2.1. Literature review on methodology 
X-efficiency is a combination of technical and allocative efficiencies, which is called also price 
efficiency (Lovell, 1993). In the banking sector X-efficiency is more important than scale and 
scope efficiencies
17
, which are mostly exogenous problems (Berger and Humphrey, 1991). X-
efficiency captures mostly endogenous factors that influence inefficiency, while it explains only 
20% of exogenous factors (Bos and Kool, 2006). In other words, the X-efficiency explains most 
of the inefficiencies in the financial markets and we employ technical and allocative approaches 
to study bank performance in the CIS countries. This study examines both technical efficiency 
and cost/profit (allocative) efficiency to give a more complete assessment of bank performance 
of the CIS countries. Here we give definitions of both technical and allocative efficiencies, 
though, this chapter focuses on technical efficiency and next chapter investigates cost/profit 
efficiency.   
                                                          
17
 The scope economies measuring problems are identified in Berger and Mester (1997).Economies of scale arise 
when there is an increase in profits as a result of output increase. Berger et al. (1993) identified the aspects that can 
capture economies of scale. 
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We begin with the discussion of different efficiency concepts, which are necessary when 
studying efficiency. Overall economic efficiency is a broad concept, which includes technical 
and allocative efficiency together (Coelli et al., 1998). Technical efficiency can be measured 
without the need to specify cost-minimisation or profit-maximisation objectives, thus there is no 
need for price information. Technical efficiency requires only input and output data to gauge the 
ability of a bank for output maximisation or input minimization given a certain output or input 
level, which also reduces the measurement error. Estimation of technical efficiency tells us 
whether managers organise production so that a bank would operate on its production frontier 
(Hughes and Mester, 2010). Technical efficiency is a radial measure and is calculated as the ratio 
of the linear distance between the production frontier and position of a bank within the feasible 
production set (Bikker and Bos, 2008).  
On the other hand, when input prices are available, and assumptions on firm behaviour, such as 
cost minimisation or profit maximisation, are relevant, the allocative efficiency can be measured 
in addition to technical efficiency (Coelli et al. 1998).  Allocative efficiency tells us whether 
managers choose the optimal proportions of inputs and outputs in response to relative prices. The 
allocative efficiency concept sets a different standard by incorporating relative prices.  
Thus, to be overall economically efficient a firm should use the best technology (a) and 
effectively respond to changes in the relative prices (b). This requires two different abilities of 
managers, which are reflected in the differences of technical and allocative efficiency scores of 
the same firm. So, technical efficiency scores are tend to be higher on average than allocative 
efficiency (Bauer et al., 1998). 
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The efficiency concepts are closely related to the efficiency measurement and the following part 
provides a brief introduction to a simple measure introduced by Farrell (1957). Farrell suggested 
practical techniques for measuring productive (economic) efficiency of a firm, which can be 
presented by multiplication of technical and allocative efficiency. In his analysis he used an 
example of a firm, which uses two inputs x1 and x2 to produce output y, and the production is 
characterised by constant returns to scale. In Figure 1 (Coelli et. al, 1998), SS’ represents the unit 
isoquant, which allows the measurement of technical efficiency. If the firm produces at the point 
P, then by Farrell its overall efficiency can be measured by the ratio OR/OP, which can be 
further decomposed into technical efficiency and price (allocative) efficiency. A firm is 
considered as technically efficient if it operates on the isoquant SS’. The firm located at P in  
Figure 3.1: Technical and allocative efficiency 
 
Source: Coelli et al., (1998) 
Figure 3.1 is technically inefficient as it operates at the point above the isoquant. Its efficiency 
can be calculated as OQ/OP. Allocative efficiency can be defined for the firm at point P, if the 
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information on input prices is available; and allocative efficiency is measured by the ratio 
OR/OQ. The firm on the Figure 3.1 is allocative inefficient. As stated above, the overall 
efficiency is expressed by the product: 
Overall efficiency = (OR/OQ)*(OQ/OP)            (3.1) 
Before we get overall efficiency and allocative efficiency we have to determine minimum cost 
and technical efficiency values. The minimum cost and technical efficiency are obtained using 
linear programming technique (Hassan et. al, 1990). In the case of multiple input-output 
production the linear programming problem specifies: 
minimum costs as:  
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑥 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑦 ≤ 𝑧𝑌, 𝑥 ≥ 𝑧𝑋, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑅+
.𝑘,            (3.2) 
and technical efficiency as:  
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑇 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑦 ≤ 𝑧𝑌, 𝑇𝑥 ≥ 𝑧𝑋, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑅+
.𝑘,      (3.3) 
where y is the m-dimension vector of output, which is produced by a particular firm; x is the n-
dimension vector of inputs utilised in production by a particular firm; p is the n-dimension vector 
of input prices, Y is the industry output expressed as the (𝑘 × 𝑚) matrix where k stands for the 
number of firms; X is the (𝑘 × 𝑚) matrix of inputs used by the industry; z is the vector of 
weights attached to the firm in calculation of minimum costs; and T is a scalar.  
Resolving the problem (3.2) we obtain the minimum cost level for a particular observation. The 
overall efficiency is then calculated as the ratio of the minimum costs to produce the output of a 
particular firm over actual costs of the firm producing that output, which corresponds to OR/OP 
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in the Figure 3.1. Resolving the problem (3.3) we get technical efficiency values, which 
correspond to OQ/OP ratio.  Finally, allocative efficiency is derived from the equation (3.1). 
It is important to understand different efficiency concepts. In our example the firm is technically 
and allocative inefficient, however, the ratios, which measure two inefficiencies are different. 
Thus, the values of technical and allocative efficiency may differ. Moreover, a particular firm 
can be technically efficient, if it operates at point Q in the Figure 3.1, and at the same time it is 
allocative inefficient, and it should operate at point Q’ to be both technically and allocative 
efficient.  
Distance function measure and approach 
The idea of radial contractions and expansions is underlying the concept of distance functions, 
which are very useful in measuring technical efficiency. There are two different measurement 
orientations: input and output. The input-orientated technical efficiency measure answers the 
question on proportional reduction of inputs in optimising production when keeping the same 
level of output. From the other side one can be interested in answering the question on how much 
the output can be proportionally increased keeping the same amount of inputs. The discussion on 
technical efficiency measurement illustrated in Figure 3.1 takes into account input-orientated 
measure. The differences between the two orientations can be illustrated as in the Figure 3.2 
(Coelli et al., 1998).   
Suppose that a firm produces one output q using one input x; it has decreasing returns to scale 
technology f(x) and operates at point P. Then, following Farrell, the input-orientated measure of 
technical efficiency equals AB/AP, which differs from output-orientated technical efficiency 
measured as CP/CD. Thus, the measures of inefficiency can differ depending on whether input- 
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or output-orientated model is estimated even if inefficiencies are measured against the same 
efficiency frontier of the best-operating firms (Coelli et al., 1998).   
Figure 3.2: Input and output-orientated technical efficiency measures 
 
Source: Coelli et al., (1998) 
The choice of measuring inefficiencies by using the distance function is based on its qualities 
outlined (when its applications had become common in the literature) in Cuesta and Orea (2002), 
Coelli and Perelman (2000), Grosskopf et al. (1995) and Fare et al. (1993). The distance 
functions provide several advantages. First, distance functions can accommodate multiple 
outputs and multiple inputs production technology. It makes them useful for estimating 
efficiency of multioutput industries, like financial sector. Multioutput technologies traditionally 
were modelled using (a) a single output index or (b) a dual cost/profit function. Comparing 
results of estimated parameters using these two models with distance function model, Coelli and 
Perelman (2000) found distance function to be superior to others. Second, it is bound up with the 
technical efficiency. Third, distance function does not need information about prices in contrast 
to cost/profit function approach. It can measure the multi-product technology using only 
information about outputs and inputs quantities. The additional requirement on price information 
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can be problematic to meet especially when doing research on developing countries. Yet existing 
price information may lack of exougeneity property, which is assumed in the estimation of cost 
or profit frontiers (Cuesta and Orea, 2002). In this case, the distance function approach is 
beneficial over cost/profit function approach for the reasons that it doesn’t face the problem of 
the absence of price information and mismeasurement. Fourth, behavioural assumptions such as 
cost minimisation or profit maximisation are not required when using distance function 
approach. In case of highly regulated industries these assumptions may be inappropriate, making 
the distance function approach a valuable option.  
Estimation techniques  
The evolution of performance analysis started from traditional ratio assessment and 
incrementally grew into more sophisticated techniques, which included econometric models of 
least-squares analysis, total factor productivity analysis and efficiency frontier analysis. While 
least-squares and total factor productivity analyses measure performance (technical change) 
based on the assumption that all firms are technically efficient, frontier analysis allows for 
estimating technical change and differences in efficiency across firms, which also allowed for 
identification of the factors that trigger the differences (Coelli et al., 1998).   
Efficiency frontier analysis requires the best practice frontier to be estimated from a given 
sample; against this frontier relative efficiencies are to be measured. There are two main 
approaches to estimate the best practice frontier, such as nonparametric techniques and 
parametric techniques. The first group includes two nonparametric techniques: data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) and free disposable hull (FDH) analysis. The second group includes three 
commonly used parametric techniques: the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), the thick frontier 
approach, and the distribution-free approach (DFA) (Mester, 1994). A comprehensive literature 
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overview on banking sector efficiency studies, which consider different time periods and 
estimation techniques, was carried out by Berger and Humphrey (1997). The two groups of 
techniques to measure efficiency differ mainly in the assumptions imposed on the data set in 
terms of how much shape of a frontier is dictated by the functional form, the treatment of random 
error, and the distribution assumption to distinguish between random error and inefficiency (half-
normal or truncated normal) (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).  They conclude that efficiency 
results variations resulting from different estimation techniques used. Among 130 reviewed 
studies of 21 countries sixty studies use the stochastic frontier approach.  
Estimation technique: nonparametric methods 
Nonparametric techniques are presented by DEA and its version FDH, which differs from DEA 
by presuming that linear substitution of observed input combinations is not possible and excludes 
the points on the lines, which connect the DEA vertices. DEA presents a frontier, which consists 
of efficient firms’ input/output combinations observed (vertices) and connected by piecewise 
linear segments. Originally introduced by Charnes et al. (1978), DEA became a popular 
approach of frontier estimation. Though, nonparametric approaches have their benefits that they 
do not require the explicit specification of the form of the distribution of inefficiencies across 
observations and allow efficiency to vary over time, these approaches suffers a major drawback. 
The nonparametric approaches do not distinguish between random error and inefficiency, which 
significantly distorts technical efficiency results (Bauer et al., 1998). To overcome this problem, 
there were some efforts to impellent stochastic inference by using bootstrapping (Grosskopf, 
1996). This additional properties of DEA made this approach promising for efficiency analysis 
(Simar and Wilson, 2000; Glass et al., 2010).  Another problem with DEA approach is that it 
suffers from ‘self-identifiers’ and ‘near-self-identifiers’ problem. That means that a firm can be 
80 
 
100% efficient when other constraints are specified such as environmental factors, regulatory 
variables or quality controls; it becomes impossible for other firms to be comparable in so many 
dimensions (Bauer et al., 1998). 
Estimation technique: parametric methods 
All parametric methods (SFA, TFA and DFA) allow for random error, but differ in assumptions 
on how to disentangle random error from inefficiency, which are both unobserved. The 
distribution-free approach (DFA) measures inefficiency using panel data set; it assumes no 
specific distributions of the inefficiencies or random errors, however, presumes that random error 
averages out over time while ‘core’ efficiency or average efficiency of each firm stays the same. 
The inefficiency then calculated as the difference between firm’s mean residual and the mean 
residual of the firm on the frontier (Berger and Humpfrey, 1997). The critique comes from the 
point that while averaging out firm’s efficiency variations over time together with the random 
error, it also implicitly assumes that inefficiency is the time invariant fixed effect, which in turn 
incorporates some persistent factors omitted in the model specification as inefficiency (Bauer et 
al., 1998).   
The thick frontier approach (TFA) approach specifies a functional form however, does not 
impose distributional assumptions on inefficiency and random errors. TFA approach presumes 
that random errors are deviations from predicted performance values within group of firms with 
the highest performance quartiles and lowest performance quartiles, and inefficiencies are 
deviations in predicted performance between the quartiles (Berger and Humpfrey, 1997).  The 
‘thick frontier’ is formed by the firms in the lowest average cost quartile, which assumed to have 
above average efficiency. This assumption that lowest average cost quartile is a true ‘thick 
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frontier’ of efficient firms is rather arbitrary and makes efficiency levels vulnerable.  Moreover, 
TFA estimates the general level of overall efficiency rather than provides efficiency estimates for 
individual firm.  
The stochastic frontier approach (SFA) imposes a functional form on frontier (cost, profit or 
production function) and employs a composed error, which consists of inefficiencies and random 
errors. The two parts are disentangled using different distributional assumptions, where random 
errors are normally distributed (usually they have standard normal distribution) and 
inefficiencies follow an asymmetric distribution: half normal and exponential distributions, 
which are single-parameter distributions, and Gamma distribution and truncated normal 
distributions, which are two-parameter distributions (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).   
Parametric and nonparametric approaches are two main estimation techniques, which are 
implemented for frontier analysis. Both approaches have their pros and cons, and the choice 
depends on researcher’s objectives. Nonparametric method imposes less structure on the frontier 
avoiding misspecification errors of underlying production processes. At the same time, 
nonparametric method assumes that there is no random error, which accounted as inefficiency, 
distorting efficiencies estimates. Contrary to these, parametric approaches impose a particular 
functional form that defines the shape of the frontier which can be misspecified. As a result, 
measured efficiencies would suffer from misspecification error. However, positive aspects of the 
parametric estimation overweigh potential problem.  
Parametric estimation avoids inaccuracy in estimation of inefficiencies by decomposing error 
term into random error and inefficiencies. Random error may include measurement error in 
constructing the frontier; luck that temporarily gives a decision making unit better measured 
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performance one year from the next, inaccuracies created by accounting rules that would make 
measured outputs and inputs deviate from economic outputs and inputs (Berger and Humphrey, 
1997); and different environmental shocks. Parametric and nonparametric approaches had been 
compared to check if there is a substantial difference between the two in Berger and Humphrey 
(1997). They compared average efficiency levels and ranking across various techniques, and 
found that there is similarity in central tendency of the distribution of average efficiency scores 
but similarities are weaker for financial institutions ranking using estimated efficiency values. 
Bauer et al. (1998) compared different efficiency techniques based on six consistency 
conditions’ framework, and concluded that while there is general consistency within parametric 
and nonparametric approaches in terms of distributional properties (mean, standard deviations), 
ranking, best and worst practice institutions identification and efficiency levels, there is 
substantial divergence between parametric and nonparametric methods. They also established 
that parametric methods better complies with consistency conditions, which assess the degree to 
which the efficiency scores are consistent with competitive conditions in the market and standard 
non-frontier performance measures such as cost/revenue ratio or return on assets, than 
nonparametric methods.  
Defining input-output: intermediation approach 
There are two most applied approaches to which input and output variables should be included to 
capture more precisely banking activity. One is the production approach, which supposes that a 
banking firm serves its clients where deposits and numbers of loans are considered as output, 
while labour and physical capital are input factors. Production approach requires information for 
outputs such as the number and types of transactions or documents processed over a period of 
time. This kind of data on transactions’ flow is typically not available. Instead, data on the 
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number of deposits or loan accounts, or number of transactions made are usually used (Goddard 
et al., 2001). The production approach is found in early literature (Benston, 1965) and later, for 
instance, in Berger and De Young (1997), Berger and Humphrey (1991), Swank (1995), Resti 
(1997). 
The intermediation approach, which was initiated by Sealey and Lindley (1977), treats bank as 
intermediaries, where a banking firm attracts funds (from savers) and transforms them into loans 
and investments (to borrowers). Loans and investments’ values are treated as outputs, and labour, 
capital and deposits are taken as inputs. In this approach, opposite to production approach, 
deposits regarded as an input, which results in that operating and interests costs are taken into 
account. This approach was applied in works by Barr et al. (1994), Avkiran, (1999), Casu and 
Molyneux (2003), Fries and Taci (2005).  
Each approach includes only one part of the dual role of financial firms: the provision of 
transaction and document-processing services (production approach) or the transfer of funds 
from savers to borrowers (intermediation approach). However, each of them can serve better for 
different purposes. The production approach has advantages in evaluating efficiencies of banks’ 
branches as customer documents are processed mainly in branches for the bank as a whole, 
bank’s funding and investment decisions are not under control of branch managers. On the other 
hand, the intermediation approach allows for better evaluation of entire financial institution as 
this approach takes into account interest expenses, which comprise from one-half to two-thirds of 
total costs. Additionally, it can be better for measuring profitability in frontier analysis as the 
minimization of total costs required for maximising profits (Goddard et al., 2001).   
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The other two less commonly used approaches are a value-added approach and a user-cost 
approach. The first one includes assets and liabilities, which add considerable value to the 
financial institution, as outputs, and labour and the value of physical capital (premises and fixed 
assets) as inputs. The user-cost approach pioneered by Hancock (1985) takes those assets and 
liabilities, which contribute to a financial institution’s revenues, as outputs and those assets and 
liabilities, which contribute to a financial institution’s cost of production, as inputs (Park and 
Weber, 2006).  
The early literature in banking was involved in debates on which approach explains better 
banking industry, because it has an influence on modelling and input-output choice. All 
approaches agree on loans and other earning assets to be treated as outputs, while deposits could 
be considered as inputs and outputs due to the dual role of deposits in a financial institution. 
Deposits have input characteristics because interest is paid for them; they have output 
characteristics because they are associated with considerable amount of liquidity, safe-keeping 
and payment services to depositors (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). However, recently the 
intermediation approach is commonly used (See, for example, Koetter et al., 2012, Zhang et al., 
2013).  
In order to conduct efficiency analysis, input and output variables must be specified. Based on 
the above considerations and objectives of this study to measure bank efficiency at firm and 
industry level using frontier analysis, this research adopts the intermediation approach for both 
empirical works on bank performance. Viewing banks as financial intermediations we employ 
the following inputs and outputs for the analyses. We discuss inputs and outputs used for 
technical efficiency and cost and profit efficiency analysis here and in the next empirical chapter 
we refer to this discussion.  
85 
 
The multiple output production technology of banking industry is taken into account in our 
study. This research defines outputs employing profit before taxes and loans values, which are 
commonly used in bank performance analysis, and inputs are labour, capital and deposits. Based 
on what outputs we use, we distinguish two models such as revenue-focused model and asset-
focused model, which we estimate for technical efficiency and cost/profit efficiency respectively. 
Following literature (Sturm and Williams, 2004; Park and Weber, 2006 and Zhang, 2013), this 
study estimates technical efficiency using revenue-focused model specification and defines pre-
tax profit such as interest income and non-interest income as outputs, and interest expenses and 
non-interest expenses as inputs. This model measures the efficiency of financial institutions in 
turning costs into revenue.   
Asset-focused model applied to measure cost and profit efficiency and represents a classical 
intermediation model; it specifies two outputs such as loans and other earning assets (Sealey and 
Lindley, 1977) and uses two input prices for estimating bank cost and profit efficiency: labour 
and physical capital calculated as a ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets (Hasan and 
Marton, 2003; Fries and Taci, 2005; Bonin et al, 2005a; and Jiang et al., 2013) and funds  
calculated as interest expenses to total customer deposits (Bonin et al., 2005a; Berger et al., 
2009).  The definition of input variables in this model slightly deviates from the intermediation 
approach theory due to unavailability of data on number of employees; the model uses a variable, 
which consist of labour and physical capital together (non-interest expenses to total assets). 
However, this approach is practical especially for transition countries, and was used in a number 
of studies sited above. Total costs are measured as the sum of interest and non-interest costs 
(Bonin et al., 2005a) and total profits are measured by pre-tax profit (Jiang et al., 2013).  Cost 
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and profit efficiency measures how close a bank is to the ‘best-practice’ minimum cost or 
maximum profit frontier determined by best performer in the sample (Berger et al., 2009).  
 The models include one fixed input – equity – to control for risk preferences, which was proved 
to be important for the accuracy of bank efficiency estimates (Mester, 1996; Berger and Mester, 
1997). Particularly, the inclusion of equity as a fixed input in the cost and profit efficiency 
estimation is important. Financial capital is a buffer against portfolio losses, thus it is an 
important aspect for insolvency risk absorption. Bank costs and profits are influenced by 
insolvency risk through the risk premium the bank has to pay for uninsured debt and through the 
risk management activities that bank managers undertake. On top of that, raising equity is more 
costly than raising deposits, which has direct effect on costs (Berger and Mester, 1997).  
3.2.2. Literature survey on the relationship between bank 
ownership and performance  
Bank ownership influence on banks performance has attracted a great deal of research attention. 
Massive privatisation in banking sectors after the change in political regime reshaped the 
ownership landscape in these countries. However, the centralised banking and state ownership 
prevailing in soviet times left its legacy in many CISs banking sectors. Over the years, a 
substantial deal of literature on the relationship between ownership and bank performance has 
been developed.   
State ownership is dominant in developing and transition countries, however, it has been 
lessening steadily over time (Megginson, 2005). In general, different types of bank ownership 
reflect different forms of governance (Berger et al., 2005), which exist in transition countries 
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nowadays offering rich grounds to measure difference in efficiency across ownership types. The 
pro and cons of the state ownership are argued from different theoretical points. 
From the ‘political’ view theory, state owned banks are less efficient because they finance the 
inefficient but socially desirable projects while having major control over the choice of projects 
to finance (La Porta et al., 2002). Government maximises its own welfare and does not maximise 
social welfare. Politicians and regulators may persuade banks to give credits to a politically 
connected firms, or potent banks may pursue politicians and regulators to act in the banks’ best 
interest instead of society (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Levine, 2004); while direct official 
supervision reduces the efficiency of banks (Horiuchi and Shimizu, 2001). However, the 
countervailing ‘development’ view has been advocated state ownership by the reason that 
government can swiftly organise and direct finance to boost economic development and 
industrialisation. The role of government in this case is to balance social and economic aims. 
Government control is also considered as an antidote to market failures (Megginson, 2005).  
Thus, state ownership of banks has two different theories reflecting the government’s objectives 
‘development’ and ‘political’.  
Another two clear strands of theories are helpful in studying ownership: the principal-agent 
framework, which explains relationship on the micro level, and soft-budget constraint, which 
also can be referred to as ‘political’ theory. Bearle and Means (1932) examined the separation of 
ownership and control. The theory states that over time executives get the main power over the 
corporate control so that the board’s supervisory role becomes ineffective. This theory was 
rekindled in the debates over ownership and control explicitly referring to a principal-agent 
problem in 1970s.  
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In banking, the question on what is the most appropriate governance structure for banks concerns 
the principal-agent problem. The principal-agent problem arises when agents (bank managers) 
and principals (banks shareholders) have different interests, and principles cannot directly 
control that the other party always acts in principals’ interests. Therefore, the principal should 
exert monitoring and control via external auditing and board of directors, which could be both 
costly and difficult due to separation of ownership and control. Principal-agent problems exist in 
any type of ownership structure where this separation presents. These problems result in 
differences in banks performance depending on how banks with different ownership types solve 
the principal-agent problems (Williams and Nguyen, 2005).  The problems’ source is asymmetric 
information, where managers know better about the bank’s state; besides managers may have 
own interests conflicting with shareholders’, and may maximise their own utility (Heffernan, 
2005). Little monitoring in principal-agent framework can arise for the following reasons. The 
control of information flow is one of the factors that small shareholders lack of expertise to 
monitor managers. Moreover, small shareholder with small stake in the bank may find it costly 
to monitor managers and induce a ‘free-rider’ problem when individual shareholder would rely 
on others for monitoring. In general, the principal-agency problem is thought to lead to 
inefficiencies (Button and Weyman-Jones, 1992). In the case of banks’ state ownership the 
problem appears because principals are all individuals in the state and ownership is dispersed. 
That leads to the ‘free-rider’ problem as no one individual would undertake the costly monitoring 
over the governmental management. That gives the power of control to the government (Huibers, 
2005, p. 289) and leads to a non-optimal monitoring18.   
                                                          
18
 See also for nonfinancial firms: Furubotn and Pejovich (1972); Vickers and Yarrow (1991); Dyck (2001). 
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The soft-budget constraint concept was introduced in the context of socialist enterprises by 
Kornai (1979, 1980). The socialist enterprises had an access to finance constantly or had soft 
budget constraints when they could not cover their costs. Kornai reformulated his concept and 
expanded to “the paternalistic role of the modern State” without judgemental attitude towards it 
as being “good” hard budget constraint and “bad” soft budget constraint. He also made a point 
that the syndrome of soft budget constraint exists in other than socialist economies (Korani 
1986), though the soft budget constraint syndrome is more damaging in the systems with public 
ownership either socialist economies rather than those with private ownership (Kornai, 1998). 
The concept is about the rational planning problem, which appears when there is a relaxation of 
the relationships between earnings and expenditures, so that the firm’s expenditures, which 
exceed earnings, will be paid by the State. When there is the high expectation probability that 
those extra expenditures will be covered, it influences the behaviour of the managers and in the 
end the efficiency (Korani, 1986). Thus, there is a trade-off between efficiency and the social or 
human consequences when it comes to the policy considerations whether to harden or soften 
budget constraint (Korani, 1986).  According to the theory, state owned banks can easily get 
refinancing as state owned enterprises, which is characterised as soft budget constraints in 
economic literature (Kornai, 1979, 1980, 1986). Implicit government guarantees may negatively 
influence banks’ performance by limiting market discipline and discouraging efficient 
performance of banks’ management and thereby increasing the moral hazard problem (Huibers, 
2005, Megginson, 2005).  
Empirical studies show mostly negative impacts from state ownership. Government ownership 
may slow down financial development, lead to a lower income and productivity growth, and 
even increase the probability of banking crisis (Barth et al., 1999, La Porta et al., 2002, Caprio 
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and Peria, 2000). However, while private banks were significantly more profitable, private banks 
appeared to be less cost efficient than government owned banks among western banks between 
1999 and 2004 (Iannotta et al., 2007). 
The substantial presence of state owned financial institutions in transition economies provided 
rich grounds for investigation of the impact of the state ownership on performance. It is generally 
found that predominantly state ownership has a negative impact on banks (Bonin et al., 2005; 
Fries and Taci, 2005; Jiang et al., 2009; Yao et al., 2007; Zhang et al. 2013). State banks 
underperformed persistently in cost efficiency, while privatised banks improved their mark-ups 
in 15 transition countries including Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine during the period between 
1995-98 and 2002-2004 (Fries et al., 2006).  Fries and Taci (2005) found that private banks were 
more cost efficient than public banks in transition countries over the period 1994–200119. 
However, some studies for transition and developing countries argue in support of state 
ownership. Bonin et al. (2005a) came to the conclusion that there is no much evidence that state-
owned banks in transition countries are less efficient compared to domestic private banks for the 
period from 1994 to 2000. In Turkey state owned banks are more efficient than their peers both 
domestic private and foreign banks (Isik and Hassan, 2003) as well as in India (Shanmugam and 
Das, 2004) and Argentina (Staub et al., 2010; Tecles and Tabak, 2010). Additionally, transition 
is effective for decreasing interest margins, which were employed as indicators of efficiency by 
Drakos (2003). He finds that notably narrower margins are set by state-owned banks, including 
Belorussia and Ukraine. 
                                                          
19
 Fries and Taci (2005) found that Kazakh banks are more efficient than Russian banks over the considered period. 
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Karas et al. (2010) estimated cost efficiency frontier for Russian banks and found that state-
owned banks are more efficient than domestic private banks, while foreign banks are more 
efficient than their peers. The reasons why public banks may be more efficient than domestic 
private banks are found in deficiencies of market based institutions in Russia.  Institutional 
deficiency in Russia include widespread distrust, dishonesty in business and fraudulent 
behaviour, which hinder the private banking development and lead to a domination of public 
banks associated with ‘government’s stable hands’.  
In line with that, Grigorian and Manole (2002) used DEA technique and found that privatisation 
of state banks to domestic owners didn’t improve efficiency in the period 1995-1998 in their 
cross-country analysis of the CEEs and CISs banking sectors (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Moldova, Russian Federation and Ukraine). However, controlling for foreign ownership proved 
that foreign banks have higher efficiency in transition countries. It suggested that privatisation to 
domestic owners hasn’t led to substantial efficiency advances and entrance of foreign banks 
would be preferable.  
Foreign ownership 
Another aspect of ownership issue relates to globalization and liberalisation of the financial 
sectors in transition countries, which led to a greater involvement of foreign owners in the 
banking sectors of the countries. Foreign banks increase competition in the banking sectors of 
the host countries but also can crowd out the domestic banks causing their bankruptcies. There 
are two different hypotheses that predict efficiency of foreign owned and domestic owned banks 
proposed by Berger et al. (2000): the home field advantage hypothesis and global advantage 
hypothesis.  
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The global advantage hypothesis claims that foreign banks can be more efficient that the 
domestic banks in host countries (Buch, 2003; Berger et al., 2005). These banks can be more 
efficient for several reasons. First, foreign institutions can have superior managerial skills, best-
practice policies and procedures; and in developing countries these institutions can have access 
to superior information technologies for collecting and processing ‘hard’ quantitative 
information. Second, being a part of large banking firm, they face the same economies of scale 
as their home bank. Third, they set up their branch offices in the countries to serve their 
multinational customers, which operate in foreign countries, and provide them with services that 
cannot be offered by domestic banks. Finally, those organisations have a better access to capital 
markets and superior skills of risk diversification, which allow them to make investments with 
higher risks and higher expected returns.   
The global advantage hypothesis has two forms. General form considers that foreign banks, 
regardless of the nation in which they are headquartered, are more efficient than domestic banks 
because they are able to overcome any cross-border difficulties, and they are managed 
effectively. Under the limited form of the global advantage hypothesis, foreign banks are 
efficient only in a limited number of nations with favourable market or/and regulatory and 
supervisory conditions.  
The home field advantage hypothesis states that domestic banks are more efficient than foreign 
banks. Domestic banks do not experience diseconomies of managing from a distance, which 
include operating, monitoring and organisation. Domestic institutions have soft knowledge of 
local customers; opposite to foreign institutions, domestic banks have no barriers of language, 
culture, currency, regulatory and supervisory structures and country-specific market features 
(Berger et al., 2000; 2005).  
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A comprehensive comparison of findings regarding foreign versus domestic ownership was 
carried out by Berger (2007) for over 100 studies. He found that the home field advantage 
hypothesis holds in developed nations, where domestic banks are on average more efficient than 
foreign banks. The studies that support this hypothesis are done by De Young and Nolle (1996), 
Berger and De Young (2001, 2006), Berger et al. (2000). However, some studies find that 
foreign banks are more efficient in the developed nations than domestic (Sturm and Williams, 
2004). 
The reverse tendency in favour of global advantage hypothesis is found in developing countries 
(Berger, 2007), though with notable exceptions. Empirical studies in favour of home field 
advantage hypothesis evidence benefits of the foreign entrance via privatisation in transition 
countries (Bonin et al., 2005b, Fries et al., 2006) and improvement of home banks’ efficiency 
(Fries and Taci, 2005; Bonin et al., 2005a; Weill, 2003; Kasman, 2005; Kasman and Yildirim, 
2006). Styrin’s work (2005) covered the banking sector performance of Russia reporting that 
foreign banks are more efficient than Russian domestic banks. However, some studies provide 
with the opposite evidence of foreign bank ownership in transition counters, when foreign owned 
institutions are less efficient in support of home field advantage hypothesis (Rao, 2005).  
Differentiating between foreign, domestic private and state banks Shanmugam and Das (2004) 
found that foreign banks outperform domestic private but not state banks in developing country. 
Mixed results are found in Poland where foreign owned banks are less profit efficient but more 
cost efficient (Nikiel and Opiela, 2002). 
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3.2.3. Literature on the relationship between risks and performance   
Risks are a key aspect of banks’ production. Banks need to assess, monitor and diversify risks 
and, thus, risk management is an essential part of the banking business. Risk-taking behaviour is 
approached at the macro and micro levels. On the macro level the stability of banking system is 
considered in terms of competition in the banking sector. Some commentators argue that lack of 
competition enhances monopolistic behaviour in banking sector and monopoly charges high 
interest rates, which in turn increase the adverse selection problem leading to unstable banking 
sector (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Allen et al., 2011; Schaeck et al., 2009). The opposite view 
states that competition could be harmful for the banking sector as it encourages risk-taking 
behaviour and adverse selection problems as riskier projects are financed. That could be bad for 
financial stability; the risk-taking behaviour can be decreased by monopoly rents (Allen and 
Gale, 2004, Keeley, 1990). We address the macro level stability in the third empirical chapter 
where we explore competition issues in the CIS banking sectors. 
At the micro level, bank performance dependence on different types of risks and importance of 
their inclusion for efficiency studies was outlined in many studied (Berger and De Young, 1997; 
Altunbas et al. 2000; Altunbas et al. 2007; Brissimis et al., 2008; Fiordelisi et al. 2011). In our 
study we employ four risk taking behaviour measures such as capital risk, credit risk, liquidity 
risk and market. These bank behaviour characteristics shows the amount of risk manager of a 
bank are taking on, and do not necessarily indicate causation of efficiency or inefficiency; rather 
they would indicate clues towards increasing efficiency (Mester, 1996). 
Capital risk is measured as equity over total assets and characterises regulatory conditions. 
Usually, a lower capitalisation leads to lower efficiency levels because banks with low capital 
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face higher risk taken at greater leverage, which results in greater funds’ costs. Capital ratio also 
can be related to cost inefficiency because inefficient bank earns low profits (or profit 
inefficient), which results in lower capital level in the future (Mester, 1996). In line with that 
Berger and Mester (1997), Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997), and Isik and Hassan (2003) found that 
well-capitalised banks are more efficient. Later studies by Fiordelisi et al. (2011) found negative 
relationships between risk taking behaviour and performance in the European banking for the 
period 1995-2007 showing that higher capital had positive relationship to efficiency; however, 
Altunbas et al., (2007) stated that inefficient banks tend to hold more capital studying the period 
between 1992 and 2000.  
Bank failures are caused by two main reasons: bad loan quality and insufficient liquidity levels. 
To minimise risks banks may choose an increase in liquidity and/or portfolio diversification, 
which relate to liquidity and credit risk respectively. Following the empirical literature, liquidity 
risk is measured as ratio of liquid to total assets. Liquidity raising strategy would involve better 
monitoring and screening liquidity risk and, therefore, improving efficiency. This strategy can 
predict future risk level. Liquidity holdings also reflect management efficiency because efficient 
manager would hold lower levels of liquid assets, while not efficient manager would hold excess 
amount of these low-yield assets. Moreover, liquidity holdings imposed by the regulation are 
costly for a bank because higher levels of cash and liquid assets have higher costs (Altunbas et 
al., 2000). The relationship between the level of liquidity and profitability was found to be 
negative in Molyneux and Thornton (1992), while the opposite was found by Bourke (1989). We 
expect negative association between higher liquidity levels and efficiency. 
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Credit risk is measured as loan loss reserves over total loans. Credit risk arises when loans and 
accrued interests are not paid by the borrowers, and characterises asset quality. Riskier loans are 
supposed to have higher return, and thus have a positive impact on income; however, a low asset 
quality should increase the bank’s cost of funding reducing income. At the same time, higher 
loan quality requires more efforts on loan monitoring and credit underwriting, thus increasing 
costs.  Thus, the net impact of loans on profit is inconclusive (Iannotta et al., 2007). Loan loss 
reserves to total loans ratio was used as a proxy for asset quality and risk to study banks 
performance and risk in 15 European countries over the period 1999-2004 in Iannotta et al. 
(2007); mutual banks are characterised by higher asset quality and lower asset risk, while public 
sector banks are riskier and less profitable than their peers. They considered the impact of the 
ratio of loans loss provision to total loans on profits and found positively significant relationship 
between the two variables. Miller and Noulas (1997) and Athanasoglou et al. (2008) found a 
negative influence on profitability from credit risk.   
Some studies calculate credit risk as non-performing loans to total loans ratio (Berger and De 
Young, 1997; Williams, 2004), which is backward looking measure accounting for realised 
credit risk (Fiordelisi et al., 2011), while the loan loss reserve to total loans indicator focuses on 
present and future credit risk assessment by managers. Sun and Chang (2011) measured credit 
risk effect on cost efficiency in emerging economies using loan loss reserve to total loans ratio. 
They found that a bank with a higher loan loss reserves to total loans ratio operates less cost 
efficient; a higher ratio implies that the bank has a threat that its loans will become 
nonperforming. In general they concluded that there is a significant effect of risks such as credit, 
operational and market risks on cost efficiency and variability over studied period 1998-2008.  
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Less efficient banks are overloaded with bad loans and have a higher credit risk. Cost inefficient 
banks are likely to have more nonperforming loans for a number of reasons. Bad management of 
a bank may make mistakes in monitoring both bank’s costs and loan customers resulting in 
capital losses and potential failure of a bank, which is described as ‘bad management’ 
hypothesis. On the other hand, some exogenous to a bank events, which are not under 
management control such as economic downturn and associated with it extra costs for 
monitoring, negotiating workout arrangements, seizing and disposing of collateral, divert senior 
managerial focus, can influence low cost efficiency. This phenomenon is described as ‘bad luck’ 
hypothesis (Berger and De Young, 1997).  Berger and De Young (1997) analysis suggested that 
problem loans precede reductions in measured cost efficiency and that reductions in capital at 
poorly capitalised banks precede increases in problem loans.  
Similar to Berger and De Young’s (1997) result was found by Altunbas et al., (2000) where non-
performing loans are negatively related to bank cost efficiency. Their finding suggests that 
efficient banks better evaluate credit risk.  In line with that, Isik and Hassan (2003) tested 
whether non-performing loans are negatively associated with X-efficiency, and found that there 
was a statistically significant negative association between non-performing loans and cost, 
allocative, technical and scale efficiency. These findings confirm that managing problem loans is 
costly.  
For transition countries, Brissimis et al. (2008) find that capital and credit risks have negative 
impact on bank performance in newly accepted EU members, while liquidity risk have positive 
impact on performance. In developing countries the risk-taking effects on bank efficiency was 
carried out for the BRIC banks including Russia (Zhang at al., 2013). Zhang at al. (2013) used 
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output-distance function to estimate technical efficiency and efficiency effects, and concluded 
that BRICs banks performance was jeopardised by taking excessive credit, market and overall 
risks, but taking more capital risk led to higher efficiency. In general, the lower risk taking 
strategies are better for banks’ performance in BRIC countries.   
Market risk is calculated as interbank loans to total borrowed funds and reflects bank’s market 
exposure to interbank unsecured borrowings, which can lead to high risk exposure in case of 
market rates volatility. Funds’ costs purchased in the interbank market differ from deposits’ 
funds over the business cycle. Foreign banks in the US that used more purchased funds appeared 
to be less cost efficient (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Banks that rely on purchased regardless 
foreign or domestic funds found to be less profit efficient but contrary to expectations more cost 
efficient in the US (Berger and Mester, 1997).  In support to the results of Berger and Mester 
(1997), Isik and Hassan (2003) found that banks with relatively higher level of purchased funds 
are likely to be more cost efficient, which they explain by that that bank can economise on labour 
of physical capital using external funds. The efficiency can be also explained by the market 
discipline. Schaeck and Cihak (2007) included the ratio to adjust for market discipline referring 
to the opportunity for banks to monitor other banks in the interbank market and incentive for 
discipline as interbank deposits are uncovered by deposit protection schemes. Market risk found 
to have a negative influence on bank performance in developing countries when bank 
performance frontier is measured for a single country (Jiang et al., 2009), and as a common 
frontier for BRIC countries (Zhang et al., 2013). 
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3.2.4. Control variables  
We control for environmental and bank level factors that might influence efficiency. In our study 
we control for income diversity, assets diversity and listing at the bank level; and for the word 
financial crisis, GDP growth and custom union at the country level.    
Bank level factors 
Product diversification is closely related to scope efficiency, whether a bank is efficient at 
combining outputs. Bank’s efficiency might be linked to bank’s strength in targeting particular 
market niche; a specialised bank is more efficient than a universal bank (due to diseconomies of 
scale). Diversification is desirable for reduction of idiosyncratic risks, growth, realisation of 
efficiency gains via economies of scale and scope (Stiroh, 2010). However, the benefits of 
diversification towards no-traditional banking can be overweighed by more volatile revenue 
streams and inefficient performance (Stiroh, 2004; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 2010; Liu and Wilson, 2010). Poorer asset diversification had a negative impact 
on cost efficiency in Russia overweighing savings on skimping behaviour (Styrin, 2005). 
A number of empirical studies find that product diversity has a negative impact on cost 
efficiency Aly et al. (1990), Isik and Hassan (2003). In recent study by Zhang et al. (2013) 
diversification strategies appeared to have negative impact on bank performance with the 
exception of positive impact on the revenue sources in income-based model. We expect that 
diversification would negatively influence bank performance.  
Listing status captures the governance effect on performance, and it is used to analyse whether 
banks which go public are more efficient due to market pressure and transparency requirements 
or multiple monitoring than unlisted banks. In developed countries listed banks appeared to be 
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less cost efficient but more profit efficient than unlisted banks, which can be related to the 
difference in size, both mix and quality of assets, and operating performance (Iannotta et al., 
2007). Earlier findings also found that publicly traded banks are more cost and standard profit 
efficient (Berger and Mester, 1997). For developing countries results differ depending on what 
business processes are analysed. Listed banks are more efficient in income generation but less 
efficient in earning assets growing in China (Jiang et al., 2009); similarly, listed banks are more 
cost, profit and interest income efficient than unlisted banks. We expect that listed banks would 
have better performance than unlisted banks because going public policy are likely to improve 
performance.   
Environmental factors 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 and its negative consequences for transition countries we 
discussed in the chapter on the CISs banking systems review. We include dummy variable to 
capture financial environmental risk of the World financial crisis of 2007-2009. The crisis has 
fuelled the research relating to financial crisis and bank performance. The literature mainly 
indicates a negative impact of the crisis on efficiency. Cost efficiency significantly plunged 
down in emerging Asian economies (Sun and Chang, 2011). The impact of the global financial 
crisis was examined across the emerging economies’ banks by Zhang et al. (2013). They found 
that BRIC banks performance was negatively affected by the crisis with Russian banks being the 
most affected. Other study indicated that profit efficiency was more affected by the crisis than 
cost efficiency in China (Jiang et al., 2013).  The recent study by Matousek, et al. (2015) reports 
the overall decline in efficiency of European banks following the financial crisis and slow 
adjustments to the pre-crisis efficiency level, which confirmed Tsionas (2006) argument that 
efficiency does not recover fast after systemic shocks. We expect negative influence of the 
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global financial crisis on bank performance. We include GDP growth in to control for the level 
of economic development of the countries. This is a control variable, which is commonly used in 
cross-country studies. While GDP growth had a negative impact on performance in developing 
BRIC countries reflecting banks involvement in economic growth but not improving 
performance (Zhang et al., 2013), it had a positive impact on efficiency in China (Jiang, 2009). 
We anticipate a positive impact of GDP growth on efficiency.   
In our study we consider the regional integration processes and their influence on banks 
performance. Within the custom union treaty and its establishment, a common external tariff was 
adopted; and the customs clearance among the member-countries was abolished in July 2010, 
though member-countries agreed several exclusions from the common customs territory, the 
majority of which was valid until 2015 (World Bank Report, 2012). We use the dummy variable 
to reflect the integration process: 1 for after the customs clearance abolishment and 0 for before. 
We expect that the custom union membership would negatively affect bank performance due to 
worsening of economic conditions including increased price level on goods and services, which 
countries encountered after the lifting of trade barriers (especially in Kazakhstan and Belarus, 
where prices had to adjust and equalise with the price level in Russia). The influence of 
integration and particularly the custom union on bank efficiency has not been studied yet, though 
regional integration is one of the most important topics on political agenda in the CISs.     
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3.3. Methodology  
3.3.1. Stochastic frontier approach and inclusion of environmental 
variables 
In this work the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) is employed to measure the CISs banking 
sector efficiency. The advantages that SFA method has for our sturdy include the argument that 
disregarding which specific distributional assumptions are imposed, the SFA approach will 
always rank the efficiencies of the firms in the same order as their residuals, because the 
conditional mean is always increasing with the size of the residual (Bauer et al., 1998).  This 
SFA property calls for measuring bank efficiency for regulatory purposes because a bank, which 
keeps its costs low for its given exogenous conditions, is evaluated as a high rank in terms of 
efficiency. The other argument refers to the error term decomposition. As it was stated in the 
literature section, the random component of a residual may include measurement error, 
accounting inaccuracies and environmental disturbances, which are more likely in transition 
countries (Fries and Taci, 2005).   
The widely applied stochastic frontier analysis approach to measure efficiency originated in two 
papers, one by Aigner et al. (1977) and the other by Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) a 
month later. As mentioned before SFA models impose functional form for cost, profit and 
production relationship and allows for composed error term. In the SFA, an error term (𝜀𝑖) is 
decomposed into two parts and a distribution assumption is made about their functional forms. 
One part is production inefficiency as a non-negative random variable (𝑢𝑖) and the other is a 
random error (𝜗𝑖). That is:  𝜀𝑖 = 𝜗𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖 , where 𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0. The random error  𝜗𝑖  is normally 
independently and identically distributed as 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2), and 𝑢𝑖 has truncated normal distribution, 
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which is truncated at 0 because inefficiencies cannot be negative.  The two terms are independent 
of each other. Both random error  (𝜗𝑖) and inefficiency (𝑢𝑖) are orthogonal to the input (𝑥𝑖) and 
output (𝑦𝑖) vectors or environmental variables entering the equation.  The efficiency of each firm 
is based on the conditional mean (or mode) of inefficiency part of composed error (𝑢𝑖), given the 
estimated composed error term (𝜀𝑖)  (Bauer et al., 1998).  
Stochastic frontier approach postulates existence of the inefficiency effects, which vary across 
firms and/or through time.  If there are variations, it is important for efficiency studies to seek 
determinants of these variations since it could inform on what policies are appropriate to 
influence producer performance. Three different groups of factors were described that can 
influence producer performance. The one group of factors is associated with management 
abilities to organise production processes. The other two groups are exogenous such as 
environmental characteristics in which producer operates, and the influence of good/bad luck and 
omitted variables, which are reflected in a random error (Fried et al., 2002). The biasness in 
estimation of efficiency in models without environmental characteristics is due to the assumption 
that inefficiency differences across banks appear only because of managerial decisions. This 
should be corrected by including those environmental variables into models. This analysis 
requires a model, which can incorporate these factors.    
Existing analyses of producer performance can be divided into two stages. The first step is to 
estimate a stochastic frontier of cost, profit or production function, which serves as a benchmark 
against which the cost, profit or technical efficiencies are estimated. The objective of this 
component is to estimate the efficiency with which a producer uses inputs in producing outputs 
under some behavioural and distributional assumptions. In this step the distributional assumption 
is that inefficiencies are identically and independently distributed. 
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The second stage explores the causes of efficiency differences across firms by associating 
variations in producer performance with firm level characteristics and environmental variables 
(𝑧𝑖). These exogenous variables play a specific role in explaining efficiency differences by 
influencing the structure of the technology by which inputs are converted into outputs, or by 
influencing the efficiency with which outputs are produced using inputs. The environmental 
exogenous variables are out of managerial control and not the part of inputs to the production 
process or outputs, however, they influence the performance. Exogenous environmental 
variables among others may include various macroeconomic factors, ownership form, 
competitive pressure (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).   
Unfortunately, the formulation of the second stage has serious econometric problems. The two-
stage estimation procedure is inconsistent in the independence of the inefficiency effects 
assumptions in both stages. First, in the first stage a stochastic frontier excludes the exogenous 
variables (𝑧𝑖), and maximum likelihood estimator is used to generate regression residuals 
assuming that the components of   𝑧𝑖 and  𝑥𝑖 are uncorrelated with each component of  𝜀𝑖. If there 
is a correlation then the obtained maximum likelihood estimates are biased due to omitted 
variable 𝑧𝑖 in the stochastic frontier model. Thus even a successful second-stage regression 
would give dubious results as it used biased estimates of the true efficiencies. Second, in the first 
stage it is assumed that inefficiencies are identically distributed, however, in the second stage the 
estimated inefficiencies are used to regress against the exogenous variables  𝑧𝑖, which means that 
𝑧𝑖 should vary with 𝑢𝑖 to give the explanations. For these contradictions the two-stage approach 
is called as ‘schizophrenic’ approach (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).  
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Environmental variables incorporated 
In stochastic frontier framework, the environmental variables 𝑧𝑖 may be incorporated directly 
into the estimation of production frontier as control neput variables together with inputs 𝑥𝑖  and 
outputs 𝑦𝑖. In this case each firm faces a different production frontier (Drake et al., 2006)
20
. 
However, even if the environmental variables are included in the deterministic part as they 
influence the production processes, these models don’t inform on the impact of those variables 
𝑧𝑖  we are interested in on producers’ performance, which can be useful for policy implication. 
The other way of incorporation of the environmental variables 𝑧𝑖  is to employ a two-stage 
procedure by including them in the second stage of regressions after estimating production 
frontier. It is assumed that  𝑧𝑖  directly influence efficiency and the purpose is to explain the 
differences in obtained efficiencies. However, the drawbacks of this two-stage procedure, which 
are discussed in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), have been listed two paragraphs above.  
These problems were tackled by offering a single-stage procedure, where estimation of 
production technology and factors influencing inefficiencies are implemented simultaneously. In 
Wang and Schmidt (2002) the two-stage procedures are proved to be severely biased in both the 
first and second stages by using Monte Carlo evidence. They argue in favour of one-stage 
procedure, which estimators perform well, if one wants to assess the causes of differences in 
efficiencies. Single-stage procedure was proposed in stochastic frontier models by Kumbhakar et 
al. (1991), Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) and Battese and Coelli (1995).  
Kumbhakar et al. (1991), Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) and Huang and Liu (1994) models 
estimate stochastic frontier functions and specify the inefficiency effects (𝑢𝑖) as an explicit 
                                                          
20 
Inclusion of the environmental variables is discussed by Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), Lozano-Vivas et al. 
(2001) and Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002). 
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function of a vector of firm-specific variables and a random error. Battese and Coelli (1995) 
model reflects the same specifications as in the proposed models but the first-order profit 
maximisation conditions are removed, allocative efficiency is imposed, and it can be used for a 
panel dataset (Coelli, 1996).  The Battese and Coelli (1995) stochastic frontier model is specified 
as follows:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = exp(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡 −  𝑈𝑖𝑡),                                                                              (3.4) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the output of firm i (i = 1,2,…, N) at the t-th observation (t =1, 2,…,T);   𝑥𝑖𝑡   denotes 
a (1 × 𝑘) vector of values of known functions of inputs of production and other explanatory 
variables related to the 𝑖-th firm at time 𝑡; 𝛽 is a (𝑘 × 1) vector of unknown parameters to be 
estimated; 𝑉𝑖𝑡  are random errors 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑉
2); 𝑈𝑖𝑡 are independently distributed technical 
inefficiencies of production, which are non-negative normal distribution truncated at zero with 
mean 𝑧𝑖𝑡 𝛿, and 𝜎
2 variance; 𝑈𝑖𝑡 and 𝑉𝑖𝑡 are distributed independently of each other. 
The technical inefficiency effects 𝑈𝑖𝑡 in the model (3.4) are specified in (3.5): 
𝑈𝑖𝑡 =  𝑧𝑖𝑡𝛿 +  𝑊𝑖𝑡 ,                                                                                                       (3.5) 
where 𝑧𝑖𝑡  is a (1 × 𝑚) vector of exogenous variables associated with the technical inefficiency 
of production of firm 𝑖 over time 𝑡; and 𝛿 is a (𝑚 × 1) vector of unknown coefficients, 𝑊𝑖𝑡 is a 
random variable defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with mean ‘0’ and variance 
𝜎2, such that the truncation point is −𝑧𝑖𝑡𝛿,  i.e. 𝑊𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝛿 (Battese and Coelli, 1995).  
 The simultaneous estimation of the stochastic frontier parameters and inefficiency effects is 
made by using maximum likelihood function, which parameters are expressed in terms of 
variance,  σS
2 ≡  σV
2 + σ2 and γ ≡ σ2/σS
2 (Battese and Coelli, 1993). 
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Then the technical efficiency of production for the 𝑖th firm at time 𝑡 is calculated using the 
equation in (3.6):  
𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 = exp(−𝑈𝑖𝑡) = exp(−𝑧𝑖𝑡𝛿 −  𝑊𝑖𝑡 ).                                                               (3.6) 
The Battese and Coelli (1995) model can be easily specified as other efficiency models. The 
original model of Aigner et al. (1977) with half-normal distribution is specified, if all elements of 
the 𝛿 vector equal zero. In case if all z variables’ coefficients are equal zero except the first one, 
which has value 1, than the model represents Stevenson (1980) and Battese and Coellli (1992, 
1988) cases.  
Thus, the Battese and Coelli model uses maximum likelihood method and estimates both the 
model for the time-varying technical inefficacy effects and the parameter of the stochastic 
frontier simultaneously (in a single-stage) (Battese and Coelli, 1995). Besides the model can 
utilise technologies represented by distance, cost, profit and production functions fitting the 
Cobb-Douglas, Fourier Flexible and translog functional forms.   
3.3.2. Distance functions approach 
Hyperbolic distance function 
The efficiency frontier can be measured using cost, profit and distance functions. The first two 
cost and profit functions were usually used for estimation of frontiers (Berger et al., 1999), 
however, distance functions gained more extent application recently (Orea, 2002; Lovell, 2003; 
Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et. al., 2009). 
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After the distance functions were defined by Debreu (1951) and Shephard (1953), and 
empirically implemented by Farrell (1957), they were widely used based on input or output 
production possibility set representation of the technology. The first attempt to relax this 
assumption was done by Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985), when they presented hyperbolic 
graph distance function. The hyperbolic distance function quality that it does not depend on a 
fixed level of inputs or outputs technology was an advantageous leap forward.  
Paul e t al. (2000) embedded distance functions into SFA approach, which allowed for stochastic 
frontier estimation and separation of error term into random error and inefficiencies. The next 
improvement in hyperbolic distance function was done by Cuesta and Zofio (2005), who 
introduced a parametric translog hyperbolic distance function specification. This improvement 
allowed using the hyperbolic distance function for stochastic frontier analysis.   
We employ hyperbolic distance function for the following reasons. Hyperbolic distance function 
overcomes restrictions that are set by output and input distance functions. The traditional 
distance functions’ orientation allows for expansion of outputs while inputs are assumed 
exogenous in case of output distance function, and for contraction of inputs while outputs are 
assumed exogenous. So that, while input or output distance functions assume that outputs or 
inputs (respectively) are fixed, there is no such restriction in a hyperbolic distance function 
approach. These kind of restrictiveness is undesirable in some cases. We are interested in such a 
measure of efficiency that accounts for both inputs and outputs adjustability; and hyperbolic 
distance function allows for a simultaneous expansion of outputs and reduction of inputs. Lastly, 
a translog specification introduced by Christensen et al. (1971, 1973) is widely used in the 
literature on efficiency. For empirical application, translog specification for hyperbolic distance 
function, which complies with the conventional properties of the hyperbolic distance function, 
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was introduced by Cuesta and Zofio (2005). The translog specification of the hyperbolic distance 
function requires relatively simple transformations of the variables and can be implemented in a 
stochastic frontier analysis framework. We count on the Aigner et al. (1977) stochastic frontier 
model and its generalisation to the panel data by Battese and Coelli (1988) in analysis of bank 
efficiency in the CIS countries.  
Hyperbolic distance function and technical efficiency 
This study uses the stochastic hyperbolic distance function. As it was sated in literature review 
part, the advantages of the distance function in general is that it allows a production frontier to be 
estimated for industries with multiple inputs and multiple outputs when behavioural assumptions 
of optimisation of costs or maximisation of profit are not applicable and/or prices of output are 
not observed or inaccurately measured (Coelli and Perelman, 2000; Cuesta and Orea, 2002). 
Technical efficiency can be expressed as a hyperbolic distance function that is the distances from 
the actual vector of inputs-outputs and the production frontier. Therefore, technical efficiency 
denotes the ability to reduce inputs and expand output to maximally place production on the 
production frontier. Because of relaxation of assumption imposed on input- and output-distance 
functions, which allow for only input or output-orientation, the stochastic hyperbolic distance 
function allows for simultaneous estimation with expansion of outputs and contraction of inputs 
(Fare et. al., 1985; 1994). 
This study employs a one-step model, estimates all countries’ banks common efficiency frontier 
and uses the stochastic hyperbolic distance function. Suppose a production technology can 
produce outputs vector   𝑦𝑖 = (𝑦1𝑖 , … , 𝑦𝑀𝑖)  ∈ ℜ+
𝑀 , out of inputs vector  𝑥𝑖 = (𝑥1𝑖 , … , 𝑥𝐾𝑖)  ∈
110 
 
ℜ+
𝐾  , where 𝑖 = (1,2, … , 𝑁) is a number of firms. The technology can be presented following 
Cuesta and Zofio (2005):  
𝑇 = {(𝑥, 𝑦): 𝑥 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 𝑦}                                 (3.7) 
The hyperbolic distance function is introduced as maximum proportional expansion of the output 
vector 𝑦 and same proportional reduction of the input vector 𝑥.  The hyperbolic distance function 
𝐷𝐻: ℜ+
𝐾  × ℜ+
𝑀  → ℜ+ 𝑈 {+∞} is defined as: 
𝐷𝐻(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓{𝜆 > 0: (𝜆𝑥, 𝜆
−1𝑦) ∈ 𝑇 }            (3.8) 
where  represents the contraction of inputs and expansion of outputs proportionally, 0 < 𝜆 ≤ 1. 
The name of the hyperbolic distance function identifies the path to the production frontier that it 
generates. The hyperbolic distance function ranges: 0 < 𝐷𝐻(𝑥, 𝑦) ≤ 1.  
𝐷𝐻(𝑥, 𝑦)  ≤ 1(𝑥, 𝑦) ⇔  (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑇 indicates that vector (𝑥, 𝑦) is efficient when  𝐷𝐻(𝑥, 𝑦) = 1 
and the vector is inefficient if 𝐷𝐻(𝑥, 𝑦) < 1 , which can be improved by increasing outputs by 
and decreasing inputs by 1/. In this representation the hyperbolic distance function describes 
the production technology and technical efficiency is measured by the hyperbolic distance.  
For our purposes, the hyperbolic distance function 𝐷𝐻(𝑥, 𝑦) should satisfy the monotonicity 
constraints of increasing in output and decreasing in inputs
21
. The function is almost 
homogeneous of degree -1 in inputs (Aczel, 1966, Ch.7), 1 in outputs, and 1 in itself (Fare et al., 
1985).  
                                                          
21
 According to Fare et al. (1985) the hyperbolic function can behave non-monopolistic or be flat.  
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We intend to estimate hyperbolic technical efficiency using distance function in its translog 
form. The condition of almost homogeneity of translog distance function is imposed using Euler 
Theorem, which was introduced by Lau (1972). The hyperbolic distance function for an 
individual bank, i=1,2,…,I with n inputs and m outputs and time periods t = 1,2,…,T in translog 
form is shown below (Cuesta and Zofio, 2005): 
ln(𝐷𝐻𝑖) =  𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
1
2
 ∑ ∑ 𝑎𝑛𝑗 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑛=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1
+  
1
2
 ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑝
𝑀
𝑝=1
𝑀
𝑚=1
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑚 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡  
𝑀
𝑚=1
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡         (𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝐼)                       (3.9) 
The condition of almost homogeneity is satisfied when we normalise the equation (3.9) by an 
arbitrary output y (or input x) and we get the equation (3.10): 
ln(𝐷𝐻𝑖 𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡⁄ ) =  𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑛 
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡
∗∗ +
1
2
 ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑛𝑗 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡
∗∗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
∗∗
𝑁
𝑛=1
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡
∗
𝑀
𝑚=1
+  
1
2
 ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑝
𝑀
𝑝=1
𝑀
𝑚=1
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ +  ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡
∗∗
𝑀
𝑚=1
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡
∗        (𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝐼)                         (3.10) 
        
where  𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡⁄       and 𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡
∗∗ = 𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡. It results that all the logarithmic terms that 
have the normalising M
th
 output equal zero; and summation comprising  𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡
∗   includes M-1 
outputs. At the same time, the inputs are preserved at the same number N. 
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The almost homogeneity condition of degrees -1, 1, 1 is satisfied when the following constraints 
(3.11) are imposed in equation (3.10) and involves all lnx and lny. This means that when the 
outputs are increased by a certain proportion and the inputs are decreased by that proportion, it 
will result that the distance function will be increased by the same proportion.  
∑ 𝛽𝑚 
𝑀
𝑚=1
−  ∑ 𝛼𝑛 = 1 ;
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
∑ 𝛾𝑚 
𝑀
𝑚=1
−  ∑ 𝛼𝑛 = 0 (𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
𝑠𝑜 ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑚 
𝑀
𝑚=1
𝑁
𝑛=1
−  ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑛𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
= 0; ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑡 
𝑀
𝑚=1
 −  ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑡 = 0 (𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑀), 𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
𝑠𝑜 ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑝 
𝑀
𝑝=1
𝑀
𝑚=1
− ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑚 
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑀
𝑚=1
= 0;                                                                                                 (3.11) 
and therefore: ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑘 = ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑚 
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑀
𝑚=1
𝑀
𝑘=1
𝑀
𝑚=1 ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑛𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 = 𝛷
𝑁
𝑛=1            (3.12) 
We present the hyperbolic distance function in a stochastic framework, which allows for a 
random disturbance (3.13).  
−𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑛 
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡
∗∗ +
1
2
 ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑛𝑗 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡
∗∗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
∗∗
𝑁
𝑛=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡
∗
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
+  
1
2
 ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑝
𝑀−1
𝑝=1
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ +  ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡
∗∗
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝛿𝑡𝑡 +  
1
2
 𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑡
2
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑦𝑚𝑡 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑛
∗
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑥𝑛 𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛
∗ + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐻𝑖               (𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝐼)     (3.13) 
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where, −𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐻𝑖, which is interpreted as 𝑢𝑖~ |𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2)|, captures technical inefficiency and has a 
truncated non-negative normal distribution, which measures the distance between the observed 
input-output vector and the common production frontier; 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is a random error, which 
incorporates noise and has a normal standard distribution, 𝑣𝑖𝑡~N(0,σv
2
); and v and 𝑢𝑖  are 
independent of each other.  
The assumption that  𝑣𝑖𝑡 and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 are independent for all t = 1, 2,…, T, and i = 1,2,…, N is a 
simplification, which is required to be accounted. The method of maximum likelihood 
methodology introduced by Pitt and Lee (1981) and extended by Battese and Coelli (1988) is 
used to retrieve the individual conditional distribution of the one-sided error term, 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝜀𝑖𝑡), 
and the technical inefficiency model simultaneously. Equation in (3.13) represents stochastic 
translog hyperbolic distance function, and its generalised empirical model incorporating Battese 
and Coelli (1995) model is in (3.14; 3.15), which is used to obtain  𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝜀𝑖𝑡). These values are 
the inputs to (3.16), which is used to obtain time-varying hyperbolic technical efficiency estimate 
for each bank:   
ln(𝐷𝐻𝑖 𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡⁄ ) = 𝑇𝐿(𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡;  𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) + (𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖𝑡)                                                   (3.14) 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛿𝑛𝑧𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑛 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                                                            (3.15) 
𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐻(𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡;  𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾)] = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(− 𝑢𝑖𝑡) ,         (3.16) 
where the model should be re-parameterised using: 𝜎2 ≡ 𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2  and 𝛾 ≡ 𝜎𝑢
2 (𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2 )⁄  
(Battese and Corra, 1977). 
The possibility of endogeneity problem in econometric estimation of distance functions is an 
issue when in the standard input-oriented and output-oriented distance functions both sets of 
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inputs and outputs appear as explanatory variables. This problem was mentioned in some 
empirical works
22
 and later was discussed in Coelli (2000). It was established that distance 
functions can be safely estimated. Due to the nature of normalisation of the input (output) 
distance function the set of explanatory variables are the outputs (inputs) and the input (output) 
ratios. After this normalisation the ratios explanatory variables can be treated as exogenous, 
because the homogeneity of degree one condition in inputs (outputs) indicates that the error term 
equally affects all the inputs (outputs). This argument can be applied to the econometric 
estimation of hyperbolic distance functions as well (Cuesta and Zofio, 2005).  When one of the 
outputs is used for normalisation, regressors are now presented by the outputs ratios and the 
products of that normalising output and inputs. Both outputs and inputs are affected by the error 
term, though outputs are affected directly and inputs inversely. Therefore, all regressors can be 
treated as exogenous variables. 
Overall, the model includes merits of hyperbolic distance function approach, and one-step 
stochastic model of Battese and Coelli (1995), and adds to the hyperbolic function model of 
Cuesta and Zolio (2005) by estimating time-varying technical efficiency model. Additionally, the 
empirical model of technical efficiency estimates the effects of bank ownership and risk-taking 
characteristics, and environmental conditions simultaneously. The complex analysis is possible 
to implement in practice using the software package developed by Coelli: Frontier4.1. 
Robustness tests 
We check our main results obtained using hyperbolic distance function by using different 
functional specification, namely output distance function. As it was stated in section 3.2 distance 
                                                          
22 
See Sickles et al. (1996), Cuesta and Orea (1998), Atkinson and Primont (1998), Atkinson et al. (1999) and 
Alvarez (2000). 
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functions can model multi-input and multi-output technologies; in this section the output-
distance function is defined.  
The output distance function is chosen for robustness test for the following reasons. Financial 
liberalisation that experienced transition countries together with high growth rates of economies 
on average in the region provided favourable conditions for, that banks would be most likely 
concentrated on output production expansion. The other reason is that if we want to robust check 
the hyperbolic distance function, which takes into account both expansion in outputs and 
contraction in inputs, we are interested in explaining a larger part of inefficiencies using other 
distance functions. In this case our choice is the output-distance function, given that the most of 
differences in bank efficiency arises from the output side (Berger et al., 1993).   
The output distance function is an alternative representation of a production technology with 
multiple inputs and outputs. The duality relationship between several production technologies 
and economic behaviours was established by Shephard, who also linked output distance function 
and revenue function (Shephard, 1970)
23
. The multiinput-multioutput technology can be 
modelled by the technology set of feasible combinations of inputs and outputs in a convenient 
functional form (Fare and Primont, 1995). Let us assume the following technology:  
𝑇 = {(𝑥, 𝑦): 𝑥 ∈ ℜ+
𝑁 , 𝑦 ∈ ℜ+
𝑀, 𝑥 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 𝑦},                      (3.17) 
where x = (x1, …, xN) is the input vector N; y = (y1,…, yM) is the output vector M;  and  ℜ+
𝑁 is the 
set of non-negative and real n-tuples.  
Let P(x) be the set of feasible output vectors, y, that are obtained from the input vector x:  
                                                          
23 
 Earlier Shephard (1953) established the duality between the input distance function and the cost function in 1953. 
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𝑃(𝑥) = {𝑦: (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑇}.                                        (3.18) 
Then the output distance function in terms of the output set is (Fare and Primont, 1995):  
𝐷𝑂(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜃 > 0 ∶ (𝑦/𝜃) ∈ 𝑃(𝑥) },                 (3.19) 
where  𝜃 is the scalar, which corresponds to the ‘distance’ by which the output vector can be 
deflated; 𝐷𝑂(𝑥, 𝑦) is non-decreasing, positively linearly homogeneous, and convex in y – the 
output vector, and non-increasing in x – the input vector (Lovell et al., 1994), and it is defined as 
the maximum feasible expansion of the output vector, y, with the input vector, x, held fixed. The 
distance function 𝐷𝑂(𝑥, 𝑦) will be less or equal to one, if the output vector, y, is an element of the 
feasible production set of P(x). The firm is considered as efficient if the distance function 
𝐷𝑂(𝑥, 𝑦) equals to one meaning that the firm’s output, y, is located on the best-practice frontier. 
The firm is inefficient, if its output, y, is interior of the frontier, and the value of the distance 
function 𝐷𝑂(𝑥, 𝑦) is less than one. The constant return to scale is imposed by imposing 
homogeneity of degree -1 in inputs (Coelli and Perelman, 1996).  
We employ a translog functional form instead of Cobb-Douglas from. The translog function is 
flexible and allows satisfying regulatory restrictions of degree one in outputs. Following Lovell 
et al. (1994), if firms use n inputs to produce m outputs, then a translog form of the above output 
distance function is:  
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𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑂(𝒚, 𝒙, 𝑡) =  𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚 +
1
2
 ∑ ∑ 𝑎𝑚𝑝 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝
𝑀
𝑝=1
𝑀
𝑚=1
 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
+
1
2
 ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑗 + ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑚 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛 
𝑀
𝑚=1
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚 +   𝛿𝑡𝑡 +  
1
2
 𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑡
2
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑦𝑚𝑡 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
+  ∑ 𝛿𝑥𝑛 𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛                                                                       (3.20)  
where ‘o’ sands for the ‘output-oriented’ distance function, x denotes input, y denotes output and 
t denotes time trend. The constraints for homogeneity of degree one for outputs are sown in 
(3.21): 
∑ 𝛼𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1 = 1;  ∑ 𝑎𝑚𝑝 
𝑀
𝑝=1 = 0 (𝑚 = 1, 2, … , 𝑀); ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑚 = 0 (𝑛 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁); 
𝑀
𝑚=1  ∑ 𝛿𝑡𝑡 =
𝑀
𝑚=1
0 (𝑚 = 1, 2, … , 𝑀),                                                                                          (3.21) 
and symmetry is in (3.22): 
𝛼𝑚𝑝 =  𝛼𝑝𝑚  (m,n = 1,2,…,M) and  𝛽𝑛𝑗 =  𝛽𝑗𝑛 (𝑛, 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑁)           (3.22) 
The homogeneity constraint for output-distance function is imposed by dividing the output-
distance function by one of the outputs. The homogeneity property infers that 𝐷𝑜(𝑥, 𝜔𝑦) =
𝜔𝐷𝑜(𝑥, 𝑦) for any  𝜔 > 0. The constraint can be met in empirical practices, if we normalise by 
the 𝑀𝑡ℎ output and set 𝜔 equal to 1 𝑦𝑚⁄ , then 𝐷𝑜(𝑥, 𝑦 𝑦𝑚⁄ ) = 𝐷𝑜(𝑥, 𝑦)/𝑦𝑚. In this case the 
Equation (3.20) converts into: 
ln 𝐷𝑜𝑖 /𝑦𝑀𝑖 =  𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑛 
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖 +
1
2
 ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑛𝑗 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑗𝑖
𝑁
𝑛=1
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖
∗
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
+
1
2
 ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑝
𝑀−1
𝑝=1
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖
∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑖
∗ +  ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖
∗     𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁   (3.23)  
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were 𝑦𝑚𝑖
∗ =
𝑦𝑚
𝑦𝑀
, 𝑦𝑝𝑖
∗ =
𝑦𝑝𝑖
𝑦𝑀 .
 
After rearranging the (3.23) we get the following expression: 
−𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑀𝑖 =  𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑛 
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖 +
1
2
 ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑛𝑗 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑗𝑖
𝑁
𝑛=1
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖
∗
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
+  
1
2
 ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑝
𝑀−1
𝑝=1
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖
∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑖
∗ + ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖
∗ − ln 𝐷𝑜𝑖         𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁           (3.24) 
When we fit in a distance function into the stochastic frontier models we interpret the 
distance,− ln 𝐷𝑜𝑖, as an inefficiency error term 𝑢𝑖, which is an inefficiency part of a composed 
error term of a standard stochastic frontier; the other part is a symmetric random error 𝑣𝑖 .  
The left hand side term −𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑀𝑖  is transformed into positive term 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑀𝑖 for empirical purposes, 
and we substituted − ln 𝐷𝑜𝑖  by its components 𝑢𝑖 and  𝑣𝑖. Then, the function 𝐷𝑂(𝒚, 𝒙, 𝑡) in our 
study is converted into the following output distance model with standard stochastic frontier 
settings, when normalised by the output yM (Lovell et al., 1994; Coelli and Perelman, 1996) and 
rearranged:  
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑛 
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
1
2
 ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑛𝑗 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=1
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡
∗
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
+
1
2
 ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑝
𝑀−1
𝑝=1
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ +  ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡
∗ +  𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 
1
2
 𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑡
2
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑦𝑚𝑡 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑛
∗
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
+  ∑ 𝛿𝑥𝑛 𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡       (𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝐼)                (3.25) 
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where  𝑦∗ =  𝑦𝑚/𝑦𝑀, u captures technical inefficiency and has a truncated non-negative normal 
distribution, and when by definition 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑜  ≤ 0, then u = −𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑜; v incorporates noise and has a 
normal standard distribution, v~N(0,σv
2
); and v and u are independent of each other. 
As with the hyperbolic distance function, a translog stochastic output distance function in (3.25) 
is empirically estimated by fitting into Battese and Coelli (1995) model: 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝐿(𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑖 𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾⁄ ) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                               (3.26) 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛿𝑛 𝑛 𝑧𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                                                               (3.27) 
𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 = exp(−𝑢𝑖𝑡) = exp(−𝑧𝑖𝑡𝛿 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡)                                                                         (3.28) 
where the model is re-parameterised (Battese and Corra, 1977) by: 𝜎  2  ≡  𝜎𝑣
2  +  𝜎𝑢
2   and  
𝛾 ≡
𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑣
2+𝜎𝑢
2  .  
When both inputs and outputs are dependent variables, it can cause endogeneity problem as they 
are simultaneously identified, as discussed in section on hyperbolic distance function. This 
problem is tackled by normalising all outputs by one of the outputs, thus imposing homogeneity 
of degree one in outputs. As a result the independent variable now is the output ratios rather than 
output volumes, which make these variables exogenous (Coelli and Perelman, 1996). 
Kumbhakar (2013) advises on using two-step estimation approach for endogeneity problem. This 
remedy is offered for the non-constant returns to scale models, and when inputs and outputs are 
considered as endogenous variables. The first step is to estimate the model using instrumental 
variables for endogenous variables while ignoring inefficiency effects, while the second step is to 
estimate inefficiency using the stochastic frontier technic.  
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3.3.3. Empirical model and data 
The empirical model estimated in the study represents the intermediation approach based on 
Sealey and Lindley (1977). The choice of inputs and outputs of the financial firm in this chapter 
specifies income-based model. The estimated empirical model specifies two inputs such which 
are interest and non-interest expenses and two outputs as net interest income and non-interest 
operating income, which helps to focus on the efficiency of generating revenue (Sturm and 
Williams, 2004). Technical inefficiency effects model estimates the influence of risk-taking 
behaviour, different ownership types, and environmental characteristics on bank efficiency. We 
don’t include firm-specific/environmental factors directly in the deterministic part of cost/profit 
functions and assume that they influence inefficiency distribution (as in Coelli et al., 1999). It 
means that these factors impact the distance between banking firm performance and the best 
practice frontier. The estimated efficiency scores are regarded as ‘gross’ measures of efficiency 
when firm-specific and macroeconomic factors define inefficiency effects and take into account 
differences among countries (Coelli et al., 1999).  
The empirical technical inefficiency effect model for an individual financial firm below (3.29), 
which contains indicators of ownership; risk taking behaviour and a set of control variables, is 
estimated, using on-stage estimation procedure, together with the equation in (3.13) by Cuesta 
and Zofio (2005), with the difference that we estimate time-varying hyperbolic technical 
efficiency.  
𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝛿0 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑎𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑏𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 
8
𝑏=5
+  ∑ 𝛿𝑐
14
𝑐=9
4
𝑎=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                       (3.29) 
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where 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 stands for a set of dummy variables representing the nature of ownerships such 
as foreign, state, private, and CIS-country-owner, for bank i in time t; 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 is a set of 
explanatory variables capturing risks such as capital, credit, liquidity and market risks, for bank i 
in year t; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑙 represents a vector, which contains control variables for the model such as 
bank level controls: income diversity, asset diversity and listing, and environmental controls: 
GDP growth, the world financial crisis 2007-2009 and custom union establishment. 
Risk represents different types of risk that financial firm can face. Following the empirical 
literature we define capital, credit, liquidity, and market risks as follows. The first is capital risk, 
which is measured by the ratio of equity to total assets. The higher is the ratio means the higher 
is the capital, as a result the lower is the risk that the bank becomes insolvent. The second is 
credit risk. The ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans indicates how credit risk is managed by 
a bank. If the ratio is low, a bank makes sufficient successful loans, given a similar charge-off 
policy, the lower the ratio the better the quality of the loan portfolio. The third risk is liquidity 
risk. The liquidity risk is lower if there are enough holdings of liquid assets, which can be 
measured by the liquid assets to total assets ratio. However, the imposed liquidity levels are the 
cost for bank as higher levels of cash and liquid assets holdings causes higher costs. The fourth is 
market risk, which is proxied by the ratio of interbank borrowing to total borrowing. The more a 
banking firm relies on the interbank loans the higher the market risk that occurs in case of hikes 
in interest rate or during the crises periods.    
The Control variables present two levels of specific indicators. The first is environmental 
indicators, which include dummies custom union establishment (2010), GDP growth and the 
global financial crisis (2009). The dummy variable for the custom union establishment takes 
value 1, when the custom union-member countries when the customs clearance among the 
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member-countries was abolished in 2010 and 0 before that. The GDP growth reflects the 
economic environment while the custom union dummies reflect institutional environment and 
legal framework in which banking firms operate in the custom union member-countries (Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russian Federation). The last country level control – financial crisis dummy 
variable (2009) – divides the period into two parts before the crisis from 2005 till 2009 and after 
the crisis from 2009 till 2012. The definitions of dummy variables used for technical and 
cost/profit inefficiency effects models are in the Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1: The definitions of dummy variables in the technical inefficiency effect model 
Ownership variables Definition 
Government-owned banks Equals 1 for state-owned commercial banks and 0 otherwise  
Domestic private banks Equals 1 for private commercial banks and 0 otherwise 
Foreign-owned banks Equals 1 for foreign-owned banks and 0 otherwise 
CIS-member-owned banks Equals 1 for CISs member country owned banks and 0 otherwise 
Control variables   
Global financial crisis 2007-2009 Equals 1 for after 2008 and 0 before 
Custom union establishment Equals 1 for after the establishment of the custom union and 0 for before 
Listing  Equals 1 for publicly listed banks and 0 otherwise 
Note: The first indicator is omitted from the estimation because of collinearity 
The second group is banking firm-specific indicators. They include the dummy Listing, which 
considers whether a banking firm is registered on a stock market (1) or not (0). Listed banks may 
be more disciplined and transparent and thus are expected to perform better. For controlling 
diversity in banking activities we look at assets and income diversity. Diversification of banking 
activities reflects economies of scope. Non-traditional banking activities combined with 
traditional ones may show small positive results for profitability (Gallo et al. 1996), and may not 
contribute to risks reduction; on the contrary it can increase risks and income volatility
24
 in 
comparison with banks oriented to the lending loans as a traditional banking activity (Lepetit et 
                                                          
24
 See for example De Young and Roland, 2001; Boyd and Graham, 1986; Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Kwan, 1998; 
Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh, and Rumble, 2006; Laeven and Levine, 2007 
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al., 2008). In our work, Assets diversity is expressed as the fraction of securities in total earning 
assets, which means that the higher the share the more assets are diversified. Income diversity is 
represented as the fraction of non-interest earnings received from non-traditional banking 
activities in total earnings, where the higher the share the greater is diversification.  
Data and descriptive statistics  
This study uses data for commercial banks of the CISs countries. The period under consideration 
is between 2005 and 2012, because most of the reforms on transition from planned to market 
bases in the banking sectors had been implemented in the CIS countries before 2005. We use the 
unbalanced panel data obtained from the Bankscope
25
  data base, national central banks of the 
CIS countries, the Financial Structure Dataset from the World Bank, and the websites of the 
commercial banks of the sample. The data are in thousands of US dollars and adjusted to the 
GDP deflator with 2005 as the base year. The number of observations is 2431; the number of 
commercial banks of the CIS countries is 376, including all commercial banks of CIS countries 
available from the Bankscope database except for Russia. Russian banks include banks that are 
in the list of the Interfax-100 data as the top 100 banks in Russia and, all other banks with 
average total assets greater than 150,000 thousand dollars, and banks with average less than 
150,000 thousand dollars, if ownership information is available. Turkmenistan banks were 
excluded from the sample for two reasons. The number of observations left only 5, which meet 
the requirements for the sample. Moreover, in Turkmenistan banks operate as payment agents of 
the central bank to subsidise the economy, which make the efficiency analysis meaningless. 
                                                          
25
 Bankscope is a database provided by Bureau van Dijk. It provides harmonised data for banks based on financial 
statement information. Bankscope data has been extensively used for banking sectors analysis as well as for cross-
country comparisons. 
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The sample breakdown by country and number of bank as well as average assets size is resented 
in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.2: Sample description: number of banks and average assets size by country and 
year 
Country/Y
ear 
200
5 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total by 
country 
Total assets of 
average bank  
(th $) 
Armenia 8 10 11 14 14 13 13 11 94 162,927 
Azerbaijan 9 11 12 13 16 17 18 19 115 570,906 
Belarus 7 7 9 9 10 15 15 13 85 1,106,009 
Kyrgyzstan 3 3 3 4 3 3 6 5 30 101,872 
Kazakhstan 13 13 17 19 19 18 20 22 141 3,331,045 
Moldova 8 8 10 11 9 9 10 10 75 218,076 
Russian 
Federation 
157 192 207 209 230 246 250 245 1736 2,239,447 
Tajikistan 2 2 2 2 1 4 4 4 21 221,335 
Ukraine 8 8 10 11 11 12 14 12 86 3,265,249 
Uzbekistan 3 3 3 5 6 8 11 9 48 841,556 
Total by 
year 218 257 284 298 320 346 362 351 2436 2,005,317 
Note: Turkmenistan is not included in the sample as the only one bank information was available from Bankscope 
with three consequent years data for commercial banks. 
3.3.4. Descriptive statistics 
The banking sector statistics of the CISs are shown in Table 3.3. The mean statistics indicates the 
average numbers over the period for the countries. The first part of the Table 3.3 contains input 
and output variables used for technical efficiency estimation. The risk-taking behaviour variables 
reveal that the banking sectors are capitalized by 17.8%. The ratio of credit risk shows 7.2% for 
the CISs. The CISs’ banks as a whole hold 28.7% of total assets as liquid assets. The CISs banks 
source 17.6% of their total borrowings from the interbank markets. The similar average risk 
ratios in BRIC countries are 8%, 5%, 34% and 22% for capital, credit, liquidity and market risk 
respectively (Zhang et al., 2013) indicating that CISs countries are on average are better 
capitalised and have lower market risks, while have riskier credit portfolio and higher liquidity 
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risk
26
. The CISs banks on average choose income diversification over asset diversification 
strategies.  
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics (2005-2012) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Input and output variables         
Interest expenses* 68864.76 159693 222.136 873927 
Non-interest expenses*  91799.09 157905.1 1551.42 836355 
Net interest income* 61232.57 138375.7 915.427 756753 
Non-interest income* 68067.14 121591.5 131.344 661512 
Inefficiency effect variables     
Risk-taking     
Capital risk 17.75 32.29 0.035 943.04 
Credit risk 7.15 6.98 0.009 108.87 
Liquidity risk 28.67 32.92 1.601 932.24 
Market Risk 17.58 20.31 0 100.01 
Other control variables     
Income diversity 54.12 56.15 0.01 2298.14 
Asset diversity 12.75 13.12 0.0001 97.28 
Log of GDP growth 2.39 0.84 0 3.131 
Note: (1) * Values are in thousands US dollars (2005 price level).  
 
  
                                                          
26  
The EU countries had 7.5% and 8.2% of capital and credit risk ratios respectively (World Bank Financial 
Indicators. Available from: http://data.worldbank.org/region/EUU. Accessed on: 19.98.2015). 
126 
 
3.4. Empirical results 
3.4.1. Results from frontier estimation 
Table 3.4 reports estimation results of the one-step maximum likelihood obtained from the 
income based model using stochastic hyperbolic distance function and traditional output-based 
distance function both without and with inclusion of country dummy in the frontier model. 
Models (1) and (3) use hyperbolic distance function, while (1) is without country dummies in 
frontier model and (3) has country dummies in its frontier model; (2) and (4) use traditional 
output-based distance function, while (2) is without country dummies in frontier model and (4) 
has country dummies in its frontier model. While individual coefficients for inputs and outputs 
are not discussed because of problematic interpretation due to collinearity problem arising from 
quadratic and interaction terms in the translog specification, the overall quality of the model in 
the maximum likelihood estimation is characterised by the re-parameterised deviations  𝜎2 ≡
𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2  and 𝛾 ≡ 𝜎𝑢
2 (𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2 )⁄  (Battese and Corra, 1977).  The first variance  𝜎2  is the sum of 
random errors’ squared standard deviations and inefficiencies’ squared standard deviations, and 
the second variance 𝛾 is the ratio, which measures the share of the inefficiency term 𝜎𝑢 as a part 
of the total composite error term. 
Results indicate that the models are of a good fit. Gamma (≡u
v
u
) is 0. 78 in the base 
model (1) estimated using stochastic hyperbolic distance function and 0.86, 0.87 and 0.86 in 
other (2), (3) and (4) respectively. The gammas indicate that a significant part of the error terms 
reflect inefficiencies. The goodness of fit statistics of the model such as the log likelihood 
function’ statistics and the LR test, which show the presence of the one-sided error component, 
indicate a good fit of the models. The monotonicity of the output distance function is proved by 
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the expected signs of the elasticities at the geometric mean. That means that the hyperbolic 
distance function is decreasing in outputs and non-decreasing in inputs. The scale elasticities are 
defined as the sum of all input elasticities of order one, which negative value indicates returns to 
scale (Färe and Primont, 1996). If the absolute value of the sum input elasticities is less (greater) 
than one then there are decreasing (increasing) returns of scale. In our models estimation the 
scale elasticity indicates decreasing returns to scale for the CISs banks in all model specifications 
(1) (3) and (4) with elasticities -0.545, -0.953, -0.527 and -0.908 respectively. The average 
efficiency of the CISs banks in the models are 94%, 89%, 94%, and 89% during the period 2005-
2012.  
Table 3.4: Estimation results of efficiency frontiers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Hyperbolic distance 
function 
Traditional output 
oriented distance 
function 
Hyperbolic distance 
function 
Traditional output 
oriented distance 
function 
Scale elasticity -0.545 -0.953 -0.527 -0.908 
Sigma-squared  0.100***  0.433*** 0.100***  0.401*** 
Gamma 0.783*** 0.866*** 0.731*** 0.860*** 
Log likelihood 1395 -276 1341 -238 
LR test 1166 1191 984 1231 
Average efficiency 0.943 0.893 0.936 0.896 
Country dummy in 
frontier model 
No No Yes Yes 
Notes: *, **, *** signifies significance level at 10 %, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 3.5 show results of technical efficiency by country and by year for the model (1)
27
. Mean 
technical efficiency scores on average are higher than profit and cost efficiencies reported in the 
next chapter. The scores also indicate differences in technical efficiencies across the CISs’ 
                                                          
27
 See Appendix B, Table B1 for mean technical efficiencies estimated using other model specifications. 
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banks. On average, banks from Ukraine are the most technical efficient (0.956) while 
Kazakhstani banks are the least efficient (0.896). 
Table 3.5: Mean technical efficiency by country and by year (2005-2012), model (1) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average  
by country 
Armenia 0.888 0.915 0.891 0.905 0.936 0.934 0.932 0.934 0.919 
Azerbaijan 0.939 0.927 0.921 0.904 0.953 0.957 0.954 0.955 0.942 
Belarus 0.960 0.944 0.925 0.934 0.939 0.932 0.923 0.929 0.934 
Kyrgyzstan 0.902 0.885 0.885 0.905 0.931 0.933 0.928 0.914 0.912 
Kazakhstan 0.938 0.933 0.911 0.930 0.806 0.899 0.896 0.883 0.896 
Moldova 0.956 0.943 0.915 0.926 0.957 0.950 0.946 0.952 0.942 
Russia 0.936 0.933 0.934 0.952 0.956 0.951 0.950 0.951 0.946 
Tajikistan 0.958 0.948 0.952 0.955 0.956 0.955 0.959 0.937 0.952 
Ukraine 0.965 0.960 0.959 0.929 0.960 0.966 0.966 0.964 0.959 
Uzbekistan 0.961 0.958 0.953 0.951 0.956 0.959 0.946 0.961 0.955 
Average by year 0.937 0.933 0.930 0.943 0.945 0.948 0.946 0.946  
 
3.4.2. Results from inefficiency effect model 
The results of the technical inefficiency of the income-based model estimated using stochastic 
hyperbolic distance function and traditional output-based distance model are reported in the 
Table 3.6. We report first the results from the model estimated using stochastic hyperbolic 
distance function as the base model in the column (1) and the other results are the robustness 
tests (column 2, 3, and 4). One must keep in mind that the model we estimate identifies 
inefficiency, thus to interpret the results the positive sign would mean more inefficiency or less 
efficiency and vice versa.   
Our model distinguishes among ownership types, risk taking characteristics and environmental 
variables impact on bank performance. We first report the ownership impact on performance. 
The findings are of particular interest as they shed light on the bank ownership structure 
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effectiveness in terms of technical efficiency. The state-owned indicator is omitted for 
comparison reason.  
Table 3.6: Estimation results of technical efficiency using distance function approach 
  (1) 
Main model 
(2) 
Robust check  
(3) 
Robust check 
(4) 
Robust check 
  Hyperbolic 
distance 
function 
Traditional 
output 
oriented 
distance 
function 
Hyperbolic 
distance 
function 
Traditional 
output 
oriented 
distance 
function 
Ownership     
Domestic private banks 0.354*** 0.210** 0.609*** 0.235*** 
Foreign-owned banks 0.865*** 0.168*** 0.827*** 1.609*** 
    CIS-member-owned banks -0.250*** -0.100*** -0.043 -0.817*** 
Risks         
Capital risk 0.003*** 0.0095*** 0.0008 0.013*** 
Credit risk -0.006*** 0.005* -0.009*** 0.003 
Liquidity risk -0.004*** -0.0096*** -0.002 -0.0129*** 
Market risk -0.433*** -0.007*** -0.0013 -0.007*** 
Controls     
Income diversity -0.00002 -0.00009** -0.0004 -0.145*** 
Asset diversity 0.007*** 0.016*** 0.004*** 0.014*** 
    GDP growth -0.008 -0.077** -0.065*** -0.150*** 
2007-2009 Global financial crisis -0.390*** -0.100*** -0.431*** -1.311*** 
Custom union establishment 0.110*** 0.134*** 0.166*** 0.379*** 
Listing -0.495*** -1.09*** -0.257*** -0.843*** 
Country dummy in frontier model No No Yes Yes 
Notes: (1) Robust t-statistics in parentheses; (2) *, **, *** signifies significance level at 10 %, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
Our findings suggest that, taking state owned banks as a benchmark, privately owned banks are 
less technically efficient at 1% significance level then state-owned banks in terms of income 
generation. These results of the revenue focused model indicate that state-owned banks are more 
efficient in turning costs into revenue then private domestic banks. The reasons could be two 
fold. Firstly, the state-owned banks usually invest in large scale government projects due to 
‘development’ objective (Megginson, 2005), thus having high output level. Secondly, it can be 
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explained by the legacy of the financial sector inherited from the soviet times; due to being 
widely trusted and long present in the market, state owned banks have wider and less costly 
access to deposits in terms of labour and physical capital. As a result they have advantages in 
costs
28
. Switching costs endogenously appear when banks have an advantage because they have 
better information on their clients in comparison to their rivals (Rajan, 1992).   
The positive and significant coefficient at 1% significance level for our second banks type 
specification indicates that foreign banks are less efficient than state-owned banks in the CISs 
countries, which can be explained by the differences in institutions between host and home 
country of foreign bank (Lensink et al., 2008). Though, Lensink et al. (2008) found that foreign 
banks are less cost efficient than domestic, while we found it for technical efficiency. Our 
results, nevertheless, support the home field advantage hypothesis for foreign banks technical 
efficiency, which may be the result of comparative disadvantages in technologies involving 
‘soft’ information about the host country market conditions, which is difficult to process for 
foreign banks (Berger, 2007). 
We found that the CISs-member ownership has statistically significant positive association with 
bank performance at 1% significance level. It is not surprisingly, taking into account the strategy 
of the expansion of the CISs banks abroad. That is the CISs banks enter countries with less 
developed financial sectors in the region, this banks priori are more efficient than banks of the 
host country. It is mostly Russian state-owned banks and Kazakhstan commercial banks, which 
banking sectors are the most developed in the region, that penetrate into the other CIS countries 
banking sectors. 
                                                          
28
 Switching costs can arise from time and efforts needed to close and open an account and to become accustomed to 
new procedures and stuff in another bank (Kim et al., 2003). 
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Turning to our second group of variables, the findings show different impacts of risk behaviour 
on bank technical efficiency in the CISs countries. The coefficient on capital risk is positive and 
highly significant, indicating that there is a positive association between capital risk (lower 
capital) and performance. Such results may have analogous implications as those of Altunbas et 
al. (2007) who suggest that inefficient banks hold more capital and take less risk.   
The credit risk coefficient is negative and significant indicating that banks with riskier behaviour 
are more efficient. The higher loan loss reserves indicate the managers’ anticipation of a higher 
future level of credit risk being aware of the riskier loans they made in the past. However, riskier 
loans produce higher interest income, which is one of the outputs of our model specification, 
reflecting higher efficiency. The result implies that managers are deliberately trading off between 
risk and expected returns, which is known as ‘skimping’ behaviour such as economising on 
selection and monitoring of loans (Breger and De Young, 1997). Les selection and monitoring 
results in higher output level of assets. Additionally, costs that are reduced by less selection and 
monitoring of loans may have positive impact on efficiency. Our results are similar to Iannotta et 
al. (2007). However, ‘skimping’ or mistakes in monitoring of loan customers might precede 
capital losses, which may result in potential failure of a bank. The financial authorities should 
monitor tightly banks, which have higher levels of credit risk.   
Liquidity risk is significant and negatively relates to banks performance in our data set. Though 
the magnitude of the impact is low, taking a greater liquidity risk reduces technical efficiency of 
a bank, which means that the less liquid is the bank, the less efficient it is. The results indicate 
that more liquid banks are more efficient as they can produce more output of liquid and other 
assets and can be considered as ‘liquidity efficient’ (Gorton and Huang, 2002). 
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The market risk coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level in our study and has a negative 
sign. The result implies that the high exposure to the market risk via obtaining banks’ liquidity in 
the interbank markets increases the CISs banks technical efficiency. The result contradicts to 
some results for emerging economies, for instance the BRIC countries are less efficient in 
presence of higher market risk (Zhang et al., 2013). We can suggest that the CISs banks that rely 
more on interbank loans may be subject to more market discipline and able to monitor other 
banks in the interbank market, and, thus, they are better at monitoring and screening market risk 
enhancing their efficiency. 
Control Variables 
The first control variable on bank level income diversity is not significant for the hyperbolic 
distance function, though it has the same negative sign as in the traditional output distance 
function specification where this variable is statistically significant. The negative sign is 
interpreted as positive impact of income diversification on bank efficiency. Taking to the account 
that banks have considerable share of their income earned from non-interest activities, this 
indicate that revenue sources’ diversification would positively impact bank efficiency. Asset 
diversity coefficient has positive sign and statistically significant. This implies that assets 
diversification strategy negatively influences bank performance. The ratio is calculated as total 
securities to total earning assets. The last bank level control variable is listing. Listed banks are 
more efficient, which can be explained on the bases that listed banks are using better and more 
transparent practices.  The results are similar with Zhang et al. (2013). 
Results for a set of control variables at the country level suggest that GDP growth, which reflects 
the macroeconomic environment, has a no effect on efficiency in our main model. Though, it has 
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significantly positive effect in the rest of our models (Table 3.6, columns (2), (3) and (4)), which 
complies with our expectations. The GDP growth rates were high in most of the CISs countries 
as it is shown in the previous chapter, providing favourable macroeconomic conditions, which 
positively influenced bank performance.  
The coefficient on the 2007-2009 Global financial crisis is positive and significant, which means 
that the crisis had significantly positive impact on bank performance. For the income-based 
model, which we specified, banks retained their efficiency due to increased spreads between 
lending rates and deposit rates. Banks in almost all countries increased their lending rates while 
increasing deposit rates by lesser amount. In 2008 the increase in interest rates spread was in 
Russia (1.6 pp), Tajikistan (2.3 pp) and Ukraine (1.8pp); in 2009 the increase was in almost all 
the CIS countries: Azerbaijan (0.3pp), Belarus (1.0 pp), Kyrgyzstan (3.3 pp), Moldova (2.5 pp), 
Russia (0.3 pp) and Tajikistan (0.8 pp)
29
 .  
The last control variable covers the integration processes in the CIS region. We find that in the 
base model estimated using hyperbolic distance function the abolishment of the customs 
clearance among the custom union member-countries and introduction of the common external 
tariffs had a negative effect on banks performance, perhaps due to changes in economic 
environment. Having in mind that Belorussia has the same adjustments to the custom union 
membership as Kazakhstan because of the weaker economic positions, the repercussions of the 
custom union on Belorussia’s economy are likely to be similar to the repercussions on 
Kazakhstan’s economy. According to the World Bank report on assessment of custom union’s 
cost and benefits for Kazakhstan, the impact of the common tariffs reduced the real income by 
                                                          
29 
World Bank Indicators. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/, accessed on 20.06.2015. There was no 
data on Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
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0.2% in 1 year after implementation of the common tariffs. The custom union increased import 
costs for businesses and customers from outside the custom union and the common tariff 
umbrella led to inefficient production. There was depression of real wages by 0.5%, and decrease 
of the real return on capital by 0.6%. The reduction of trade with other world countries than CISs 
and more with Russia and Belorussia resulted in less imported high-techs from more 
technologically advanced European Union and other countries, which leads to productivity loss 
in the long term. Service sectors do not benefit from the custom union protection and became 
less profitable experiencing sector contraction and decline (World Bank Report, 2012).    
3.4.3. Robustness tests 
We ran a number of robustness checks. First we estimate the models with changed sample 
specification. We excluded Russia from the sample and ran both hyperbolic and output distance 
function specification. We ran robustness checks by adding and dropping other variables such as 
deposit insurance, overall risk and concentration ratio. The main results remained robust. We use 
the traditional output-oriented distance function approach as another robustness test, further we 
add country dummy in the frontier control variables of the traditional and hyperbolic distance 
functions. Robustness test results are reported in columns (2) (3) and (4) in the Table 3.6. In 
general, results from different specifications suggest that the base model is robust.  The efficient 
scores from the output-distance function, model (2), demonstrate a bit lower technical efficiency 
(Table 3.7), though the ranking in term of average scores by country are similar to our main 
model.   
The robustness tests indicate the major consistency of the results obtained using the stochastic 
hyperbolic distance function approach, relating our concerns to qualitative change of sign for 
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credit risk in traditional output function specification, though it is only marginally significant. 
The ownership variable of CISs member-owned banks, capital risk, liquidity and market risk are 
sensitive to the inclusion of the country dummy specification in the frontier model. The inclusion 
of country dummies in the frontier absorbs the effect of the CISs country differences, which 
leads to the insignificance of these variables. The GDP growth variable is insignificant for the 
hyperbolic distance function, but statistically significant in all robustness checks; it also has the 
same sign across all specifications.  
Table 3.7: Mean technical efficiency by country and by year (2005-2012), using output-
distance function 
Country/Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average by country 
Armenia 0.823 0.870 0.831 0.848 0.890 0.886 0.881 0.883 0.866 
Azerbaijan 0.891 0.874 0.862 0.830 0.906 0.914 0.862 0.911 0.884 
Belarus 0.927 0.900 0.872 0.885 0.885 0.876 0.865 0.879 0.882 
Kyrgyzstan 0.850 0.820 0.814 0.837 0.870 0.872 0.865 0.840 0.847 
Kazakhstan 0.884 0.874 0.841 0.870 0.757 0.856 0.846 0.812 0.839 
Moldova 0.921 0.900 0.856 0.868 0.918 0.905 0.898 0.909 0.895 
Russia 0.881 0.877 0.878 0.906 0.905 0.906 0.903 0.904 0.896 
Tajikistan 0.915 0.898 0.899 0.910 0.906 0.918 0.927 0.890 0.909 
Ukraine 0.928 0.919 0.916 0.859 0.906 0.924 0.926 0.920 0.912 
Uzbekistan 0.920 0.912 0.900 0.889 0.909 0.908 0.886 0.914 0.903 
Average by year 0.885 0.879 0.873 0.893 0.895 0.902 0.896 0.897 0.891 
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3.5. Conclusion 
This study has analysed the banking sector performance in the CIS countries. Particularly it 
investigated the impact of ownership structure and bank risks (capital, credit, liquidity, 
market, and overall risks) on banks technical efficiency in the CIS countries over the period 
from 2005 till 2012. The study uses intermediation approach and estimates the income based 
model with two inputs: interest expenses and non-interest expenses, and two outputs: interest 
income and non-interest operating income using stochastic hyperbolic distance function. Our 
main findings are generally robust to the alternative model specifications and other 
robustness checks we conducted. The results are as follows. From the estimation of the 
frontier model the average technical efficiency of the CISs countries is estimated as 94%. The 
most efficient banking system is in Ukraine as average over the studied period while the least 
efficient are Kazakhstani banks. Efficiency of Kazakh banks exceeded efficiency of Russian 
banks in the beginning of the period studied, which is similar to what was found by Fries end 
Taci (2005) for the period between 1994 and 2001, and declined after the world finical crisis.  
Turning to the results on the inefficiency effects, firstly we discuss the ownership impact on 
bank technical efficiency. Our findings suggest that ownership structure matters for banks 
efficiency. We distinguished impact of four ownership types on bank performance such as 
State-owned banks, Domestic private banks, Foreign-owned banks and CIS-member-owned 
banks. Firstly, private banks are less efficient than state-owned banks in the CISs countries 
for possible two reasons. On the one hand, the state banks are widely trusted and long present 
in the market, and have wider and less costly access to deposits and advantage in switching 
costs. On the other hand, the state-owned banks could have different activity sets than private 
banks. The ‘development’ role of state-owned banks is that sate-owned banks swiftly 
organise and direct finance into the projects, which boost economic development and 
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industrialisation. This kind of projects does not require customer evaluation and monitoring 
as the customer is the state itself and the projects are usually large scale, which results in high 
ouput level of state-owned banks. 
Banks with foreign majority are also less technically efficient than state-owned banks, which 
supports the home field advantage hypothesis. The difference in institutional environment 
between the country of origin and the host country is likely the reason for foreign banks’ 
technical inefficiency. Moreover, difficulties in processing of ‘soft’ information about the 
host country market conditions may result in comparative disadvantages in technologies 
involving this kind of information for foreign banks.  
The cross-regional CISs ownership has a significant positive impact on banks performance. It 
means that CIS-owned foreign banks perform more efficient than other banks. Unlike foreign 
banks from out of the region, the CIS-owned foreign banks are familiar with the environment 
and can easily process the ‘soft’ information regarding the market conditions in the country 
of entry. Additionally, being priori more efficient CISs banks (mostly from Russia and 
Kazakhstan), which pursue going abroad policy, enter the CIS countries with less developed 
financial sectors, which provide them with more advantageous environment conditions. This 
finding is in line with limited advantage hypothesis.   
Secondly, we observe different results for the risks-taking behaviour and bank performance 
in the CISs countries. There is positive association between capital, credit and market risk 
and performance, while negative association of liquidity risks with bank performance in the 
CISs.   
Finally, various control variables shed light on the economic and institutional environment 
impact. All control variables have significant impact on efficiency indicating that they have 
to be included. The GDP growth has a positive effect on bank efficiency, indicating that the 
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CISs banks benefited from the considerable GDP growth, which was high in the most of the 
CISs countries. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 had a positive impact on bank performance 
due to the increased interest rate spread supported by the authorities in their effort to cushion 
the crisis impact. There is a drop in the efficiency in the wake of abolishment of the customs 
clearance among the member-countries in 2010 and establishment of common external 
tariffs. Listed banks are more efficient perhaps because they have strong incentives to 
discipline and transparency.  
This question especially important in the context of recent developments in the CISs region 
including armed conflicts, the unstable political situation in the CISs region and economic 
sanctions towards Russia, which in complex can influence negatively economic and financial 
stability in the whole region and needs to be closely investigated. Although, there are some 
divergence in economic situation and financial sector development in the CIS countries, there 
are on-going processes of financial integration among the CIS countries, which are politically 
supported. In the light of these processes the questions still remain, whether the banking 
sectors are moving toward regional integration, and whether the banking sectors are stable in 
changing environment. Considering financial integration, further issues of bank efficiency 
and convergence will be addressed in the following empirical study in Chapter 4. 
Concluding policy remark 
Given the fact that CISs private banks are less efficient than public banks, the state ownership 
in the CISs banking sectors is not necessarily the only reason of lower levels of financial 
intermediation or relative inefficiency. While the main inefficiency is inherent in domestic 
private banks, the policy implication is that the banking systems’ efficiency may be enhanced 
via increased competition in financial sectors. It can be achieved by creating a sufficient and 
efficient regulation and supervision framework to clear the CISs banking systems of 
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inefficient and fraudulent banks and by impoving banks entry and exit requirements. Taking 
into account the negative association of liquidity risk to bank performance in the CISs, banks 
may improve their technical efficiency by increasing liquidity levels or taking less liquidity 
risk, which is the main reason for bank failures. Additionally, due to deterioration of 
economic conditions as a result of the common external tariff adoption and abolishment of 
mutual customs clearance as a result of the custom union establishment, efforts should be 
directed towards mutually beneficial inter-country policies and regulations. 
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Chapter 4  
Cost and profit efficiency and financial 
integration in the CIS countries 
Preamble  
This chapter examines cost and profit efficiency of the CISs’ banks and investigates the 
impact of banking sector ownership and risk-taking behaviour on bank cost and profit 
efficiency. Different concepts of efficiency introduced in this study extend the analysis of 
bank efficiency, and offer a comprehensive study of the CISs banking performance. Cost 
efficiency occurs when a bank does not waste input resources in its production processes 
resulting from allocative and technical inefficiency (Isik and Hassan, 2003). Profit efficiency 
arises when a bank uses optimal amount of input mix (cost minimisation) to produce optimal 
amount of output mix (revenue maximisation) (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The 
estimation of cost and profit efficiency allows us to further extend the analysis and 
investigate the process of integration in the banking sector of the CISs by testing for 
convergence in bank cost and profit efficiency.  
4.1. Introduction  
Having examined the technical efficiency and various factors that impact bank efficiency, the 
thesis comes to assess bank cost and profit efficiency employing the same one-stage SFA as 
in the previous chapter, however, using different efficiency concepts, cost/profit function and 
stating cost and profit optimisation objectives.  
As we discussed in the previous chapter, when input prices are available, allocative efficiency 
can be measured (Coelli et al. 1998). Technical efficiency doesn't consider allocative 
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efficiency and one cannot use it to compare banking firms that might specialise in different 
input or output mixes, while cost and profit efficiency make it possible to compare input and 
output compositions and the extent to which they respond to relative prices (Vander Vennet, 
2002). Farrell (1957) suggested the practical techniques for measuring productive efficiency 
of a firm (technical and allocative efficiency).  
This chapter takes account of allocative efficiency and examines the impact of ownership and 
risk-taking behaviour on bank cost and profit efficiencies. Different concepts of efficiency 
introduced in this study extend the analysis of the previous empirical chapter, and allow for a 
comprehensive comparative analysis of efficiency in CISs banking. Moreover, the estimation 
of profit and cost efficiencies allow us to further investigate degree of integration in banking 
sector of the CIS, which is one of the goals of this study, additional to the custom union 
establishment impact on efficiency.  
The cost and profit concepts are based on economic optimisation as a reaction of banking 
firms (management) to market prices and competition (Berger and Mester, 1997). The 
convergence in cost efficiency relates to the one price law criterion, when banking firms offer 
similar products for the same price. This implies that banks’ costs of inputs such as, for 
example, deposits (in the intermediation approach), labour and capital (in the production 
approach), should equalise leading to the convergence in banks cost efficiency. The 
convergence in profit efficiency was justified by Gropp and Kashyap (2009). Integration 
results in lifting barriers among countries; and new entry and takeovers lead to convergence 
in profitability. Therefore, we apply two-step approach: first we estimate the cross-country 
cost and profit efficiency in the CISs; and second, we check, whether there was a 
convergence in cost and profit efficiency scores using  and  - convergence tests (Weill, 
2009). 
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There is a vast literature on efficiency in banking including developed countries
30
, and 
developing and transition countries
31
. Despite this, there is currently a lack of literature and 
empirical research on finance development in the CISs. Cost and profit efficiency estimation 
for all the CIS member countries using stochastic frontier approach has not been done before 
nor have there been estimates of the effects of ownership type, risk-taking behaviour and 
different environmental factors on bank efficiency. 
There are several studies that used  and  - convergence to test the financial integration of 
banking sectors across the EU countries (see Weill, 2009; Casu and Girardone, 2010; 
Mamatzakis et al., 2008). To our knowledge, there is no literature on banking sectors 
convergence in the CISs using beta and sigma convergence. 
To this extend, the specific research questions of this chapter are: How do bank ownership 
characteristics and risk-taking affect banks cost/profit efficiency? To what extent has 
financial integration taken place in the banking sectors in the CIS countries in terms of 
cost/profit efficiency scores convergence? 
The objectives of this Chapter are to extend the analysis of the CISs banking and implement a 
different concept of efficiency namely cost/profit efficiency for comprehensive analysis of 
banks performance; analyse the influence of different types of ownership and risk-taking 
behaviour on banks cost/profit efficiency; explain the integration of banks among the CISs by 
measuring cost and profit efficiency scores convergence; provide information for policy 
makers or/and financial sector authorities in the CIS countries on the banking sector policies 
in terms of better services and financial reintegration of the banking sectors.  
                                                          
30
 Berger and Mester, 1997; Berger and De Young, 1997; Mester, 1996; Eisenbeis et al., 1999; Altunbas et al., 
2001 
31 
 Fries and Taci, 2005; Bonin et al., 2005a, b; Weill, 2003; Rossi et al., 2005; Kasman and Yildirim, 2006; 
Hollo and Nagy, 2006; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; Jiang et al. 2013. 
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This study contributes to the literature as follows. First, it estimates cost/profit efficiency 
derived from the stochastic frontier approach for all the CIS member countries measuring 
allocative efficiency with cost-minimisation and profit-maximisation behavioural settings, 
which has a higher standard than technical efficiency by incorporating relative prices. Thus, it 
measures the ability of managers to respond effectively to changes in the relative prices and 
depicts different from technical efficiency aspects of bank efficiency. Second, it measures 
cost and profit efficiency incorporating important variables, which are considered critical for 
efficiency differences, such as ownership type, risk-taking behaviour and different 
environmental factors, to estimate reliable cost and profit efficiency measures. It also 
contributes to literature by investigating the impact of CISs ownership in the region on bank’ 
cost and profit efficiency. The results are expected to illuminate most weak segments of the 
banking systems and to advise financial authorities on financial institutions policy. Third, it 
proceeds to the estimation of β- and σ-convergence of cost and profit efficiency scores for 
further analysis of integration in banking sectors of the CISs. 
Research methodology statement 
We estimate both cost and profit efficiency as both concept are important for examining bank 
performance. Though, Berger et al. (1995) and Berger and Mester (1997) provide arguments 
in favour of using profit function for bank inefficiency analysis, we also estimate cost 
inefficiency.  
As the main methodological framework is similar to the previous chapter, here we give a 
general overview of the methodology and highlight the aspects relating to cost and profit 
efficiency estimation, while detailed discussion is given in the previous chapter.  In the 
previous chapter we discussed that the best-practice frontier can be derived by using two 
nonparametric techniques: data envelopment analysis and free disposable hull analysis; and 
three parametric: the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), the thick frontier approach, and the 
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distribution-free approach (Mester, 1994). The widely applied approach to measure efficiency 
introduced by Aigner et al. (1977) is stochastic frontier analysis. Similar to technical 
efficiency estimation, we employ stochastic frontier analysis in this chapter to estimate cost 
and profit efficiency. 
There are two different approaches to the selection of variables of input and output order to 
capture more precisely banking activity: the production approach and the intermediation 
approach. The production approach treats deposits and number of transactions and loans as 
outputs, while labour and physical capital are inputs (See Berger and Humphrey, 1991; 
Swank, 1995; Resti, 1997; Berger and De Young, 1997). The intermediation approach treats 
banks as intermediaries, where a banking firm attracts funds and transforms them into 
investments such as loans and securities (See Sealey and Lindley, 1977; Barr et al., 1994). 
This chapter uses the intermediation approach similar to the previous chapter. 
Cost efficiency and alternative profit efficiency is estimated using one-step estimation model 
(Battese and Coelli, 1995)
32
. The alternative profit efficiency is preferred over the standard 
profit efficiency as the alternative profit function keeps output constant and profits are 
affected by the variations in input prices.   
The process of banking integration among CISs countries is investigated by measuring 
convergence in cost/profit efficiency scores among commercial banks using  and  - 
convergence. We follow Canova and Marcet (1995), Parikh and Shibata (2004) and Weill 
(2009) methodology in estimating cost and profit convergence.  
The data for commercial banks of the CISs cover an eight year period from 2005 to 2012. 
The data are obtained from the Bankscope data base, national central banks of the countries, 
                                                          
32
 Wang and Schmidt (2002) discussed various methodological limitations of one-step and two-step methods. 
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Financial Structure Dataset World Bank, and the websites of the commercial banks of the 
sample. The data and information on ownership have been revised and adjusted where 
necessary to get reliable information. The dummy variable on the custom union establishment 
reflects the effect on efficiency in member-states before and after the custom union common 
tariffs introduction and mutual abolishment of the customs clearance. The data differ from 
our sample in the previous analysis due to additional requirements of input prices for 
allocative efficiency estimation. In this regards, our sample decreased from 376 to 328 banks 
and the number of observations changed from 2431 to 2208.  
  
146 
 
4.2. Literature review 
4.2.1. Cost and profit efficiency 
There is a massive literature on bank efficiency in developed and developing countries. 
Banking performance in developed and developing countries is different due to the 
differences in financial systems, economic development, banking regulation and 
management
33
. In international comparison of cost and profit efficiencies was done by 
Maudos et al. (2002), where they established that cost efficiency is lower than profit 
efficiency in ten countries of the European Union. The other evidences show that profit 
inefficiency is higher than cost inefficiency in banks (see Berger and Mester, 1997; Lozano, 
1997; and Rogers, 1998). This can be explained by the difference in profit and cost concepts. 
The concept of profit efficiency is better in measuring the overall performance because it 
accounts for inefficiencies both on the output and input sides, when the output side 
inefficiencies are as large as the input side inefficiencies (Berger et al., 1993).  Here we 
present literature with a particular focus on association between risk-taking behaviour, 
ownership and the cost and profit efficiency.  
Risks 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, risks are a key aspect of banks’ production as banks 
should assess, monitor and diversify risks and thus risk management is an essential part of the 
banking business. Studies on bank performance dependency on different types of risks on 
micro level, like capital, credit, liquidity risk and market risk shed light on risk-taking 
behaviour in banking sector (Berger and De Young, 1997; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; 
Altunbas et al. 2007; Fiordelisi et al. 2011; Brissimis et al., 2008). The inclusion of different 
                                                          
33
 This part will consider the literature on bank performance in transition and developing countries too. 
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types of risks to control for their influence on bank efficiency was proved to be useful for 
accurate measurement of efficiency (Altunbas et al., 2000; Mester, 1996; Clark, 1996 and 
McAlliser and McManus, 1993). 
Literature on bank cost and profit efficiency included different risk-taking characteristics into 
efficiency estimation. The capital risk was included in the studies by Mester, 1996, Berger 
and Di Patti (2006), Altunbas et al. (2007), Athanasoglou et al. (2008), Brissimis et al. 
(2008),  Fiordelisi et al. (2011), and Radic et al. (2012). The credit risk influence on bank 
efficiency was studied by Athanasoglou et al. (2008), Brissimis et al. (2008) and Fiordelisi 
and Molyneux (2010). The liquidity risk was included in the function estimation in Altunbas 
et al. (2000), Brissimis et al. (2008), Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010) and Radic et al. (2012). 
The market risk exposure was studied by Berger and Humphrey (1997), Berger and Mester 
(1997), Isik and Hasan (2003) and Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010). 
Lower capital level leads to lower cost efficiency levels because banks with low capital face 
greater funds’ cost due to greater leverage (Radic et al., 2012). Mester (1996) found that 
lower capital level can be related to cost inefficiency, which was in line with Brissimis et al. 
(2008) and Fiordelisi et al. (2011), who found negative effect of capital risk on cost 
efficiency. However, Altunbas et al., (2007) stated that cost inefficient banks are likely to 
hold more capital. Profit efficiency was positively related to higher capital level 
(Athanasoglou et al., 2008). Opposite to this, Berger and Bonaccorsi Di Patti (2006) found 
that lower equity ratio (higher leverage) was associated with higher profit efficiency. Credit 
risk found to have negative impact on bank profitability in Athanasoglou et al. (2008). Credit 
risk or higher credit losses are likely to increase the cost of capital offsetting higher banks’ 
interest income, which arises from larger business volume and lower quality of loan portfolio 
in EU banking (Fiordelisi and Molyneux, 2010). These findings are in line with Iannotta et al. 
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(2007). Liquidity is negatively related to cost efficiency because holding a large amount of 
liquid assets is costly (Altunbas et al., 2000). Liquidity risk exposure showed positive link to 
economic profits but negative link to cost of capital, which offsets the economic profits effect 
in Fiordelisi and Molyneux, 2010.  They also found that higher market risk exposure was 
negatively linked to both economic profits and economic value added in European banking. 
Earlier studies evidenced that higher level of purchased funds is related to lower cost 
efficiency (Berger and Humphrey, 1997) and lesser profit efficiency (Berger and Mester, 
1997). Contrary to the findings by Berger and Mester (1997), Isik and Hassan (2003) found 
that banks with relatively higher level of purchased funds are likely to be more cost efficient.  
Most of the studies focused either on the influence of risk-taking behaviour on either cost 
efficiency (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Williams, 2004; 
Altunbas et al. 2007) or profit efficiency (Berger and Bonaccorci di Patti, 2006). The 
influence of risk-taking behaviour on both cost and profit efficiency was taken into account in 
some works such as Fiordelisi et al. (2011), Fang et al. (2011) and Radic et al. (2012). 
Fiordelisi et al. (2011) recognised that cost and revenue efficiencies reflect different abilities 
of managers such as cost minimisation and profit maximisation abilities, thus can have 
different links with bank risks. Radic et al. (2012) analysed among others bank risk-taking 
factors including liquidity and capital risk exposure for investment banks in developed 
countries. They found that liquidity risk is negatively related to cost efficiency but has a 
positive impact on profit efficiency, and higher capital risk reduces cost efficiency and 
increases profit efficiency. In this study, we are addressing influence of risk-taking behaviour 
on cost and profit efficiency.  
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Ownership  
In the previous chapter we discussed ownership literature and underlying theories, which help 
to explain the influence of different types of ownership on efficiency. Here we continue 
literature survey concerning ownership issues with an accent on cost and profit efficiency 
studies. As discussed in the previous chapter, the main theoretical framework for analysis of 
ownership is principal-agent theory, soft budget constraint theory, ‘developmental’ and 
‘political’ view theories, global advantage hypothesis and home field advantage hypothesis.  
It was shown in a number of studies that different types of ownership influence differently 
efficiency, risks and profitability of banks. In the US, the early studies (Nicols, 1967; O’Hara, 
1981; Mester, 1993; and Saunders et. al., 1990) suggested that private banks are less efficient 
than mutual banks. In other works it was shown that there was no difference in the efficiency 
of financial institutions (see Cebenoyan, 1993). In the European Union the ownership types 
have a different impact on efficiency. Private banks are more profitable then mutual banks, 
but are less cost efficient than other banks (Iannotta et al., 2007).  German private banks are 
more profitable than mutual banks (Beck et al., 2009). Japanese private banks proved to be 
more cost and revenue efficient than regional banks in Loukoianova (2008). 
Empirical studies show mostly negative impacts from the state ownership (Barth et al., 1999; 
La Porta et al., 2002; Caprio and Peria, 2000). Goddard et al. (2014) used a random 
parameters model to estimate cost efficiency progress for the period 1985-2010 in Latin 
America. Their conclusion was that the government-owned banks experienced a decrease in 
cost efficiency in the 1990s and improved it afterwards before the sub-prime crisis.  
However, some studies have opposite results and support state-ownership of banks. Bonin et 
al. (2005a) report that there is no much evidence that state-owned banks are less efficient 
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compared to domestic private banks, and Karas et al. (2010) find that domestic private banks 
are not more efficient than domestic public banks. 
The presence of the foreign ownership is expected to bring advanced technology, up-to-date 
expertise and managerial skills as well as capital into the banking sector. In exchange, the 
local partnership allows foreign investors to gain local clients and knowledge of the market. 
Almost all empirical studies confirm the benefits of the foreign entrance via privatisation in 
transition countries (Bonin et al., 2005b, Fries et al., 2006) and foreign investors improve 
banks’ efficiency in transition countries (Fries and Taci, 2005; Bonin et al., 2005a; Weill, 
2003; Kasman, 2005; Kasman and Yildirim, 2006). Styrin’s work (2005) covered the banking 
sector performance in Russia and reported that foreign banks are more efficient than Russian 
domestic banks. Weill (2003) considered the influence of foreign ownership on cost 
efficiency in the Czech Republic and Poland and found that foreign banks are more efficient 
than domestic banks, which is consistent with the global advantage hypothesis (Berger et al., 
2000). The same association was found between foreign ownership and cost efficiency by 
Kasman (2005).  
Bonin et al. (2005a) consider ownership effect on banks’ cost and profit efficiency in eleven 
CEE transition countries for the period from 1994 to 2000. They find that majority foreign-
owned banks are more cost and profit efficient and provide better quality services, while 
banks with single strategic foreign investor are more cost efficient. There is no much 
evidence that state-owned banks are less efficient compared to domestic private banks. In 
Bonin et al. (2005b) the ownership impact on banks’ cost and profit efficiency confirms the 
hypothesis that foreign-owned banks are the most efficient of all bank types and that state-
owned banks are the least efficient the CEE countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania), which relates to the global advantages hypothesis.  
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Support for the global advantage hypothesis was also found in the several other studies, such 
as in Staikouras et al. (2007) with the analysis of cost efficiency in six South Eastern 
European countries for the period from 1998 to 2003; in Mamatzaki et al. (2008) with the 
analysis of cost and profit efficiency in ten new European Union members for the period 
1998-2003, who found that foreign bank are more profit efficiency than both state-owned and 
private banks; in Kasman and Yildirim (2006) with the analysis of cost and profit efficiency 
for new EU members, which joined the EU in 2004 for the period from 1995 to 2002. 
The findings of studies of the regional evidence for the global advantage hypothesis were that 
the hypothesis was mostly rejected for the developed countries (Berger et al., 2000; Claessens 
et al., 2001; Vander Vennet, 1996). 
However, the literature that includes banking sector ownership analysis of the CIS countries 
is in short supply. The handful amount of studies, which include some on the CIS countries, 
is following. State banks underperformed persistently in cost efficiency and demand, while 
privatised banks improved their mark-ups in 15 transition countries including Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Ukraine during the period between 1995-98 and 2002-2004 (Fries et al., 2006).  
Fries and Taci (2005) assessed banks efficiency in transition countries including three CIS 
members (Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine). They found that foreign-owned banks are more 
cost efficient than the other ownership types; private banks are more cost efficient than public 
banks and that Kazakh banks are more efficient than Russian banks. However, substantially 
reduced costs at the early stages of reforms had a tendency to rise at advanced stages.  
The other work that includes the CEE and CIS countries banking sector analysis was done by 
Grigorian and Manole (2002), who estimated bank performance in those countries. Out of 17 
countries under consideration six were CIS countries: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Moldova, Russian Federation and Ukraine. The conclusion was that foreign banks 
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outperform domestic banks and that privatisation of state banks to domestic owners didn’t 
improve efficiency. 
Karas et al. (2010) found that in Russia state-owned banks are more cost efficient than 
domestic private banks, although foreign banks outperform domestic state and private banks 
in profit efficiency. The study of banking sector performance in Uzbekistan for the period 
2004-2006 found no significant difference in performance between private, joint-stock and 
foreign banks Nigmonov (2010). 
4.2.2. Convergence literature 
The increased integration of financial markets should lead to a greater competition and 
efficiency in banking sectors. According to the definition, in an integrated financial market 
participants face a single set of rules; have equal access to the financial instruments and/or 
services; are treated equally when they are active in the market (ECB, 2009). The criteria 
relate to the one price law, when banking firms offer similar products for the same price. This 
implies that banks’ costs of inputs such as, for example, deposits (in the intermediation 
approach), labour and capital (in the production approach), should equalise leading to a 
convergence in banks cost efficiency. Evidence in support of cost minimization and increased 
efficiency due to increased competition, financial innovations and economic and financial 
freedom is presented by Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010), Chortareas et al. (2013). 
Together with financial integration benefits Stavárek et al. (2012) define its main drawbacks, 
such as increased vulnerability to external macroeconomic shocks, and higher output and 
consumption volatility due to financial crises.  
Gropp and Kashyap (2009) argue that the process of integration via new entry and takeovers 
due to lifting barriers will lead to a convergence in profitability. They shift the focus from the 
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law of one price towards integration via lifting entry barriers and takeovers, an approach 
which permits the use of profitability convergence to measure bank integration. 
Literature on the link between efficiency and integration in the banking sector in the 
European Union include Molyneux et al. (1997), Goddard et al. (2007), Brissimis et al. 
(2010), Fiordelisi et al. (2011). A number of studies, which looked at the convergence in 
efficiency scores of the banking sectors before the financial crisis, also observed increased 
efficiency in banking sectors among the EU (Altunbas et al., 2001; Casu and Molyneux, 
2003). More recent work on efficiency convergence in the EU banking sectors was carried 
out by Matousek et al. (2015). This study estimated technical efficiency using a hyperbolic 
distance function and found a negative influence of the financial crisis of 2008 on efficiency 
convergence. 
There are several studies that used  and  - convergence to test the financial integration of 
banking sectors across the EU countries. Weill (2009) investigates  and  - convergence of 
cost efficiencies in the banking sector of the EU and comes to the conclusion that there was a 
convergence in bank efficiencies between 1994 and 2004. Casu and Girardone (2010) applied 
tests of convergence of banking efficiencies for panel data and tested a dynamic panel data 
model. They found that with integration there was a movement of cost efficiency towards the 
EU average level between 1997 and 2003. Mamatzakis et al. (2008) study cost and profit 
efficiency of the East and Central European country members of the EU in the period 1998-
2003. They showed that there was some convergence in cost efficiency among the countries 
but no convergence in profit efficiency.  
To our knowledge, there is as yet no literature on banking sector convergence in the CISs. 
The present study aims to find the evidence of integration in the CISs banking using tests of  
and convergence for cost and profit efficiency convergence.  
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4.3. Methodology 
4.3.1. Cost and profit efficiency 
In the literature three distinct economic efficiency concepts are employed: cost efficiency, 
standard profit efficiency and alternative profit efficiency. They are grounded in economic 
optimisation as a reaction of firms to changes in market prices and competition (Berger and 
Mester, 1997).  
Cost efficiency measures bank’s best performance in terms of producing the same amount of 
output with optimised amount of inputs. It is expressed from a cost function and has a general 
form as following Berger and Mester (1997):  
 𝐶 = 𝐶(𝑤, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑣, 𝑢𝑐 , 𝜖𝑐),                                                (4.1) 
where C stands for variable costs; w is the vector of inputs prices; y is the vector of variable 
output quantities; z is a vector of netputs (inputs or outputs); v is a bundle of different 
environmental variables
34
; uc represents inefficiencies in costs and 𝜖c is a random error, 
which contain measurement error and luck, that can temporarily increase or decrease banks 
costs. 
We can represent the cost function as a natural logarithm function and separate the 
inefficiency and random terms from the rest of the cost function: 
𝑙𝑛𝐶 = 𝑓(𝑤, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑣) +  𝑙𝑛𝑢𝑐 + 𝑙𝑛𝜖𝑐 ,                                (4.2) 
where  f denotes a functional form of the cost function and other variables defined as above.  
                                                          
34
 The biasness in estimation of efficiency in models without environmental variables is due to the assumption 
that inefficiency differences across countries appear only because of managerial decisions. This should be 
corrected by including those environmental variables into models. Inclusion of the environmental variables is 
discussed by Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), Lozano-Vivas et al. (2001) and Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002). 
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For the individual bank b the cost efficiency ratio in Berger and Mester (1997) is: 
𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑏 =  
?̂?𝑚𝑖𝑛
?̂?𝑏
=
exp[?̂?(𝑤𝑏,𝑦𝑏,𝑧, 𝑣𝑏)]∗ exp [ln 𝑢𝐶
𝑚𝑖𝑛]
exp[?̂?(𝑤𝑏,𝑦𝑏,𝑧, 𝑣𝑏)] ∗ exp [ln 𝑢𝐶
𝑏]
=  
 𝑢𝐶
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑢𝐶
𝑏          (4.3) 
where  ?̂?𝐶
𝑚𝑖𝑛  is the  ?̂?𝐶
𝑏  minimum across all banking firms in the sample.  
Cost efficiency can vary from 0 to 1; and 1 is the score of the best cost efficient banking firm 
in the sample.  
The other measure of efficiency is profit efficiency. There are two types of profit efficiency 
measures: standard profit efficiency and alternative profit efficiency. The alternative profit 
efficiency is more reliable when underlying assumptions of perfect competition in pricing for 
standard profit function is questionable, or when quality of services differ among the banks 
(Maudos et al. 2002). 
Standard profit efficiency measures the bank’s ability to select its outputs and inputs to 
produce maximum feasible level of profit given input and output prices. The revenues are 
also included in the profit function as it allows for variations in outputs and inputs. Prices of 
output are exogenous, which allows for output inefficiencies be responsive to these output 
prices.   
The log form of standard profit function is: 
ln (𝜋 + 𝜃) = 𝑓(𝑤, 𝑝, 𝑧, 𝑣) +  𝑙𝑛𝑢𝜋 + 𝑙𝑛𝜖𝜋 ,                        (4.4) 
where π is the profit of the bank; θ is a constant added to every firm's profit to ensure that log 
function can be taken; p is the vector of output prices; w, z, v are defined as in the cost 
function;  𝑙𝑛𝑢𝜋  captures inefficiency that influences profits; and 𝑙𝑛𝜖𝜋  is a random error. 
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The concept of profit efficiency can be more useful then cost efficiency in estimating the 
overall performance of the bank as it allows for measuring inefficiencies on both input and 
output sides, while inefficiencies on the output side could be even larger then on the input 
side (Berger et al., 1993; Berger and Mester, 1997). The standard profit efficiency ratio for an 
individual bank b as the ratio of actual to maximum predicted profits by Berger and Mester 
(1997) is: 
 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝜋𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑏 =  
?̂?𝑏
?̂?𝑚𝑎𝑥
=
{exp[?̂?(𝑤𝑏,𝑝𝑏,𝑧,𝑣𝑏)]∗ exp [ln 𝑢𝜋
𝑏]}− 𝜃
{exp[?̂?(𝑤𝑏,𝑝𝑏,𝑧,𝑣𝑏)] ∗ exp [ln 𝑢𝜋
𝑚𝑎𝑥]− 𝜃
 ,          (4.5) 
where  ?̂?𝜋
𝑚𝑎𝑥  is  ?̂?𝜋
𝑏  maximum across all the sample of banking firms.  
In contrast to the standard profit function, the alternative profit function keeps output 
statistically constant as with the cost function and profits are affected by the variations in 
controlled output prices.   
The log form of the alternative profit function is: 
ln (𝜋𝑎 + 𝜃) = 𝑓(𝑤, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑣) +  𝑙𝑛𝑢𝑎𝜋 + 𝑙𝑛𝜖𝑎𝜋 ,          (4.6) 
where variables are defined as in (4.4) except for y, which is defined as a vector of variable 
output quantities. 
The ratio for the alternative profit function expresses the same idea as the standard profit 
function, by Berger and Mester (1997) it is: 
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝜋𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑏 =  
𝑎?̂?𝑏
𝑎?̂?𝑚𝑎𝑥
=  
{exp[?̂?(𝑤𝑏,𝑦𝑏,𝑧,𝑣𝑏)]∗ exp [ln 𝑢𝑎𝜋
𝑏 ]}− 𝜃
{exp[?̂?(𝑤𝑏,𝑦𝑏,𝑧,𝑣𝑏)] ∗ exp [ln 𝑢𝑎𝜋
𝑚𝑎𝑥]− 𝜃
 ,    (4.7) 
where  ?̂?𝑎𝜋
𝑚𝑎𝑥  is  ?̂?𝑎𝜋
𝑏  maximum across all the sample of banking firms. 
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When the standard profit efficiency is measured, larger banks may be characterized as 
more profit efficient than small banks, because small banks have lower output levels, 
and output levels are not statistically controlled. The alternative profit function holds 
output levels constant statistically, which eliminates the potential problem of scale bias 
by measuring capability of profit generating for the same levels of output.   
4.3.2. Model specifications of cost and profit function 
This empirical analysis applies stochastic frontier analysis, which was introduced by Aigner 
et al. (1977) to measure cost and profit efficiency; and was made traceable by Battese and 
Coelli (1995) in one-step model estimation for panel data, which was also used by Wang and 
Schmidt (2002). We follow the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) when 
defining bank inputs and outputs. We discussed our methodology choice in the previous 
chapter.  
Cost efficiency can be measured as allocative input efficiency, where maximum efficient firm 
uses the optimal input mix given input prices to produce the output. Economic characteristics 
of the production processes given input prices can be estimated. This assumes that a bank 
attempts to minimise its costs. The stochastic analysis identifies a bank as inefficient, if its 
costs lie above those of the most efficient bank, which uses the same mixture of inputs and 
produces the same mixture of outputs.  
Profit efficiency measures the extent to which bank’s profits are lower compared to the most 
efficient bank in the sample. There are two profit function approaches – the standard and the 
alternative profit function (Berger et al., 1993). However, we opt for the alternative profit 
function, which allows for an impact on profits through exogenous input prices and 
statistically controlled output quantities; output prices are no longer exogenous incorporating 
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product demand structure and technology structure resulting in a non-dual structure of 
production technology (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The alternative (nonstandard) profit 
function is used in measuring the CISs’ bank profitability because we assume that (a) perfect 
competition condition does not hold and the bank has some power over the output prices, (b) 
there are some errors in output prices measurement, (c) there are differences in the quality of 
banking services among banks in the sample, and (d) banks in the CISs differ in size (See 
Berger and Mester, 1997). These conditions reflect better the reality in banking research 
(Humphrey and Pulley, 1997).  At the same time the alternative profit function reduces the 
problem of scale bias by fixing the output and comparing the ability of banking firms to 
generate profit for the same level of output (Berger and Mester, 1997). The alternative profit 
function has been estimated in Berger and Mester (1997), Rogers (1998), Berger and Mester 
(1997), Humphrey and Pulley (1997), Maudos et al. (2002), Kasman and Yildirim (2006), 
Jiang et al. (2013).  
The estimated empirical asset-based model specifies two inputs, namely labour and physical 
capital and funds; and two outputs namely total loans and other earning assets. Other 
earning assets mainly include total securities and loans and advances to banks (Bankscope). 
The netput equity is a quasi-fixed input, which is included into the model to capture the cost 
of equity and not only the cost of debt (Hughes and Mester, 2010). The value of the financial 
capital (equity) should be included rather than the total equity to total assets ratio because 
‘there is good reason to believe that cost-minimization does not fully explain a bank’s capital 
level – e.g., regulations set minimum capital-to-assets ratios, and bank managers may be risk 
averse… this might lead one to conclude that the risk-averse bank was producing its output in 
an allocatively inefficient manner when actually it is the risk-preferences that differ’ (Mester, 
1996).  The labour and physical capital price is defined as the ratio of non-interest expenses 
to total assets, following literature (Hasan and Marton, 2003; Bonin et al., 2005a), and the 
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borrowed funds price is the ratio of interest expenses to total customer deposits (Berger et al., 
2009). The total costs are defined as the sum of interest expenses and non-interest expenses. 
The total profits are defined as pre-tax profit, the use of which is justified by the differences 
in the tax systems of the CIS countries. 
The translog form of the cost/profit efficiency frontier is estimated by using the specification 
in (4.7). The specification imposes symmetry and linear homogeneity with respect to input 
prices by dividing dependent variables (total cost and pre-tax profit) by the fund price. The 
model is time-variant, and the time variable interacts with each input and output variable, 
thus assuming flexibility in efficiency both over time and among banks. The quadratic term 
of the time variable allows for non-monotonic technical change (Coelli et al., 1998, p. 303).  
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑘,𝑡(𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑃) = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
2
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𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑇
+ ∑ 𝛹𝑗𝜏𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗𝑇
2
𝑗=1
+  𝑙𝑛𝑣𝑘𝑡 + 𝑙𝑛𝑢𝑘𝑡              (4.7) 
where TC is the total costs of a banking firm k in year t; Yi are outputs in a certain year for the 
i
th
 banking firm; Pj are input prices, where p1 is the price of labour and physical capital, p2 is 
the price of funds; and E is a fixed input, which is represented by bank’s total equity 
(Altunbas et al., 2001); T captures change in technology over time; ukt captures inefficiencies 
and has a truncated non-negative normal distribution; vkt incorporates noise and has a normal 
standard distribution, v~N(0,σv
2
); and vkt and ukt are independent of each other; and the 
parameters are estimated: , β, ψ, ϕ, τ, σ , γ , ώ. 
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The intuition behind the component error term is that deviations from the frontier captured by 
uit, are under control of management of a bank. Meanwhile, vit is a random error, which 
influences the random variations of the frontier across banks, which makes the frontier 
stochastic, and also incorporates measurement and observation errors.  
The empirical cost/profit inefficiency effect model for an individual financial firm in (4.8) is 
estimated together with (4.7) using one-stage procedure. 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝛿0 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑎𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑏𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 
7
𝑏=4
+  ∑ 𝛿𝑐
13
𝑐=8
3
𝑎=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                    (4.8) 
where Ownerit stands for the nature of owners (state-owned, domestic private, foreign and 
CISs foreign) for bank i in time t; Riskit is an explanatory variable, which denotes risk taking 
behaviour of bank i in year t (capital risk, credit risk, liquidity risk and market risk); Control 
represents a vector, which contains other environmental variables in the model (assets 
diversification, income diversification, listing, Custom Union Establishment, Global financial 
crisis 2007-2009).  
We use the functional form in (4.7) and equation (4.8) to estimate simultaneously a common 
frontier of commercial banks operating in the CISs countries. As in the previous empirical 
chapter we assume that the difference in risk-taking behaviour, various ownership types, and 
environmental characteristics influence bank efficiency level rather than the production 
technology, which is in the deterministic part of the equation. 
 We use the same specification as in (4.7) and equation (4.8) to obtain the profit efficiency 
scores with the difference that we replace TC by the TP variable and the inefficiency term uit 
is subtracted for profit maximisation problem rather than added as in the case with cost 
minimisation problem.  
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We use the same firm-specific and environmental factors as in the empirical study on 
technical efficiency in the previous chapter. Ownership effect includes four dummies namely 
government-owned banks, domestic private bank, foreign-owned banks, CIS-member-owned 
banks. We assign corresponding ownership, if its share equals or exceeds 50% of ownership 
in the banks’ capital. 
Risk represents: capital risk, credit risk, liquidity risk and market risk. The importance of 
inclusion of the risk variables in cost and profit function specification was underlined by 
Altunbas et al. (2000), Mester (1996), Clark (1996), and McAllister and McManus (1993) as 
not controlling for risk can lead to a miscalculation of inefficiency. Similar to the previous 
chapter on technical efficiency, the capital risk is measured by the ratio of equity to total 
assets. Higher ratio means higher capital and lower insolvency risk. The credit risk is 
calculated as the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans and indicates how credit risk is 
managed by a bank. The higher is the ratio the poorer is the quality of the loan portfolio. The 
liquidity risk is measured by the liquid assets to total assets ratio. The liquidity risk is lower 
if the ratio is higher. The ratio of interbank borrowing to total borrowing is the proxy of the 
market risk. The more a banking firm relies on interbank loans the higher the market risk.  
Control variables present two levels of factors, which influence efficiency. Country level 
indicators account for the impact of GDP growth, financial crisis (2007-2009), and custom 
union establishment (2010). The GDP growth reflects the economic environment while the 
custom union dummy reflects the legal framework and institutional environment of the 
customs union member-countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russian Federation). The other 
control variable is the 2008-2009 financial crisis dummy variable, which measures the 
influence or the crisis on efficiency separating the period into two parts before 2008 and after 
the crisis. 
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Firm level indicators include listing, assets and income diversity. Listing is a dummy variable, 
which indicates that a bank is registered on a stock market. Listed banks are considered to 
perform more efficient than non-listed banks. Assets diversity, measured as fraction of 
securities in total earning assets, and income diversity, measured as fraction of non-interest 
earnings in total earnings, control for diversification of banking activities, which reflects 
economies of scope. According to Gallo et al. (1996) non-traditional banking activities 
combined with traditional ones may show small positive results for profitability, and may 
increase risks and income volatility
35
 in comparison with banks oriented to traditional bank 
lending (Lepetit et al., 2008). The definitions of dummy variables are presented in the Table 
4.1, which is similar to dummy variables table in the previous chapter.   
Table 4.1: The definitions of dummy variables in the cost/profit inefficiency effect model 
Ownership variables Definition 
Government-owned banks Equals 1 for state-owned commercial banks and 0 otherwise  
Domestic private banks Equals 1 for private commercial banks and 0 otherwise 
Foreign-owned banks Equals 1 for foreign-owned banks and 0 otherwise 
CIS-member-owned banks Equals 1 for CISs member country owned banks and 0 otherwise 
Control variables   
Global Financial Crisis 2007-2009 Equals 1 for after 2008 and 0 before 
Custom Union Establishment Equals 1 for after the establishment of the Custom Union in 2010 and 0 
for before 
Listing  Equals 1 for publicly listed banks and 0 otherwise 
Note: The first indicator is omitted from the estimation because of collinearity 
4.3.3. Convergence 
The main approaches to convergence estimation were developed in the framework of the 
economic growth theory and now are applied to a broad range of indicators. First of all we 
should distinguish β-convergence and σ-convergence. The concept of β and σ - convergence 
                                                          
35
  See for example DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Boyd and Graham, 1986; Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Kwan, 
1998; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Laeven and Levine, 2007. 
163 
 
was proposed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and subsequently became well established
36
. 
According to the β-convergence idea, poorer countries at the starting point have higher rates 
of growth on average during integration process. In other words, growth rates of an indicator 
and its starting level are negatively correlated. On the other hand, countries with a higher 
initial level of an indicator will grow slower. Eventually, they reach convergence of the 
variables. The interpretation of β-convergence results has its weak points. When the growth 
rate is higher for a poor country, it can overshoot a rich country in growth and there would be 
no convergence present. β-convergence also doesn’t explain the dispersion of a cross-section 
(Quah, 1996).  
The concept of σ– convergence presumes measuring the dispersion of a cross-section over 
time. It captures the movement of the standard deviations in level across countries. If there is 
convergence among the countries, the standard deviation is declining. β-convergence does 
not always imply σ-convergence when groups of countries with different initial levels are 
exchanging their positions (rich become poor and poor become rich) and if there is a constant 
gap between rich and poor countries (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995). 
To assess the ‘catching up’ effect, which is measured as β-convergence, following the 
specification for panel data analysis by Canova and Marcet (1995) and Weill (2009) we 
estimate:  
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝐶𝑦𝑖
10
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,                                               (4.9) 
where 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is the mean efficiency score obtained using cost/profit efficiency functions 
for banks in country i in year t; 𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 is the mean efficiency score of a country i in the 
                                                          
36
  See also: Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Quah, 1996. 
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previous year; 𝐶𝑦𝑖 is a country dummy, which captures fixed effects for countries to separate 
the country effect in the equation; and are the parameters to be estimated; and  𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the 
error term.  
The convergence in efficiency is greater the greater is the β coefficient in absolute terms with 
a negative sign. Country dummies disentangle the country differences effects.  
The σ- convergence is estimated following the specification by Parikh and Shibata (2004) and 
Weill (2009) for panel data: 
∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝐶𝑦𝑖 +
10
𝑖=1
 𝜀𝑖𝑡,                                                                                        (4.10) 
where ∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 −   𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 −   𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑡 ,  𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡   is as for the previous 
equation the mean efficiency score of banks in country i in year t, and  𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑡  is the mean 
of 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡  for each time period. 𝐶𝑦𝑖 is again a country dummy, which disentangles the 
country differences effects, and are the parameters to be estimated, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error 
term. There is σ-convergence, if  is negative.  
4.3.4. Data and descriptive statistics  
The sample used in this chapter is similar to the sample in the previous empirical chapter, 
however, it differs in the numbers of banks as for the cost and profit efficiency estimation 
additional information on input prices are required. That caused sample differences because 
not all data were available for the banks participating in the cost and profit efficiency 
analysis. The data are obtained mainly from the Bankscope data base, national central banks 
of the countries, Financial Structure Dataset World Bank, and the websites of the banks 
included in the sample for more precise information on ownership. The data set is unbalanced 
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and covers the eight year period from 2005 to 2012. The number of observations is 2208; 328 
commercial banks of the CIS countries available from the Bankscope database are included 
for the analysis. The sample breakdown by country and number of banks is presented in 
Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2: Sample description: number of banks and average assets size by country and 
year 
Country/Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total by 
country 
Total assets 
of average 
bank (th $) 
Armenia 6 7 8 10 10 10 10 9 70 174207 
Azerbaijan 8 11 11 13 15 17 17 17 109 591225 
Belarus 6 6 7 8 8 12 12 10 69 1201611 
Kyrgyzstan 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 20 99748 
Kazakhstan 10 10 14 15 13 13 15 16 106 3408461 
Moldova 7 7 8 9 8 8 8 7 62 235430 
Russia 150 187 199 201 218 229 227 219 1630 2279458 
Tajikistan 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 17 218921 
Ukraine 7 7 10 11 11 12 13 11 82 3420330 
Uzbekistan 3 3 3 5 6 7 8 8 43 846848 
Total by year 200 241 264 276 292 314 317 304 2208 2071358 
Note: Turkmenistan is not included in the sample as the only one bank information was available from 
Bankscope with three consequent years data for commercial banks. 
The information on ownership has been revised and adjusted where necessary to get more 
reliable information for the period of 2005-2012. The breakdown of ownership as privately 
owned banks, state ownership, foreign banks and banks owned by the member of the CISs as 
well as listing information as of 2012 is given in Table 4.3. 
The banking sector descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimation of cost and 
profit efficiency for the CISs’ banks after cleaning for less than 3 consequent observations are 
shown in Table 4.4.  
The upper part of the Table 4.4 contains dependent variables such as total costs and pre-tax 
profit, which are used for estimation cost and profit frontiers respectively. The next group of 
variables consists of the input and output variables, which differ from the previous chapter 
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because we calculate input prices to measure cost and profit efficiency (1) and because we 
use asset-based model (2).  A small change in sample of banks caused a little difference in the 
data averages compared to the previous chapter, though keeping the main results similar. 
Table 4.3: Listing and ownership information (2012) 
Country/Dummy Listed Private State-owned Foreign Foreign CISs 
Armenia 0 2 0 7 3 
Azerbaijan 1 14 2 1 0 
Belarus 0 2 3 5 3 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 1 2 0 
Kazakhstan 9 10 0 6 1 
Moldova 4 5 0 2 0 
Russia 43 156 23 40 7 
Tajikistan 0 1 1 2 1 
Ukraine 7 5 0 6 1 
Uzbekistan 1 3 5 0 0 
The CISs banks on average choose income diversification rather than asset diversification 
strategy with the 41.4% and 12.5% respectively. The risk-taking behaviour variables reveal 
that the banking sectors are on average capitalized by 15.7%. The ratio of credit risk shows 
7.1% on average for the CISs. The CISs’ banks as a whole hold 26.8% of total assets as 
liquid assets. Banks face 26.6% liquidity risk, and 13.5% market risk. 
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Table 4.4: Sample descriptive statistics of variables used in the cost and profit functions 
(2005-2012) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Dependent variables          
Total costs* 170637 316818 2384.1 1692001 
Pre-tax profit* 2568652 200469 1.2 5865206 
Inputs, outputs and netput variables*         
Gross loans *  1380236 6173644 80.9 143007920 
Other earning assets *  482774 2190453 440.3 46083448 
Price of labour and capital  13.8 17.8 1.5 84.6 
Price of funds  46.3 195.6 0.2     5368.0 
Equity*  181250 385277 6200.6 2134776 
Inefficiency effects variables         
Risk-taking         
Capital risk 15.7 9.5 5.6 54.6 
Credit risk 7.1 6.1 0.2 28.9 
Liquidity risk 26.6 13.5 5.6 65.8 
Market Risk 13.5 16.0 0.01 65.4 
Other control variables         
Income diversity 41.4 25.3 2.6 92.1 
Asset diversity 12.5 12.1 0.002 51.0 
GDP growth 20.3 5.79 1 50.3 
Note: (1) * Values are in thousands US dollars (2005 price level); A banking firm is considered government-
owned, if over 50% of its share is owned by the government. A banking firm is considered domestic private 
bank, if a major share (over 50%) is owned by a private company or individuals of the host country. A banking 
firm is considered a foreign-owned, if its major share is owned by foreign investor. A banking firm is 
considered a CIS-member-owned, if its major share is owned by a foreign investor from the CISs region; 
Custom Union establishment is 1 after 2010 for Custom Union member-states and 0 before; Global Financial 
Crisis is equal 1 after 2008 and 0 before; Listing is 1 for listed banking firms and 0 for non-listed.  
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4.4. Empirical results 
4.4.1. Results from frontier estimation 
 
Table 4.5 reports estimation results of the one-step maximum likelihood procedure obtained 
from the cost/profit efficiency model using the stochastic frontier approach without inclusion 
of environmental factors in the frontier. Cost frontier estimation is reported in the first 
column and profit frontier estimation is in the second.  
Results indicate that the models are a good fit. Gamma – ≡u
v
u

), which indicates 
how much of the error term is attributed to the inefficiency 𝑢𝑖, is 0.79 in the profit efficiency 
frontier estimation and 0.30 in the cost, which is a bit low. However, the log likelihood 
function’s statistics and the LR test in the table indicate a good fit for both models (Table 4.1, 
Panel B). Additionally, the coefficients on inputs and outputs suggest that cost and profit 
efficiency models have been well estimated (Table 4.5, Panel A).  
The average cost and profit efficiency of the CISs banks in the models are 40% and 55% 
respectively during the period 2005-2012. 
The mean cost and profit efficiencies by year are plotted in Figure 4.1 for the CIS countries. 
Cost efficiency remained relatively stable during the period and peaked at about 46% in 
2008; after that cost efficiency fell back to its previous numbers. Profit efficiency 
encountered the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis shock and dropped from 70% in 2007 to 
39% in 2008. This shows that profit efficiency is more vulnerable to financial crisis than is 
cost efficiency. Profit efficiency recovered after the crisis by 10 percentage points, however it 
didn’t reach its pre-crisis level. Although governments bailed out banking sectors and  
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Table 4.5: Estimation results of efficiency frontiers 
Panel A: Production frontier variables Cost Profit 
Gross loans  (β1) 0.14*** 0.14** 
Other earning assets  (β2) 0.21*** 0.16*** 
Price of labour and capital (β3) 1.28*** 1.29*** 
Price of funds (β4) 0.59*** 0.07*** 
Equity (β5) 0.07*** 0.02** 
Panel B: Diagnosis Cost Profit 
Gamma 0.30*** 0.79*** 
Sigma-squared 0.51*** 0.39*** 
Log likelihood 176.97 -1421.98 
LR test 1768.71 2621.53 
Average efficiency 40 55 
Notes: *, **, *** signifies significance level at 10 %, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
encouraged banks to extend loans, the economic environment and real sector difficulties 
remain unfavourable and new loans extension may be questionable.   
Figure 4.1: Mean cost and profit efficiency estimates of the CISs banks (2005-2012) 
 
Table 4.6 shows results for cost (Panel A) and profit (Panel B) efficiency by country and by 
year. Mean profit efficiency scores on average are higher than the cost ones in all countries, 
which is in line with the literature on commercial banks in transition countries with the 
similar specification of the model (Bonin et al., 2005a). There was a movement of cost and 
profit efficiencies in opposite direction during the crisis yeas 2007-2009 indicating 
accumulation of nonperforming loans during these years, which increased output levels 
raising cost efficiency, however negatively influenced profit efficiency because no profit 
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could be generated form those loans. This situation reversed after crises period when anti-
crisis measures were implemented and banks were bailed out by the governments.  
The scores also indicate differences in cost and profit efficiencies across the CIS member 
countries. The best performance on average over the period showed Armenian banks in terms 
of cost efficiency and the least efficient became Ukrainian banks. The most profit efficient 
banks are Azerbaijani banks while the least efficient are Russian banks.   
Table 4.6: Mean cost (Panel A) and profit (Panel B) efficiency by country and by year 
(2005-2012) 
 Panel A 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Average 
by country 
Armenia 0.66 0.59 0.55 0.65 0.52 0.40 0.37 0.31 0.51 
Azerbaijan 0.43 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.34 
Belarus 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.41 0.41 0.45 
Kyrgyzstan 0.57 0.50 0.44 0.44 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.30 0.42 
Kazakhstan 0.33 0.30 0.49 0.48 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.43 0.41 
Moldova 0.40 0.45 0.49 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.43 
Russia 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.50 0.47 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.44 
Tajikistan 0.48 0.42 0.35 0.45 0.31 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.43 
Ukraine 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.30 
Uzbekistan 0.42 0.35 0.31 0.39 0.39 0.30 0.34 0.33 0.35 
Average by year 0.45 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.37  
Panel B          
Armenia 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.80 0.80 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.85 
Azerbaijan 0.87 0.91 0.91 0.82 0.87 0.85 0.83 0.81 0.86 
Belarus 0.59 0.71 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.39 0.56 0.66 
Kyrgyzstan 0.72 0.83 0.69 0.69 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.79 0.78 
Kazakhstan 0.82 0.83 0.79 0.75 0.83 0.80 0.83 0.75 0.80 
Moldova 0.73 0.73 0.78 0.79 0.74 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.78 
Russia 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.31 0.26 0.39 0.40 0.37 0.47 
Tajikistan 0.46 0.62 0.69 0.56 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.76 0.68 
Ukraine 0.69 0.77 0.79 0.70 0.64 0.78 0.79 0.73 0.74 
Uzbekistan 0.68 0.74 0.79 0.71 0.77 0.78 0.74 0.72 0.74 
Average by year 0.71 0.76 0.77 0.69 0.73 0.77 0.73 0.72  
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4.4.2. The effects of ownership, risks and other environmental 
variables on cost and profit efficiency measures 
We report on the results of firm-specific and environmental factors influence on cost and 
profit efficiency estimated using stochastic frontier approach in the Table 4.7.  
Our model provides estimates of the influence of different ownership types on bank 
performance. The findings are of particular interest as they shed the light on the ownership 
structure effectiveness of banking sectors in the CISs. The regression results exhibit that 
ownership affects efficiency significantly though it impacts cost and profit efficiency 
variously.  
Table 4.7: Estimation results 
  Cost Profit 
Ownership 
Domestic private banks 0.036*** -0.0105 
Foreign-owned banks -0.017 -0.143* 
  CIS-member-owned banks 0.104*** 0.138 
Risks 
Capital risk -0.037*** -0.0020 
Credit risk 0.0003 0.0206*** 
Liquidity risk 0.0031*** -0.0108*** 
Market risk 0.00068** -0.00048 
Controls 
Income diversity -0.0080*** 0.041*** 
Asset diversity 0.0030*** -0.0038** 
    GDP growth 0.0044*** -0.093*** 
2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis 0.20*** -0.995*** 
Custom Union Establishment -0.13*** 1.047*** 
Listing -0.59 0.0468 
Notes: (1) Robust t-statistics in parentheses; (2) *, **, *** signifies significance level at 10 %, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. The t-statistics reported under the variable coefficient in parentheses. 
Our findings suggest that, using state owned banks as benchmark, privately owned banks are 
less cost efficient at 1% significance level than state-owned banks, which is similar to the 
results in Karas et al. (2010) but different from the results reported in Fries and Taci (2005) 
for transition countries. However, the latter results correspond to the earlier stages of 
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financial reforms, while the current study considers more advanced stages when costs have a 
tendency to rise (Fries and Taci, 2005). Moreover, state-owned banks may have on average 
lower costs due to their activity mix, which does not typically require project screening, risk 
evaluation and customer monitoring, while for private banks those activities comprise a 
major part of costs. Further, state owned banks in the CISs have a less costly access to 
deposits being widely trusted and having lower costs in terms of labour and physical capital. 
The private banks coefficient is not statistically significant for profit efficiency indicating that 
domestic private banks are as profit efficient as state-owned banks. Yet its negative sign 
could signal that domestic private banks are more profitable than state-owned banks, which 
possibly can support the view that state-banks pursue different goals from private banks such 
as boost economic development and industrialisation but not profit maximisation.  The results 
otherwise confirm the ‘development’ view theory on state-ownership in banking sector37. 
The negative and significant coefficient at 10% significance level for our second type banks 
specification indicates that foreign-owned banks are associated with significantly higher 
profit efficient than state-owned banks in the CIS countries; however in terms of cost 
efficiency they are as efficient as state-owned banks. Higher profitability of foreign banks 
could be a result of best-practice management leading to higher returns in transition and 
developing countries (Claessens et al, 2001; Hasan and Marton, 2003; Berger et al, 2010). 
This results are in line with the most of the literature, which points that foreign banks are 
more profit efficient than domestic counterparts (Bonin et al., 2005a; Kasman and Yildirim, 
2006; Mamatzaki et al., 2008). The fact that foreign banks are no more cost efficient than 
state-owned banks in transition countries, albeit all the expertise, provides some evidence in 
favour of home field advantage hypothesis when foreign banks are lack of ‘soft’ knowledge, 
which may impose a liability of foreignness (Zajc, 2006; Lensink et al, 2008).  
                                                          
37  See previous chapter on ‘development’ view theory. 
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CIS-member ownership has a strong negative association with bank cost efficiency at 1% 
significance level compared to the banks that are not CIS-owned, while the CIS-owned banks 
are as profit efficient as non-CISs-owned banks. The high cost inefficiency can be a possible 
outcome of lack of competition; the fact that the CISs banks enter countries with less 
developed banking systems in the region and having highly valued product mix and revenue 
efficiency, they enjoy ‘quiet life’ not being pressured to reduce costs (Berger and Mester, 
1997) . 
Turning to our second group of variables, the findings show different impacts of risk 
behaviour on bank efficiency in the CIS countries. The coefficient on capital risk is negative 
and highly significant at the 1% significance level for cost efficiency, indicating that there is 
a positive association between capital level and cost efficiency, which means better manager 
motivation and control. This finding is in line with Brissimis et al. (2008) and Fiordelisi et al. 
(2011), who find that higher capital ratio positively influences cost efficiency. The result may 
imply that more capitalised banks are subject to more shareholders’ control over costs and 
capital allocation. The results for profit efficiency are not statistically significant. The credit 
risk coefficient is positive and statistically significant at 1% significance level in profit 
efficiency estimates, revealing negative influence of credit risk on profit efficiency, which 
complies with other findings that higher credit risk exposure is associated with lower firm 
profitability (Miller and Noulas, 1997; Athanasoglou et al., 2008). This can be explained by 
considering the fact that exposure to high risk credits leads to a higher level of unpaid credits 
accumulated resulting in losses in returns to banks. When trading-off between risk and 
expected return by skimping on loans selection and monitoring, banks, which are poor at risk 
management and operations, end up with lower profit efficiency. Credit risk coefficient in the 
cost efficiency estimation is not statistically significant.  
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The liquidity risk coefficient is highly significant with a negative sing, though has a small 
magnitude, in the profit function estimates, which means it relates negatively to banks’ profit 
efficiency in our model. The results are similar to Altunbas et al. (2007) and Fiordelisi and 
Molyneux (2010). This might be explained by the fact that more liquid banks are more 
efficient in the sense that, ceteris paribus, they produce more output, part of which includes 
liquid and other assets Altunbas et al. (2007). Our results for liquidity risk for cost efficiency 
estimates are statistically significant with positive sign, and show a positive impact of 
liquidity risk on cost efficiency. A possible explanation is that banks that produce more 
output including liquid assets encounter higher costs; a higher proportion of cash and liquid 
assets holdings represent a cost to banks, especially those that are required by financial 
authorities (Altunbas et al., 2000). Another explanation that could be made is that inefficient 
managers would hold more liquid assets encountering both costs from poor management and 
higher opportunity costs of these low-yield assets. The market risk ratio is highly significant 
with a positive sign for cost efficiency, which implies that the higher the market risk, the 
lower is bank’s cost efficiency, which is consistent with Berger and Humphrey (1997). 
Indeed, borrowing from other banks results in higher costs and less cost efficiency; greater 
interbank markets exposure, which are highly volatile in times of uncertainty, can negatively 
affect bank performance.  
Other control variables 
Results for a set of remaining control variables are highly statistically significant, which 
signals the importance of including these factors to avoid bias of estimated efficiency scores. 
We discuss first bank specific controls. The results on diversification are mix. The signs of 
the coefficients suggest that the income diversification has a positive impact on cost but 
negative impact on profit efficiency, while asset diversification negatively influences cost but 
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positively profit efficiency. The results imply that asset diversification towards non-lending 
activities leads to higher profitability from other earning assets; however, this results in 
higher costs. This is in line with the study by Isik and Hassan (2003), who found that 
diversification significantly and negatively related to cost efficiency. This can happen, if 
specialisation of a bank on traditional activity pays off better than diversification, which 
requires extra resources to be diverted to these activities. Expansion of noninterest income-
generating activities’ possible positive influence on cost efficiency could be offset by less 
profitability of financial institution, which may arise due to higher revenue volatility from 
non-interest income activities (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010) or due to mistakes 
leading to losses in non-interest income (Liu and Wilson, 2010). Finally, coefficients for 
listed banks are not statistically different from unlisted banks either for cost or for profit 
efficiency in the CISs region.   
The GDP growth coefficients have positive and negative signs in cost and profit regressions 
respectively. This means that GDP growth has negative and positive impact on cost and profit 
efficiency respectively. This reflects the fact that banks benefited from the GDP growth, 
which was significant in most of the CISs countries, but encountered higher costs. The 
coefficients on the 2007-2009 Global financial crisis are positive for cost and negative for 
profit efficiency estimates (both are significant at the 1% level). The crisis had a significant 
negative impact on banks cost efficiency when banks encountered high costs to borrow 
money in the international markets as well as increased losses from non-performing loans. 
The crisis positively influenced profit efficiency, which can be explained by the increased 
interest rate spreads as a result of a larger increase in lending rates than borrowing.   As it was 
discussed in the previous chapter, the spread increased with different timing in the CISs 
countries in the wake of the crisis; in Russia the spread increased by 1.6 percentage points 
(pp), Tajikistan 2.3pp, Ukraine by 1.8pp in 2008; it continued to increase in 2009 Belarus by 
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1.0 pp, Kyrgyzstan by 3.3pp, Moldova by 2.5 pp, Russia by 0.3 pp, and Tajikistan by 0.8 pp 
(World Bank Financial Indicators)
38
. 
We find that integration among the CISs countries, namely the custom union establishment, 
had a positive effect on banks’ costs, perhaps because of increased expectations of the 
entrance of competitors into their markets (World Bank Report, 2012). However, the custom 
union establishment led to a decrease in profit efficiency for banks most possibly due to 
increased competition: if reforms result in an increased competition, this can lead to lower 
profits and lower franchise values (Keeley, 1990), which in turn likely to lead to increased 
fragility. The decline in profitability was also likely due to worsened environmental 
(economic) conditions (at least in two out of the three member-countries of the custom union 
Belarus and Kazakhstan) such as: reduction in the real income, shift to the inefficient 
production, depression of real wages and decrease of the real return on capital (World Bank 
Report, 2012). Thus, efforts to establish the custom union should incorporate the harmonised 
competition policy excluding dumping/antidumping actions against member countries, and 
adequate strengthening of the prudential regulations and supervision for financial sectors. 
4.4.3. Robustness tests 
We drop Russia’s banks to check the robustness of our input and output variables and of the 
environmental/firm-specific factors we used. We find that our environmental/firm-specific 
factors and input and output variables remain significant. We also tested the robustness of 
input and output variables by estimating specification without effects on inefficiency terms, 
which also showed significance of our input and output variables.   
                                                          
38 
Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.LNDP/countries. Accessed on 25.02.2015. 
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The robustness tests indicate the solid consistency of the results obtained using all countries 
in the sample for both cost and profit efficiency functions. Market risk became sensitive to 
the sample change in the cost function as the coefficient changed its sign. Custom Union 
Establishment and domestic private banks dummies become insignificant. The Custom Union 
Establishment dummy becoming insignificant can be explained by the fact that the main 
member of this integration Russia was excluded from the sample. Regarding profit function 
estimates, asset diversity factor became sensitive to the sample change. In general, the results 
of the base models remain robust when the sample size is changed.  
4.4.4. Results of estimation of convergence of cost and profit 
efficiency scores 
The main results of -convergence and -convergence efficiency scores obtained from the 
cost and profit estimation are presented in the Table 4.8. The number of observations is 70. 
We have the expected signs for the convergence in cost and profit efficiency, which are 
negative signs, and the coefficients are statistically significant at 1% significance level. The 
results show that there are -convergence and -convergence in cost and profit efficiency of 
banking sectors in the CIS countries.  
To obtain the results on -convergence we run the regression using the equation (4.9). The 
coefficient at  𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1  represents the rate with which countries with the lowest efficiency 
scores improved to catch-up with advanced countries within the CISs, -convergence. The 
results also show that countries are catching faster in -convergence for profit efficiency ( = 
-0.618) than cost efficiency ( = - 0.616). 
When estimating the -convergence, we use the equation (4.10). The -convergence results 
are reported in the second part of the Table 4.4. The -convergence indicates the pace with  
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Table 4.8: Tests of convergence of cost and profit efficiency scores 
  Convergence in cost 
efficiency scores 
Convergence in profit 
efficiency scores  
β-convergence     
Intercept -0.505*** -0.269*** 
lnMFFt-1 -0.616 *** -0.618*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2354 0.2856 
      
σ-convergence     
Intercept 0.0694 -0.061 
Ei,t-1  -0.574*** -0.558*** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2252 0.2690 
Note: (1) *, **, *** signifies significance level at 10 %, 5%, and 1%, respectively; (2) Belarus omitted to 
correct for collinearity; (3) In the test of -convergence, the explained variable is lnMFFi,t –  lnMFFi,t-1. In the 
test of convergence, the explained variable is ∆𝐸i,t. 
which each country’s efficiency level is approaching to the CISs average efficiency level. 
The larger is  in absolute value, the faster the banks’ efficiency of each country approaches 
the average efficiency level. The results suggest the -convergence towards the CISs average 
efficiency level as the coefficient is negative and significant both for cost and profit 
efficiency scores. The CISs countries converge faster in their cost efficiency ( -0.574) 
than profit efficiency (-0.558) scores.  
Table 4.9 reports on the convergence test for cost and profit efficiency scores obtained from 
the robustness test. We report the efficiency scores for cost and profit efficiency from the 
robustness model with changed sample specification (without Russia), which were used for 
the convergence robustness check, in the Appendix C, Table C1.  
The results of the robustness check on -convergence show that there is convergence in cost 
and profit efficiency scores among the CISs countries. The coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant at 1% significance level. As in our main model the countries are 
converging faster in -convergence for profit efficiency (-0.860) than for cost efficiency 
( -0.829). The results on -convergence further confirm convergence in cost and profit 
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efficiency scores among the CIS countries. The coefficient is negative and significant at 1% 
level of significance, indicating the decrease in cost (= -0.865) and profit (= -0.791) 
efficiency variations over time among the CIS countries. The CISs countries are converging 
faster in -convergence for cost efficiency. 
Table 4.9: Tests of convergence of cost and profit efficiency scores 
  Convergence in cost 
efficiency scores 
Convergence in profit 
efficiency scores  
-convergence     
   Intercept 3.605*** -0.082*** 
   lnMFFt-1 -0.829*** -0.860*** 
   Adjusted R-squared  0.378 0.369 
-convergence     
   Intercept -0.102 0.044** 
   Ei,t-1  -0.865*** -0.791*** 
   Adjusted R-squared  0.501 0.26 
Note: (1) *, **, *** signifies significance level at 10 %, 5%, and 1%, respectively; (2) Belarus omitted to 
correct for collinearity; (3) In the test of -convergence, the explained variable is lnMFFi,t –  lnMFFi,t-1. In the 
test of convergence, the explained variable is ∆𝐸i,t. 
The results also suggest that the CISs countries converges faster when excluding Russia’s 
banks both in profit and cost efficiencies. It can indicate that the level of banking is lower in 
majority of the countries than in Russia that leads to a faster convergence among those CISs 
banking sectors.   
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4.5. Conclusion 
This study has analysed banking sector performance in the CIS countries. Particularly it 
investigated the impact of ownership structure and different types of risks namely capital, 
credit, liquidity, and market risks on cost and profit efficiency in the CIS countries over the 
period from 2005 till 2012. The study uses the intermediation approach and estimates cost 
and alternative profit efficiency functions. Our main findings are generally robust to the 
alternative model and sample specifications as well as adding and dropping variables we 
used. The results are as follows.  
From the estimation of the frontier model the average cost and profit efficiency of the CISs 
banks are estimated as 40% and 55% respectively. The higher profit efficiency scores 
compared to cost efficiency scores are consistent with other study of transition banking with 
similar model specification by Bonin et al. (2005a). The efficiency score by country revealed 
that Armenian banks are more cost efficient on average than other countries over the period 
and Ukrainian banks were the least efficient. The most profit efficient banks are in 
Azerbaijan while the least efficient are in Russia.  
Turning to the results on the inefficiency effects, our findings suggest that ownership 
structure matters for banks’ efficiency in the CISs. Firstly, our model distinguished impact of 
four ownership types on bank cost and profit efficiency. Our findings suggest that, taking 
state owned banks as a benchmark, privately owned banks are less cost efficient but as profit 
efficient as state-owned banks. State-owned banks have different activity mix from private 
banks due to ‘development’ objective (Megginson, 2005), which allows saving on project 
screening, risk evaluation and customer monitoring; state-owned banks have less costly 
access to deposits in terms of lower ‘switching’ costs and wider deposit base due to being 
widely trusted and long present in the markets. 
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We find that foreign banks are more profit efficient than state-owned banks, however, as cost 
efficient as state-owned banks. Foreign banks are more profitable possibly due to best-
practice management and up-to-date banking technologies, which could be superior to the 
local banks.  Even though foreign banks may be superior in the aforementioned expertise, 
they are no more cost efficient than state-owned, which might be due to the lack of ‘soft’ 
knowledge imposing a liability of foreignness.  
CISs-member ownership has a strong negative impact on bank cost efficiency, which might 
be a result of a lack of competition; the CISs banks enjoy ‘quiet life’ (Berger and Mester, 
1997) not being pressured to reduce costs. The CISs banks’ going abroad strategy is to enter 
countries with less developed banking sectors in the region where local banks hardly can 
compete with newcomers. Moreover, the CISs-member countries are familiar with local 
markets and have better ‘soft’ knowledge39 compared to the foreign banks.   
Turning to our second group of variables, the findings show different impacts of risk 
behaviour on bank cost and profit efficiency in the CISs countries. Banks with a higher 
capital level are more cost efficient, which can be explained by the fact that banks with 
capital strength need less external funding, which results in lower costs. The other 
explanation resides in the fact that banks with higher capital ratios are subject to more 
shareholders’ control over costs and capital allocation, thus more cost efficient. Credit risk 
has a negative influence on profit efficiency, which indicates that higher credit risk exposure 
is associated with lower firm profitability due to unpaid loans accumulation. Banks, which 
are poor at risk management and operations, trading-off between risk and expected return by 
skimping on loans selection and monitoring, turn out to be less profit efficient due to higher 
levels of unpaid credits accumulated and losses in returns to banks.  
                                                          
39 
 This is the legacy of the soviet times and centralised policy to unify all the nations, which is very beneficial 
for Russia economic and other policies.  
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The liquidity risk coefficient indicates that more liquid banks are more profit efficient in the 
sense that, caeteris paribus, they produce more output, part of which includes liquid and other 
assets, which implies that the more liquid is the bank, the more profitable it is. However, 
liquidity is negatively associated with cost efficiency. This is more likely because banks that 
produce more output including liquid assets encounter higher costs. A different reasoning that 
could be made is that inefficient managers would hold more liquidity encountering both costs 
from poor management and higher opportunity costs of these low-yield assets. We find that 
the higher is the market risk the lower is bank’s cost efficiency. Certainly, borrowing in 
interbank markets results in higher costs and implies less cost efficiency. Moreover, interbank 
markets can be highly volatile during financial turmoil and greater interbank market exposure 
can undermine banks’ stability. 
Various control variables shed light on bank level and economic environment impact on 
efficiency. Their inclusion is important to avoid bias in estimated efficiency scores.  Income 
diversification has a positive impact on cost but negative impact on profit efficiency, while 
asset diversification negatively influences cost and positively profit efficiency scores.  The 
result for assets diversification can suggest that the CISs banks, which extend towards non-
lending activities increase their profits, however, encounter higher costs because these 
activities require extra bank resources. At the same time income diversification depresses 
profit efficiency, which could arise from higher income volatility stream, however, non-
interest income activities could be beneficial for cost efficiency. Listed banks are not more 
cost or profit efficient than unlisted banks in the CIS countries.  
Turning to our macro level indicators, the CISs banks benefited from the relatively high GDP 
growth in terms of profit efficiency; nevertheless they encountered higher costs as GDP grew. 
The 2007-2009 Global financial crisis had a significant negative impact on banks’ cost 
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efficiency, which faced with credit crunch; banks encountered high costs borrowing money in 
the international markets. The crisis positively influenced profit efficiency mainly due to 
increased interest rates spreads in the wake of the crisis. Increased expectations of the 
entrance of competitors into the markets of the custom union-members resulted in a positive 
effect on banks’ cost efficiency. However, the custom union establishment led to a decrease 
in banks profit efficiency due to increased competition and worsened economic conditions in 
two member-countries out of three of the custom union.  
Lastly, drawing upon the process of cost and profit scores convergence among CISs 
commercial banks, the results clearly indicate a convergence in cost and profit efficiency 
scores of banks across the CISs countries implying an ongoing process of re-integration 
among CISs financial systems. 
Concluding policy remark 
The results offer some insights to inform financial authorities and improve managerial 
performance. The credit and liquidity risk negative association with bank profitability shows 
that the CISs banking system should encourage managers to adopt strategies improving credit 
and liquidity risk to enhance profit efficiency. At the same time the capital and market risks 
negative influence on cost efficiency can be addressed by improving capitalisation and 
discouraging excessive market risk. Also, our analysis of ownership structure in relation to 
bank efficiency detects the importance of competition to alleviate domestic banks cost 
inefficiency.  
Although there is convergence in profit and cost efficiency scores among the CISs banking 
sectors, additionally can be stated for the custom union members that worsening economic 
conditions, which appeared to happen after taking steps towards the custom union 
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establishment, have to be tackled by corresponding regulation and economic policy towards 
improving this situation. 
In general, financial integration should improve the financial flows as well as cross-border 
banking activities; it should decrease costs of investments and trade. However, financial 
integration facilitates importing financial and economic instability. Recently, the introduction 
of financial sanctions against Russia by the US and EU affected other countries of the CIS via 
different channels. Besides, Custom union led to the trade-diversion with countries outside 
the Custom union for Kazakhstan and Belorussia decreasing high-technologies imports from 
outside the Custom union. Although there is convergence in profit and cost efficiency scores 
among the CISs banking sectors, the above mentioned concerns have to be tackled by 
corresponding regulation and policy of each country concerned towards improving this 
situation.  
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Chapter 5 
Bank Competition and Stability in the CISs 
market 
Preamble  
This chapter investigates the impact of competition on the stability of banks in the CIS 
transition countries.  
5.1. Introduction 
Banking sector stability plays a critical part in the ability of the financial system to resist and 
to reduce systemic risks, which are highly potent during financial crisis. In the wake of the 
recent financial crisis, and in a quickly changing environment, change in both the financial 
regulatory framework and the banking sector structure has raised questions of the 
relationships between competition and stability, which is the main focus of this study. 
The banking sector in the CISs is subject to continuous changes, which started from the 
beginning of the banking sector transformation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Banking in the CISs has undergone the processes of deregulation, liberalisation and 
privatisation in its historical development. The surge in the number of banks due to 
liberalisation with insufficient regulation at the beginning of 1990s gave way to  
consolidation of the banking industry as a result of improved regulation of capital 
requirements as well as mergers and acquisitions in the 2000s (Barisitz, 2008; see Appendix 
D: Table D1, D2).  
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The increase in integration of financial sectors
40
 of the region started in the pre-crisis period 
of 2007-2009 due to economic growth and liberalisation of finance in many CIS countries
41
. 
Along with that, integration into the world financial markets and foreign banks actively 
entering the regional market raised the question of increased competition and its influence on 
financial stability in transition countries.  
Moreover, the recent financial crisis brought to light that weak financial institutions and 
insufficient regulation and supervision were key factors of instability. As was discussed in 
chapter two, the crisis caused the CISs banking sector’s growth rate to slowdown, banks 
experienced a liquidity crunch as they couldn’t refinance borrowing from international 
markets. The after crisis consequences were a decrease in lending to households and 
enterprises by the banking sector, an increase in interest rates and a deterioration of banks' 
portfolios as bad loans increased by two to three times (Mitra et al 2010). 
Troubled financial systems can destabilise financial intermediation, which in turn can damage 
monetary policy and macroeconomic growth, cause capital flight and exchange rate 
turbulence, and result in high fiscal costs to bail out problematic banks. Increased 
connections among banking firms and other financial institutions from different countries 
make the impacts of financial shocks rapidly spill over across countries. Therefore, resilient 
financial systems with efficient regulation and supervision are essential for economic 
stability.     
                                                          
40
 The integration process was more intensive in the banking sectors, which were the most developed segments 
of the financial systems. Banking sector integration took the form of expansion of the CIS banks to the other 
regional countries. Although in the beginning of the 2000s almost all banks in the region were operating in the 
national territory, with the integration processes many large financial institutions are operating in different CIS 
countries simultaneously. The main players in the region Russia and Kazakhstan have 19.8 and 3.4 billion 
dollars of foreign assets in the region respectively (Petrov, 2011).    
41 
Integration processes are also politically supported. The Eurasian Economic Community’s documents 
containing a programme of actions for 2007-2010 aims at the creation of a common financial market for the CIS 
countries, and the Strategy of economic development of the CIS countries till 2020 aims at currency and 
financial cooperation as a priority. 
187 
 
The relationship between competition and stability is tested using two different hypotheses 
competition-stability and competition-fragility. In support of the competition-fragility 
hypothesis is evidence from earlier studies, which find a negative relationship between 
competition and stability (Keeley, 1990; Gruben and McComb, 1999; Hellmann et al., 2000; 
Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). They hold that erosion of monopolistic profits due to 
increased competition and thus reduced franchise value give incentives for riskier behaviour 
in banking (Keeley, 1990). Franchise value is defined as the ‘present value of the current and 
future profits that a bank is expected to earn as a going concern’ (De Jonghe and Vennet, 
2008). An alternative view is that for banks to be stronger the more competition is required to 
guarantee against market and regulatory failure. The competition-stability hypothesis was 
also empirically confirmed by more recent studies, which showed that higher level of 
competition leads to more stability (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Schaeck, Cihak, and Wolfe, 
2009; Allen, Carletti, and Marquez, 2011, Schaeck and Cihak, 2014).  
One motive for the present study is that with complex interactions between market power and 
stability, theory makes ambiguous predictions and empirical studies provide mixed results 
regarding the relationships between competition and stability (Beck et al., 2013). This study 
seeks to contribute to the literature by empirically testing interaction between competition 
and stability for transition CIS countries. Another motivation for studying the competition-
stability nexus is that the quickly changing environment and landscape of the banking sectors 
in transition countries raise a number of policy-related issues pertaining to the relationship 
between competition and stability. Moreover, both bank stability and competition issues are 
critical in the context of the recent world financial crisis 2007-2009 and particularly the 
vulnerability of transition countries to the crisis (Mitra et al., 2010).   
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Further, because regulation and supervision practices are important in promoting bank 
development and stability, we also examine the relationship between regulation and 
supervision practices and stability using environmental variables such as legal rights of 
borrowers and lenders (Legal rights) and supervisory power (Supervision). The project is 
likely to provide insights for policy makers and practitioners on what is important for 
financial stability and therefore lessen the possibility of systemic crisis.  
To this end the research questions for this chapter are: Is there a trade-off between increasing 
competition and stability in the CISs banking systems? Do we need to promote competitive 
dynamics to improve financial stability? What forms of regulation enhance financial 
stability?  
The objectives of this Chapter are: Explore relationship between stability and competition in 
the CIS countries; analyse the influence of environmental factors such as legal rights and 
supervision on financial stability in the CISs; and provide information for policy makers and 
financial sector authorities on whether the CIS countries need to encourage competition to 
maintain financial stability and which factors are most likely to support stability.  
Regarding research methodology, which we used in the current chapter, it is as follows. An 
empirical model is used to assess the impact of competition on stability. The main dependent 
variable is overall bank stability measured by Z-score (Berger et al., 2009, Schaek and Cihak, 
2014).  The Z-score indicates how quickly profits of a firm would decrease before 
capitalisation of a bank is depleted (Boyd et al., 2006). We also use the ratio of 
nonperforming loans to total loans as an alternative measure of stability. The ratio is another 
key measure of the stability of a banking system and is known as a ‘core financial soundness 
indicator’ (IMF, 2004). Competition is measured as the Lerner index, which is our main 
independent variable. Following literature (Berger et al. 2009), we also include bank level 
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characteristics such as bank size (logarithm of total assets), portfolio mix measured by the 
gross loans to total assets ratio and assets composition ratio of fixed assets to total assets. A 
range of environmental variables, which can affect the soundness of the banking system and 
which were stressed in Beck et al. (2004); Barth et al. (2013), includes legal rights of 
borrowers and lenders, and supervisory power; and the GDP growth. The data for 
commercial banks of the CISs covers a nine years period from 2005 to 2013 and includes 333 
commercial banks. We employ a generalised method of moments estimator for our main 
model to tackle the heteroskedasicity problem together with a possible endogeneity problem, 
which we address using instrumental variables. The endogeneity problem occurs due to the 
fact that competition and overall bank risk are jointly determined and may have reverse 
causation.  
The contribution of the present empirical chapter to the literature is threefold. First, this study 
intends to contribute to the literature by explicitly concentrating on the competition-stability 
nexus in transition countries. There is no clear consensus in the literature on possible impacts 
of competition on stability. Some literature argues in favour of competition for financial 
stability (Caminal and Matutes, 2002; Beck et al., 2004; and Allen and Gale, 2004; Schaeck 
and Cihak, 2014), while other literature conjectures that there is a trade-off between 
competition and stability (Carletti and Hartmann, 2002; Beck et al., 2013). Therefore, 
secondly our research attempts to revisit these two competing views and empirically 
investigate whether competition good or bad for stability. Moreover, the dynamic changes of 
banking landscape and environment in which banks operate in transition countries are 
settings which directly influence the nature of the trade-off between competition and financial 
stability. This study provides analysis of environmental and bank level factors that influence 
stability and elaborates further on related policy issues. For that, we combine data on bank 
and country levels to explore the factors of banking sector policies that influence banks’ 
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stability outcomes. Further our research benefits from dynamic panel data analysis, which 
provides comparisons across-country and across-time.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section two provides a literature 
survey on the competition and stability nexus and the measurement of competition. 
Methodological outlines are presented in the third section, data issues are outlined in section 
four, while estimated results and analysis are in sections five and six respectively. We discuss 
the results in section seven and the last section concludes.   
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5.2. Survey of the literature  
There is a developed literature on the competition and financial stability nexus. Two different 
views are developed in the academic literature. One strand supports the traditional 
‘competition fragility’ or ‘concentration stability’ view and the other supports the 
‘competition stability’ or ‘concentration fragility’ view. However, the two views on the 
impact of competition on financial system stability yield opposite results. This section 
discusses the two literature strands.  
5.2.1. Competition-stability   
More recent theoretical and empirical works report that competition positively affects bank 
soundness and therefore there is no trade-off between competition and stability. The 
‘competition-stability’ argument is built on the ‘risk shifting paradigm’, which states that 
banks that had gained market power tend to charge high interest rates, which in turn impair 
borrowers’ ability to repay debts due to moral hazard and adverse selection problems. This 
leads to an increase in non-performing loans in banks’ portfolios and destabilises the 
financial system (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Boyd et al., 2006, Schaeck et al., 2006).   
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) and Boyd et al. (2006) draw attention to the loan market, arguing 
that most works on financial stability take into account competition in the deposit market but 
not in the loan market. In their model competition in both loan and deposit markets is 
allowed. The existence of market power in the loan market may lead to destabilisation of the 
system and to financial instability. Banks also invest in loans; they have to decide on their 
asset allocation among bonds and other traded securities and their borrowers facing both 
portfolio decision and optimal contracting problems. When banks are price takers in portfolio 
decisions for bonds and other traded securities, they have to decide on the terms of the loans 
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to their borrowers. In turn, borrowers also decide on the riskiness of their projects financed 
by bank loans.  
Less competition in deposit market leads to a decreasing banks’ risk profile due to their less 
willingness to invest in high-risk-high-return projects. However, less competition in loan 
market converts into higher interest rates for borrowers. The higher expected rate of returns 
on assets, however, is offset by higher volatility of returns in a moral hazard and adverse 
selection setting. This is for the reason that higher interest rates charged for loans are harder 
to repay creating moral hazard incentives and forcing bank customers to shift into riskier 
investments. Consecutively riskier projects are likely to lead to a higher firms’ default risk 
and increase banks’ non-performing loans, which enhances the odds of bankruptcy for banks 
and bank instability. With higher interest rates the chances of adverse selection are also 
increased and more risk-loving borrowers are financed. Thus, competition resulting in lower 
loan rates to borrowers reduces moral hazard and adverse selection problems leading to 
financing less risky projects; it decreases default risk of bank customers and therefore bank’s 
risk of failure.  
A different argument in favour of competition is the ‘too big to fail’ view, which is centred 
on the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm. Market structure with small number 
of large banks are likely to influence financial authorities to be reluctant in letting larger 
banks fail, which increases the incentives of risk taking for the banks. This happens because a 
failure of a larger bank may threaten the whole financial system stability by exposing it to a 
systemic risk. The concerns of financial authorities about the contagion and financial crisis 
make banks to expect that they will be bailed out in case of solvency problem and take on 
more risks. The ‘too big to fail’ standpoint by banks may lead to greater fragile banking 
systems (Mishkin, 1999; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2006b; Schaeck et al., 2006; 
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Levy Yeyati and Micco, 2007; Beck, 2008). Besides, this view causes fewer incentives for 
banks’ monitoring by depositors, who also believe that they are likely to be protected by 
government insurance in case the bank is too risky. This leads to more risk-taking behaviour 
increasing probability of bank failure (Beck et al., 2006b; Levy Yeyati and Micco, 2007; 
Beck, 2008). 
The competition-stability view is supported in Caminal and Matutes (2002), Beck et al. 
(2004) and Allen and Gale (2004), Beck et al. (2013).  Boyd et al. (2006) empirical study 
concludes that the more the banking sector is concentrated the greater is the probability of 
failure.  
5.2.2. Competition - fragility  
The traditional literature conjectures a ‘competition-fragility’ or ‘concentration-stability’ 
nexus, which points to the negative impact of competition on bank soundness leading to 
greater instability and bank failures. Therefore, there is a trade-off between competition and 
stability. Opposite to this, market power decreases bank failures’ probability and increases 
banking system stability (Carletti and Hartmann, 2002; Beck, 2008).  
The competition-fragility paradigm analyses the association between market structure and 
banks risk-taking behaviour; it studies banks risk taking incentives and effects of competition 
on risk-taking allowing for deposit market competition but restraining loan market 
competition. Focusing on the liability side of the balance sheet, the paradigm explores the 
impact of franchise values on risk taking behaviour by banks (Carletti and Hartmann, 2002; 
Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Boyd et al., 2006; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2008). 
The competition-fragility view is based on ‘franchise value hypothesis’, which states that 
competition increases banking system fragility because it decreases profit margins of banks 
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negatively affecting the banks’ franchise value. Higher franchise value limits the risk-taking 
behaviour of banks by reducing incentive for banks risk exposure. This is because franchise 
value exists only when banks are going concerns, therefore they limit risk-taking to preserve 
their franchise values and avoid bankruptcy. Banks with market power earn monopoly rents, 
which divert banks from risk-taking behaviour because of higher profits, charter values, 
capitalization (Allen and Gale, 2004; Carletti, 2008), as well as better screening of customers 
which reduces risk exposure (Cetorelli and Peretto, 2000). Thus, with higher franchise value 
individual banks tend to hold more capital and less risky portfolios, which in turn make 
financial systems more stable (Keeley, 1990; Hellmann et al., 2000; Schaeck et al., 2006; 
Hauswald and Marquez, 2006; Jimenez et al., 2007; Levy Yeyati and Micco, 2007). 
On the contrary, higher competition causes a decline in monopoly rents or banks’ franchise 
values leading to reduction of incentives for prudential behaviour. It causes the adoption of 
more risk-taking strategies such as opting to lower quality portfolios, choosing lower capital 
level and taking higher credit risk. This is because in a competitive market banks have to 
compete for borrowers to compensate for profit margin loss and give loans to inferior 
borrowers leading to loan portfolio deterioration. This leads to an increase in the level of non-
performing loans and bank failures in financial systems. Therefore, competition causes 
financial systems to be more fragile, while more concentrated markets are preferable for 
stability (Keeley, 1990; Carletti and Hartmann, 2002; Jimenez et al., 2007; Beck, 2008; 
Berger et al., 2008).  
Carletti and Vives’ (2008) overview of competition and stability studies of the European 
banking sector point out that, given the fragility of the financial system, there is a trade-off 
between competition and stability. Turk-Ariss’ (2010) work supports the competition-
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fragility view for developing countries showing that greater market power enhances bank 
stability and profit efficiency in spite of increased cost inefficiencies. 
However, the two literature strands discussed above do not necessarily present opposite 
results on the competition stability nexus. Berger et al. (2009) show that the two views, 
competition-stability and competition-fragility, may not lead to opposite predictions and that 
in banking the link between concentration and competition is very weak. Greater market 
power although it increases credit risk may positively influence overall risk. Berger et al. 
(2009) state that with market power banks enjoy higher franchise value and tend to lend more 
thereby increasing loan portfolio risk. However, overall financial stability of banks with more 
market power is a result of other risk management methods, which may efficiently offset the 
loan risk. Another study (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010) argues that the relationship 
between competition and bank stability is not linear. While limited competition reduces bank 
risk, a highly competitive market damages overall franchise value of the bank. More recent 
study by Beck et al. (2013) argues that the relationship between competition and stability 
depends on regulatory frameworks, market structure and levels of institutional development. 
They argued that an increase in competition will negatively impact banks’ stability more in 
countries with better developed stock exchanges, lower systemic fragility, stricter activity 
restrictions, more generous deposit insurance and more effective systems of credit 
information sharing.  
 5.2.3. Measure of competition  
Two types of banking sector competition measures have been commonly used in the 
literature; these are structural and non-structural indicators. The Structure-Conduct-
Performance paradigm formed in the traditional industrial organisation theory conditions the 
competitive behaviour of a firm on the structural characteristics of an industry; it admits 
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different measures of market structure including concentration ratios of the largest three or 
five banks, market shares, and a Hirschman-Herfindahl index. The Structure-Conduct-
Performance paradigm claims that a concentrated market structure is associated with higher 
prices and profits due to collusion (Bain, 1956). However, the established literature on the 
behaviour of competing oligopolies has long acknowledged that concentrated markets do not 
reduce competition among the major firms. Moreover, the competitive behaviour in 
contestable markets is set by entry and exit conditions (Baumol, 1982; Baumol et al., 1982). 
Concentrated markets are not necessarily less competitive (Beck et al., 2006a; Casu and 
Girardone, 2009a), and thus market structure may be irrelevant and cannot necessarily be 
used as a measure of the competitive features of a market (Carbo et al., 2009).  In the review 
of the literature on bank concentration and competition Berger et al. (2004) separate different 
measures of competition and come to similar conclusions that competitiveness cannot be 
measured using concentration indicators.  
The other type of competition indicators are non-structural indicators, which measure a firm’s 
pricing behaviour. These measures are constructed as a monopoly power measure advanced 
by Lerner (1934). These indicators are embedded in the New Empirical Industrial 
Organisation approach and quantify competition between oligopolistic firms (Iwata, 1974) 
and firms operating in contestable markets (Panzar and Rosse, 1987). However, these proxies 
of the degree of bank competition stem from the static theory of the firm modelling and are 
criticised for imposing the condition that banking firms are required to be under long-run 
equilibrium (Shaffer, 2004). Though, a wide use of Panzar and Rosse H-statistics measure of 
competitiveness has been made for estimating competitive conditions (See for example: 
Molyneux et al., 1994; Carbo et al., 2003; Claessens and Laeven, 2004).  
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The Lerner Index uses the price mark-up and the higher is the mark-up, the greater is the 
attained market power. The Lerner Index is preferable to the other measures of competition 
as it permits the measurement of market power at a bank level as well as over time. It also 
makes it possible to distinguish a bank’s market power in different markets such as loan 
market and deposit market, where banks can exert different degrees of market power (De 
Guevara and Maudos, 2007). A number of studies have used the Lerner index to examine the 
evolution of competitive behaviour over time, reporting the erosion of competitive conditions 
in European banking over the past two decades (Fernandez de Guevara and Maudos, 2004; 
Fernandez de Guevara et al., 2007; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2007). This conflicts 
the common understanding that competition in Europe has intensified (see Padoa-Schioppa, 
2001; European Central Bank, 2003).  The contradiction can be explained by the non-
traditional activities explored by banks, which increase the return on assets and therefor push 
the Lerner index up, while in the traditional banking activities such as deposits and loans 
markets the competition may have increased. Another reason for increased margins and a 
higher Lerner index is that increased efficiency due to internet banking and opening ATMs 
instead of branch offices lower costs can affect the Lerner index and the return on assets ratio 
(Carbo et al. 2009). Hence, competitive behaviour measured using different approaches may 
require more thorough analysis of the results.  
In this study the influence of competition on stability will be investigated using the Lerner 
index. The Lerner index is calculated as a ratio of the mark-up price over price (Berger et al., 
2009). Marginal costs used for the Lerner Indices calculation are obtained by estimating a 
translog cost function. High values of the index indicate greater market power of banks and 
less competition in the banking sector (Berger et al., 2009).   
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5.3. Methodology and data 
This part presents the methodology and the empirical model used to examine the impact of 
market power on bank stability. Measures of competition and stability are discussed. 
5.3.1. Competition measure 
This research uses a conventional Lerner index (Berger et al., 2009) to test the impact of 
market power on bank stability and efficiency in the CISs. Market power is proxied by the 
Lerner Index, which measures the excess of the price over marginal costs as a proportion.  
The conventional Lerner index is measured as in Equation (5.1):   
𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 =
𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 −𝑀𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 
                               (5.1) 
where 𝑀𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡  is the marginal cost for bank i in a particular year t, and 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡  is output price, 
which is calculated as ratio of interest and non-interest income (total revenues) to total assets 
for i bank at time t, assuming that the non-homogeneous services of a bank are proportional 
to its total assets and where total assets are taken as the aggregate product of a banking firm
42
.  
To obtain marginal cost 𝑀𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 we first estimate of translog cost function for each country to 
better address differences in technology and obtain 𝛽1, 𝛽2,  𝜑𝑘, and 𝛿3: 
ln 𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡 +  
1
2
 β2 ln(𝑌𝑖𝑡)
2 ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑡 𝑙𝑛
2
𝑘=1  𝑊𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑𝑘 ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡
2
𝑘=1 ln 𝑊𝑘,𝑖𝑡 +
∑ ∑ 𝜃𝑘𝑗
2
𝑗=1
2
𝑘=1 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑘,𝑖𝑡 ln 𝑊𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑇𝑡 +  
1
2
 𝛿2𝑇𝑡
2 +  𝛿3𝑇𝑡 ×  ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡 +
             ∑ 𝜏𝑘 𝑇𝑡
2
𝑘=1 ln 𝑊𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                          (5.2) 
              
                                                          
42
 See: Angelini and Cetorelli, 2003. 
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where Cit is the total costs of a banking firm i in a certain year; Yit is the output of bank in a 
certain year t, measured by total assets (See De Guevara et al., 2005; Berg and Kim, 1994; 
Berger et al., 2009); 𝑊𝑘,𝑖𝑡 are input prices, where w1 is the price of labour and capital, and w2 
is the price of borrowed funds. The labour and capital price is calculated as the ratio of non-
interest expenses to total assets (Hasan and Marton, 2003; Bonin et al., 2005a), and the 
borrowed funds price is the ratio of interest expenses to total customer deposits (Berger et al., 
2009); T is a time trend to capture changes of the cost function over time; 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is an error term. 
Homogeneity of degree one in inputs is imposed by dividing the input prices and costs by the 
last input price w2 (price of borrowed funds). 
The total costs are defined as the sum of interest expenses and non-interest expenses. The 
model in (5.2) is time-variant, which assumes flexibility in efficiency both over time and 
among banks. The quadratic term of the time variable allows for non-monotonic technical 
change (Coelli et al., 1998, p. 303). 
Then the marginal cost 𝑀𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 is obtained as: 
𝑀𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑌𝑖𝑡
 [𝛽1 +  𝛽2 ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑𝑘 ln 𝑊𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 
2
𝑘=1
 𝛿3𝑇𝑡  ]                                                 (5.3) 
We calculate the Lerner Index for each banking firm and then we include it in the main 
empirical model. 
5.3.2. Stability measure  
The Z-score is a widely used bank stability measure (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Berger et al., 
2009; Foos et al., 2010; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Turk-Ariss, 2010). It represents 
the ratio of bank’s buffers capital and profits to the risk of volatility of returns. The Z-score 
indicates how quickly profits of a firm would decrease before capitalisation of a bank is 
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depleted (Boyd et al., 2006). This is also a measure of the overall risk or the insolvency risk 
of a bank (Boyd and Runkle, 1993). The higher is the Z-score, the lower is the probability of 
insolvency, providing a complete evaluation of stability. The Z-score is used as the natural 
logarithm version due to skewedness. We tag the logarithmic version of the Z-score as the 
variable Z-score for simplicity in the remaining part of the chapter.   
 
In our study the Z-score is calculated allowing it to vary over time for each bank following 
De Nicolo (2000). The Z-score presents the sum of the return on average assets of a bank and 
its equity to total assets ratio divided by the difference between the return on assets of a bank 
at a point in time and bank’s average return on assets over the period under study (De Nicolo 
et al, 2003; De Nicolo, 2000). The higher the Z-score, the more stable is a bank. 
𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =   
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+(E 𝐴)⁄ 𝑖𝑡 
|𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  |
 ,       (5.4) 
where ROAit is return on assets for bank i at time t, (E 𝐴)⁄ 𝑖𝑡 is returns on equity
43 
 for bank i 
at time t, and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is period-average retun on assets for bank i  for the period 2005-2013. 
This form of Z-score allows us to capture the dynamics of overall risk.  
We also use the non-performing loans ratio (NPLs), which is another commonly used 
measure of stability (Jimenez and Saurina, 2006), for our alternative specification of stability. 
It is calculated as a ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans. This analysis allows us to 
understand whether competition has an impact on systemic risk, measured by the level of 
non-performing loans. The higher the value of the indicator the riskier is a portfolio of the 
bank.  
                                                          
43
 Returns on average assets for individual bank is calculated as a ratio of net income to average total assets and 
it looks at the returns generated from the bank's assets. Equity to total assets is a capital adequacy ratio, which 
measures the amount of protection afforded to the bank by the equity invested.  
201 
 
5.3.3. Data and variables issues  
5.3.3.1. Sample statistics  
This empirical study uses bank-level data for commercial banks of the CIS countries for the 
period between 2005 and 2013. The sample differs from those in the previous empirical 
chapters in the thesis by adding the data for 2013, which changed the number of banks and 
included more observations accordingly.  
We use the unbalanced panel data, which, as in the previous empirical chapters, are obtained 
from the Bankscope data base, national central banks of the countries, the Financial Structure 
Dataset from the World Bank, and the websites of the commercial banks in the sample. 
However, for this research we used the data for the country level business environment, 
which we retrieved from the Doing Business World Bank database and from the Heritage 
Foundation. The data are in thousands of the US dollars and adjusted by the GDP deflator 
with the base year 2005. After thorough filtering and cleaning procedures to eliminate non-
representative data and drop banks with less than 3 consecutive observations, our final 
sample for analysis was reduced: number of observations is 2535; the number of commercial 
banks is 333, with all commercial banks of the CIS countries available from Bankscope are 
included except for Russia. Russian banks include banks on the same basis as in the previous 
empirical chapters. Turkmenistan banks were excluded from the sample as there was only 
one bank left with only 5 observations. Moreover, in Turkmenistan banks operate as payment 
agents of the central bank to subsidise the economy, which make the efficiency and stability 
analysis meaningless. The sample breakdown by country and number of banks as well as 
average assets is presented in Table 5.1. The biggest banks by average assets are in 
Kazakhstan ($3,708,976), Ukraine ($3,509,457) and Russian Federation ($2,465,346), while 
the smallest banks are in Kyrgyzstan ($114,393).  
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Table 5.1: Sample description: number of banks and average assets size by country 
Country/Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total by 
country 
Total assets of 
average bank (th $) 
Armenia 6 7 8 10 10 10 10 9 10 80 196,733 
Azerbaijan 8 11 12 13 16 17 18 18 18 131 645,299 
Belarus 6 6 7 8 8 12 12 11 10 80 1,214,096 
Kyrgyzstan 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 23 114,393 
Kazakhstan 10 10 14 16 15 15 17 18 16 131 3,708,976 
Moldova 7 7 8 9 8 8 9 8 8 72 268,427 
Russian Federation 150 187 200 201 218 229 227 219 216 1847 2,465,346 
Tajikistan 2 2 2 2 1 4 4 4 3 24 231,185 
Ukraine 7 7 10 11 11 12 13 12 11 94 3,509,457 
Uzbekistan 3 3 3 5 6 7 9 9 9 54 970,329 
Total by year 201 242 267 278 295 316 322 311 304 2536 2,226,563 
  
The descriptive statistics of variables which are used for calculation of the Lerner index 
competition indicator, particularly in estimation of cost functions to obtain respective 
coefficients and calculate marginal costs as well as in estimation of our main dependent 
variable, the Z-score, and the alternative dependent variable, non-performing loans to assets 
ratio are shown in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics of variables used in estimation of cost function, marginal 
cost and Z-score 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Output price  0.21 0.23 -0.11 3.29 
Cost* 179,694.6 329,329.9 2,578.61 1,759,445 
Total assets* 2,222,630 10,063,000 994.81 230,877,808 
Labour and capital price 13.56 17.26 1.58 84.06 
Fund price 5.29 2.34 0.73 11.12 
Return on assets  6.86 1.76 1 11.9 
Return on equity 15.63 9.40 5.48 55.26 
Non-performing loans 160,327 890,009 0.16 16,842,824 
Gross loans 1,115,847 2,653,782 9,595.89   186,921,776 
Note: (1) * Values are in thousands US dollars (2005 price level).  
The statistics of the variables that are used in the main regression are reported in Table 5.3. 
The Lerner indices and Z-scores by country and year are presented later in this chapter in the 
Empirical results and discussion part because these variables were estimated for this study.  
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Table 5.3: Sample descriptive statistics of variables used in the main model (2005-2013) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Dependent variables      
 Log of Z-score 2535 3.73 1.06 -0.0001 10.22 
 NPLs to total loans 2535 5.943 10.46694 0.1 63.22 
      
Explanatory variables      
 Lerner index 2535 0.263 0.27 -6.10 1.49 
 Loans to assets 2535 0.6243 0.315 0.02 9.65 
 Fixed assets to total assets 2535 0.037 0.035 0 0.35 
 Bank size 2535 13.05 1.53 6.9 19.26 
 Legal rights 2535 3.843 1.86 0 6 
 Supervision 2535 8.45 2.32 1 13 
 Log of GDP growth 2535 2.943 0.39 0 3.92 
      
Instrumental variables       
 Activity restriction 2535 6.37 1.59 5 11 
 Banking freedom 2535 3.82 1.07 1 9 
 Government banks assets share 2535 44.14 17.72 0 95.9 
Note: The correlation matrix is presented in Appendix D, Table D3. 
5.3.3.2. Definition of variables and hypotheses  
The key variables are constructed following theoretical concepts found in the literature and 
enable us to estimate the competition-stability nexus for transition countries. Details of the 
variables are contained in the Table 5.4.   
In our model we introduced bank-level controls. We calculate all bank-specific variables 
using the Bankscope database. We control for bank size expressed as the log of total assets. 
The control is needed because large banks are subject to ‘too big to fail’ policies (Mishkin, 
1999). On one hand, managers of larger banks might be willing to take more risk, in case the 
government is prepared to bail-out large problematic banks (O’Hara and Shaw, 1990). On the 
other hand, the advantages of economies of scale allows larger banks to stay more stable than 
smaller banks (Berger, 1995). Also, large banks engaged in a variety of activities are likely to 
enjoy economies of scope and may be assumed to be less risky (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997). 
We expect that bank size will positively impact overall bank stability (Z-score) and have a 
negative association with the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans as in Berger et al. 
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Table 5.4: Variable definitions 
Variables Definition  Source 
Dependent variables      
Z-score The Z-score is a bank-level indicator. The Z-score indicates how 
quick profits of a firm would decrease before capitalisation of a bank 
is depleted. Higher values of the indicator means higher bank 
stability and less overall bank risk.  
BankScope, 
2015 
Non-performing 
loans 
The non-performing loans to total loans ratio at the bank-level.  It 
measures the amount of total loans which are impaired or doubtful 
(BankScope). Higher values of the indicator mean a riskier loan 
portfolio and a greater instability.   
BankScope, 
2015 
      
Explanatory 
variables 
    
Lerner Index A bank competition indicator at the bank level measured by the 
Lerner index. The Lerner index is calculated as the proportion of 
excess of the price over marginal costs. The higher values of the 
index indicate less competition in the banking sector.  
 BankScope, 
2015 
Loans to assets Ratio of loans to assets is an asset composition, which indicates the 
bank’s credit exposure and used as bank control. 
BankScope, 
2015 
Fixed assets to total 
assets 
Fixed assets to total assets ratio is another asset composition ratio 
used as bank control. 
 BankScope, 
2015 
Bank Size The logarithm of total assets of a bank measures banks size.  BankScope, 
2015 
Legal rights of 
borrowers and 
lenders
 b 
Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 
c
 is an index, which measures 
rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of 
credit information available through either a credit bureau or a credit 
registry. The index ranges between 1 and 6. Higher values indicate 
availability of more credit information, from either a credit bureau or 
a credit registry, to facilitate lending decisions.   
Djankov et al. 
(2007)
d
/WB 
Supervision
b 
Supervision is and index, which shows whether the supervisory 
authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and 
correct problems. The index ranges between 0 and 14 with higher 
values indicating greater power. 
 Barth et al. 
(2013) 
 
Log of GDP growth 
 
The log value of GDP growth used as environment control for each 
country.  
 
WB-FSD
a
, 
2015 
 
Instrumental 
variables 
    
Activity Restrictions Activity restrictions is an index, which ranges between 3 and 12. 
Higher values of the index indicate greater restrictions on bank 
activities and ownership of non-financial organisations and control. 
Activities are qualified as unrestricted, permitted, restricted, and 
prohibited.  
 Barth et al. 
(2013) 
Banking Freedom Banking freedom is an index, which ranges from 1 to 10. Higher 
values of the index indicate more freedom. The index looks at 
whether foreign banks are exempted from restrictions, setting up a 
domestic banks is easy, and at government influence over the 
allocation of credit.  
 Heritage 
Foundation 
 
 
 
continued 
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Percent of 
government banks 
Government-owned banks share in the banking system of a country.   Barth et al. 
(2013), 
commercial 
banks websites  
Notes: a) Financial Structure Dataset World Bank; b) The questionnaire used in construction of the indicators is 
presented in the Appendix D, Table D4. c) For the reforms implemented on getting credit in the CIS countries in 
2008-2014 see Appendix D Table D5. d) The initial methodology was developed by Djankov, et al. (2007) and 
adopted with minor changes when reported by the Doing Business -World Bank Group. 
 (2009). The portfolio mix is measured by the bank loans to assets ratio; and assets 
composition is expressed by the fixed assets to total assets ratio. The portfolio mix measure 
may be negatively associated with stability because a high loan exposure results in a higher 
likelihood of default risk (Liu et al., 2011). We expect negative association between portfolio 
mix and overall bank stability Z-score and a positive association with the non-performing 
loans to total loans ratio.    
We also include GDP growth in logarithmic form to better control for differences in 
economic development of the countries.  Economic environment variables were included in 
Berger et al. (2009) and Shcaeck and Cihak (2014) who found that GPD per capita is 
positively associated with higher bank soundness and less bank fragility. Though, the GDP 
growth may tend to make bank lending more pro-cyclical (Berger and Udell, 2004; 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006), which can impact asset quality over time, a positive 
contribution of higher GDP growth to competition among other factors was named for the 
UK and the USA economies between 1985 and 2007 (OECD, 2010). Thus, we expect a 
positive sign for the GDP growth and overall bank stability. 
The importance of regulation and supervision for banking system stability has been 
established in many previous studies (Barth et al., 2007, 2013; Beck et al, 2013).  We use 
control variables that provide information on the wider regulatory and supervisory 
environment affecting the stability of the financial system. We control for the regulatory and 
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supervisory environment with two variables, the Legal rights of borrowers and lenders and 
Supervision for the following reasons.    
Theoretically, stronger powers given to supervisory authorities may compensate for market 
failure as banks are costly and problematic to supervise. Market failure in this case would 
lead to under-monitoring of banks and may result in inefficiency of bank performance and 
thus instability. Moreover, official supervision, which can be implemented by an independent 
agency, may prevent riskier behaviour by banks as a result of deposit protection schemes 
which have been introduced in many countries. However, powerful supervisors are prone to 
corruption, which leads to inefficiency and instability in the banking sector (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1998; Djankov et al., 2002). Also, when there is uncertainty about the supervisor’s 
ability to monitor banks, there may be a motive for the supervisor to acquire the status of a 
proficient supervisor. Protecting this image the supervisor would be reluctant to execute a 
bank closure policy and therefor might let problems accumulate (Boot and Thakor, 1993). In 
this case, a greater supervisory power would lead to bank instability. Empirically the 
relationships between regulatory and supervisory practices and banking sector fragility were 
assessed by Barth et al. (2004, 2006) using the wide range of countries in a survey conducted 
by the World Bank. They showed that policies that include regulations that force accurate 
information disclosure, empower private-sector corporate control of banks, and foster 
incentives for private agents to exert corporate control facilitate bank development, 
performance and stability (Barth et al., 2004).   
The indicator, which we use in this study to control for supervisory power, is constructed to 
capture the features that may compensate for market failure, and higher values reflect better 
supervision to promote bank development and stability (Barth et al., 2013). We expect a 
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positive association between Supervision and stability, and a negative association between 
Supervision and the non-performing loans to total loans ratio.  
We further test for the effect of the Legal rights of borrowers and lenders indicator, which 
highlights rules and practices of secured transactions by one part of the indicator and the 
availability of credit information by another. One part captures certain feature of the 
collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitating lending, and the other measures credit information 
coverage, scope and accessibility. Protection of creditor rights proved to be linked to the 
financial sector development. Particularly, creditor rights protection is crucial for financial 
contracting (La Porta et al., 1998). The strength of the legal rights of borrowers and lenders 
has an influence on the way banks manage their risks. Thus, facilitation of secure transactions 
and accessibility to information flow is another important element of financial system 
sustainability. Following the literature, we use the Legal rights indicator to reflect the 
institutional environment in which banks operate (Berger et al., 2009). The indicator ranges 
between 1 and 6. Higher values indicate availability of certain collateral and bankruptcy laws 
or credit information better facilitating lending decisions. We hypothesise that overall 
stability measured by the Z-score will be higher in a more favourable institutional 
environment, correspondingly the non-performing loans to assets ratio will be negatively 
related to the indicator.  
5.3.3.3. Instrumental variables 
We instrument the endogenous Lerner index by using three instruments, namely activity 
restrictions, banking freedom and the government ownership share
44
 of the banking sector 
following Schaeck and Cihak (2007). These variables can be used as instruments because 
                                                          
44 
In Barth et al. (2006) identified that regulatory restrictions on bank activities, regulatory barriers to the entry 
of new domestic or foreign banks, greater state ownership of banks, are not linked to a greater bank 
development, efficiency and stability. Barth et al. (2008) followed their previous studies and found that banking 
activity restrictions increase bank fragility measured as a probability of crisis.  
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they immediately impact competition. Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Claessens (2009) 
found that banking systems’ competition is determined by allowing bank entry (banking 
freedom in our case) and reducing activity restrictions on banks. Countries with fewer 
activity and entry restrictions are likely to have stronger competition (OECD, 2010). 
Theoretical forecasts of the relationships between regulation and supervision practices and 
stability are as follows. Activity restrictions is a key measure of permissible bank activities or 
the scope of activities of a bank that affect competitiveness. Regulation restricting bank 
activity has its theoretical support from different perspectives. Some theoretical reasoning 
supports a broad range of bank activities for the following reasons. With more options for 
banks’ activities, banks may realise both scale and scope economies (Claessens and 
Klingebiel, 2000); banks engage in less risker activities due to increased franchise value; 
banks are more stable because of their income diversification, thus contributing to financial 
stability. However, other theoretical considerations do not support much freedom in banks 
activities. First, conflict of interests may arise when banks have more freedom to engage in 
diverse activities such as securities and insurance underwriting, and participation in the real 
estate markets. They may attempt to assist firms which have taken out loans by selling low 
quality securities to insufficiently informed investors (John et al., 1994, Saunders, 1985).  
The other reasons are that such banks may become ‘too big to fail’; they are difficult to 
monitor; they are engaged in a riskier operations having more options of activities (Boyd et 
al., 1998); large banks weaken competition and decrease efficiency.  
This indicator captures information on four categories, which split activities into whether 
banks can engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities and whether they can hold 
stakes in nonfinancial institutions (Barth et al., 2008). Higher values stand for more 
restrictions on bank activities and on nonfinancial ownership and control.  
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Banking freedom reflects the openness of a banking system, which covers a broad range of 
characteristics. Different views on the regulation of entry of foreign banks as well as 
domestic banks into a banking system lead to different predictions. On the one hand, less 
competition, due to better screening and/or restrictions on bank entry, ensure a greater 
franchise value resulting in less risk-taking behaviour (Keeley, 1990). On the other hand, 
restrictions on bank entry and less competition might be damaging (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1998). The indicator signifies whether foreign banks are allowed to operate freely, whether it 
is difficult to set up domestic banks and whether the government exercises control over the 
allocation of credit. Higher values of the indicator reflect fewer restrictions and more banking 
freedom that promote competition. The bank freedom indicator is obtained from the Heritage 
Foundation database for 2005-2013 years. 
Finally, the share of the government ownership in a banking system is the last instrumental 
variable for competition. Economists have different theories on state ownership of banks. 
According to one theory, the state can directly finance socially desirable projects, utilise 
externalities and help to avoid failures in the capital market (Gerschenkron, 1962).  The other 
theory holds that the state assists in politically desirable investments rather than in socially or 
economically proved allocation of resources (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).  Empirically it was 
reported in La Porta et al. (2002) that state ownership hinders financial development and 
leads to sluggish economic growth. Government presence in the banking system directly 
influences competition. A bank is considered government-owned when more than 50% of the 
shares are controlled by the state. State ownership here is presented by a dummy variable 
which takes the values of 1, if a bank is government-owned and 0 otherwise. 
The data for activity restriction and government ownership share are taken from the updated 
database provided by Barth et al. (2013), which we tracked back to 1999.  
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5.3.4. Empirical model: competition-stability nexus 
The core of our analysis is to investigate the nexus between competition and stability. To 
assess the magnitude of the impact of competition on stability the empirical model (5.5) is 
estimated. We use the quadratic term of the Lerner index following the literature (Berger at 
al., 2009; Turk-Ariss, 2010). The reason is that the relationship between competition and 
bank risk may take a U-shape (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010)
45
.  We follow Berger et al. 
(2009) methodology; however, our model is different from Berger et al. (2009) in a way that 
they estimated a cross-section model, while we estimate a dynamic panel data model, which 
is the following: 
𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  + 𝜃𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
2  +  𝛾𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛿𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑘𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,                                                                        (5.5) 
where 𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 measures bank stability for bank i in time t; Competition is the main 
independent variable measured by the Lerner Index for bank i at time t; Bank Controls 
characteristics include banks size, which is measured by the logarithm of the total assets of 
bank i at time t, bank’s asset composition measured by gross loans to total assets for bank i  
in time t, and fixed assets to total assets ratios for bank i  in time t; Business Environment 
variables for each country k are: the logarithm of GDP growth; the Legal rights measured as 
an index between one and six; and Supervision is represented by an index ranging from zero 
to fourteen; and 𝛽, 𝜃, 𝛾, and 𝛿 are coefficients to be estimated. In the robustness checks the 
relationship between stability and competition is estimated by replacing the Z-score with the 
NPLs to total loans ratio in (5.5).  
                                                          
45
 They found that competition lessens the likelihood of loan defaults, which is known as a ‘risk-shifting effect’, 
but also lessens revenue or interest income from loans that is used to compensate for loan losses. The second 
effect is known as a ‘margin effect’. The outcome depends on whether the ‘risk-shifting effect’ or the ‘margin 
effect’ dominates in the market. They also state that the ‘risk-shifting effect’ prevails in concentrated markets, 
while the ‘margin effect’ prevails in very competitive markets (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010). 
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We control for possible endogeneity of the market power measure and employ the 
instrumental variables technique with a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator.  
A set of instruments we use includes activity restrictions, banking freedom, and the percent of 
government-owned banks. Endogeneity problem can arise when variables are simultaneously 
identified or there is a reverse causality. Market power can be influenced by the bank’s 
overall risk (Z-score) and loan risk. For instance, if a banking firm increased its overall risk 
and its loan portfolio risk, the incentives for gaining more market power such as pursuing a 
growth strategy and merges with another banks, may be caused by expectations of higher 
future returns. As was stated above, the possible endogeneity problem is addressed by using 
an instrumental variable technique following Berger et al. (2009).  
The problem of heteroskedasticity is a common one when empirical data are used and the 
studied objects have different characteristics. When using the instrumental variables 
technique, while the estimated coefficients are consistent in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, they are inefficient because of the standard error estimates are 
inconsistent. In the presence of heteroskedasticity the tests for endogeneity of variables and 
overidentifying restrictions are also invalid. This problem can be addressed by using the 
robust standard error option, but when the heteroskedasticity has an unknown distribution, the 
GMM estimator created by Hansen (1982) is a better tool to use (Roodman, 2009).  In our 
study we use the GMM estimator to address the heteroskedasticity problem and avoid 
spurious results.  
We use two-step estimation, which allows for robust standard error with Windmejer 
correction. The robust option provides robust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and 
arbitrary autocorrelation patterns within individuals in dynamic panel data analysis 
(Roodman, 2009). The two-step GMM estimator has advantages over a traditional 
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instrumental variables estimator in the way that it is derived using the optimal weighting 
matrix and relaxing the ‘independently and identically distributed’ assumption.  
We choose estimation of the regression with the noconstant option; and small option, which 
give the t-test statistics instead of z-test and F-test for overall fit; the orthogonal option allows 
for orthogonal transformation of data (preserving the number of observations) instead of 
differencing, which leads to the loss of observations if the panel data are unbalanced. 
Consistent with the studies on dynamic panel data (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Roodman, 
2009) and works on bank competition and stability (Schaeck and Cihak, 2014), a set of 
instruments are used based on lagged values of the explanatory variables (lags 1 and 2) to 
treat the endogeneity problem, the other set of instruments includes variables that serve to 
explain measures of the degree of competition (activity restrictions, banking freedom and 
government ownership). Our analysis differs from Schaeck and Cihak (2007; 2014) studies in 
the technique of addressing heteroskedasticity; where they used a 2SLS estimator while we 
use a GMM estimator. 
Following the literature, we use activity restrictions, banking freedom, and the percent of 
government-owned banks as instruments (Schaeck and Cihak, 2007; Berger et al., 2009). We 
test for validity of the instruments by conducting Hansen’s J test (Hansen, 1982) for 
overidentification and to check for autocorrelation we use AR(1) and AR(2) tests.    
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5.4. Empirical results and discussion  
5.4.1. Lerner index and Z-score 
Table 5.5 presents the estimates of average marginal costs by country and year used for the 
calculation of the Lerner Index. Marginal costs were calculated using coefficients  𝛽1,𝛽2, 𝜑𝑘 
and 𝛿3 obtained using individual translog cost functions (See Appendix D, Table D6). 
Estimated marginal costs indicate a sharp increase in marginal costs during the period of the 
financial crisis 2007-2009 in all of the countries and subsequently a decrease after 2010.  
Table 5.5: Marginal costs: average by country and year, 2005-2013 
Country/Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
by 
country 
Armenia 0.064 0.074 0.076 0.094 0.094 0.100 0.101 0.113 0.105 0.093 
Azerbaijan 0.074 0.064 0.066 0.080 0.078 0.076 0.070 0.071 0.070 0.072 
Belarus 0.124 0.095 0.088 0.103 0.129 0.102 0.248 0.148 0.149 0.139 
Kyrgyzstan 0.041 0.045 0.048 0.103 0.069 0.059 0.092 0.093 0.077 0.072 
Kazakhstan 0.041 0.038 0.040 0.046 0.047 0.042 0.038 0.035 0.038 0.040 
Moldova 0.089 0.089 0.079 0.095 0.099 0.087 0.083 0.077 0.072 0.085 
Russia 0.106 0.087 0.091 0.292 0.453 0.175 0.176 0.169 0.175 0.196 
Tajikistan 0.196 0.132 0.092 0.156 0.122 0.171 0.157 0.161 0.164 0.155 
Ukraine 0.094 0.085 0.082 0.099 0.115 0.110 0.101 0.096 0.096 0.099 
Uzbekistan 0.090 0.080 0.072 0.080 0.097 0.088 0.087 0.095 0.091 0.089 
Average by 
year 
0.100 0.084 0.085 0.234 0.359 0.150 0.154 0.145 0.149 0.166 
 
Table 5.6 presents the resulting estimates of the evolution of the conventional Lerner index of 
market power by country. The figures indicate varying degrees of market power in the CIS 
countries. The evidence from other studies also show that competition varies across countries, 
which depends on data sets used and period analysed (Claessens and Laeven; 2004; Bikker 
and Spierdijk, 2007). On average, market power slightly decreased in the region over the 
period 2005-2013. However, at the end of the studied period some individual countries such 
as Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine faced an increase in the market power of 
their banking sectors. The highest Lerner Index corresponds to Kazakhstan (63.53) and 
Azerbaijan (41.47), and the Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine market power indices are above 
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the region’s average. At the opposite extreme are Armenia and Tajikistan, for which Lerner 
indices are negative. Average market power over the period for all countries was highest in  
Table 5.6: Lerner index: by country and year, 2005-2013 
Country/Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
by country 
Armenia 33.69 31.77 30.06 14.48 6.73 4.76 2.81 -6.32 -5.69 10.49 
Azerbaijan 31.79 45.94 43.55 46.83 42.89 38.92 37.10 38.84 41.47 40.86 
Belarus 12.01 24.23 30.82 25.95 32.27 30.15 23.48 16.94 25.99 24.86 
Kyrgyzstan 62.21 57.50 53.35 28.52 36.08 29.42 18.00 18.98 33.18 35.93 
Kazakhstan 56.68 58.87 66.63 50.31 57.39 49.40 50.30 61.61 63.35 57.04 
Moldova 31.61 36.67 36.45 36.25 39.50 27.03 24.16 25.40 23.18 31.03 
Russia 23.64 29.41 30.52 15.40 18.91 19.60 20.88 21.74 21.92 22.25 
Tajikistan 1.75 19.43 32.96 16.21 26.41 -28.81 -30.49 -9.94 -6.91 -5.44 
Ukraine 16.51 24.24 25.55 33.46 28.69 19.76 20.54 25.18 26.48 24.70 
Uzbekistan 27.62 25.13 27.47 26.54 21.31 23.78 21.28 18.09 17.99 21.93 
Average by year 25.81 31.47 33.23 20.88 23.11 21.72 22.30 23.74 24.39 24.90 
2006-2007 just before the world financial crisis. One conclusion emerges from the finding is 
that there was a weak market competition before the crisis that led to an increase in non- 
performing loans in bank’s portfolios due to high interest rates charged, which impaired 
borrower’s ability to repay debts. This implies the ‘risk shifting’ mechanism’s presence, 
which may affect the financial system stability described in Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), 
Boyd et al. (2006), Schaeck et al. (2006). Turk-Ariss (2010) reported the Lerner index for 
some of the CISs countries measured using cross-section data averaged over the period 
Table 5.7: Z-scores
*
 average by country and year 
Country/ 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
by country 
Armenia 4.55 3.93 4.02 4.11 4.11 4.24 4.62 3.95 3.76 4.14 
Azerbaijan 3.18 3.12 3.56 3.27 3.56 3.29 3.45 3.66 3.64 3.44 
Belarus 3.35 3.14 3.31 3.68 3.16 3.59 2.57 3.65 3.53 3.33 
Kyrgyzstan 4.20 4.03 3.32 4.80 3.57 2.87 4.01 4.39 4.97 4.08 
Kazakhstan 3.05 3.17 3.30 3.71 3.10 3.28 3.96 3.25 2.99 3.34 
Moldova 3.36 3.44 3.10 4.10 3.05 3.85 4.18 3.96 3.86 3.68 
Russia 3.74 3.68 3.76 3.76 3.64 3.81 3.91 3.84 3.87 3.78 
Tajikistan 2.99 3.20 4.06 4.40 2.43 3.84 4.09 3.43 3.80 3.69 
Ukraine 3.22 2.95 2.81 3.63 3.09 3.63 3.57 3.84 3.29 3.38 
Uzbekistan 4.24 3.67 3.57 3.89 4.00 3.73 4.08 4.37 3.68 3.95 
Average by year 3.67 3.59 3.67 3.77 3.58 3.75 3.86 3.81 3.78        3.73 
Note: * Z-score is in the log-transformation form  
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1999-2005. The results are similar to our results obtained for the year 2005. 
Our empirical results on Z-score (overall risk) indicated that on average Armenia has the 
lowest risk potential in the region, while Belarus and Kazakhstan are at the opposite end of 
the overall risk scale. There was also a decrease in the average ratio of the region during the 
crisis period 2007-2009 (Table 5.7). Though the ratio does not consider the actual failure of 
banks (Beck, 2008), the results imply that there was an increase in the likelihood of banks 
failure in that period, i.e. there was an increase in return on assets volatility.  
We also report the mean Lerner index, which is obtained using equation (5.1) and averaged 
by country over all periods under study (2005 – 2013), together with other mean values of 
competition characteristics for the CIS countries in Table 5.8, Panel A and their correlation 
coefficients in Panel B. Thus, we used the average values of the activity restriction indicator 
and government ownership indicator reported in the four surveys by Barth et al. (1999-2013) 
and averaged bank freedom indicator. These characteristics tend to be consistent with each 
other in average levels of competition characteristics in the countries. For instance, the lower 
Lerner index in Armenia comparative to other countries corresponds to higher banking 
freedom index in this country.  
On the other hand the relatively high Lerner index in Belarus corresponds to a lower banking 
freedom index. In general the correlation coefficients of the competition characteristics have 
the expected signs. For instance the negative correlation sign indicates that where there is less 
banking freedom there is an increase in the Lerner index; and also that where there is higher 
government ownership there is less banking freedom. At the same time there is positive 
correlation between market power and activity restriction, which means that in more 
restrictive environment banks have more market power. 
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Table 5.8: Lerner index and other characteristics of competition, average by country 
Variable Lerner Index Activity restriction 
(3-12) 
Bank freedom 
(1-10) 
Government ownership 
Panel A: Mean values     
Armenia 0.02 8.16 7.15 0 
Azerbaijan 0.4 10.43 3.66 41.07 
Belarus 0.36 7.48 1.3 70.61 
Kyrgyzstan 0.33 6 5 13.76 
Kazakhstan 0.55 9.15 5.34 13.26 
Moldova 0.25 9.39 5 8.37 
Russia 0.25 5.64 3.7 49.51 
Tajikistan 0.3 8.17 3.67 11.54 
Ukraine 0.21 5 3.86 15.38 
Uzbekistan 0.21 8 1.26 93.54 
Panel B: Correlation     
 Lerner Index Activity restriction Bank freedom Government ownership 
Lerner Index 1    
Activity restriction 0.31 1   
Bank freedom -0.22 0.11 1  
Government ownership 0.10 -0.035 -0.88 1 
5.4.2. Main results and discussion 
The present section analyses the relationships between stability and market power together 
with bank level and country level environmental variables. Table 5.9 represents the results of 
the main model estimation: the influence of the market power on bank stability measured as 
an overall bank risk, Z-score (columns (1), (3)) and the results for an alternative measure of 
stability as a dependent variable (Table 5.10, columns (2), (4)); and here we discuss the key 
results.  
Our discussion will emphasise the main model results with the dependent variable Z-score in 
Table 4.5 column (1), which are robust to a broad set of checks. The coefficient for the 
Lerner index provides the expected negative sign at the 1% significance level. The result 
implies that more market power is associated with lower overall stability in the CISs 
countries. The finding is in line with the competition-stability view and confirms the ‘risk 
shifting paradigm’ for the CIS countries revealing the effect of market power on moral 
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hazard and adverse selection problems on the part of borrowers. The findings are similar to 
those, which also supported competition-stability view, such as Boyd et al. (2006), Schaeck 
et al. (2009), Allen et al. (2011), and Schaeck and Cihak (2014). However, these results do 
not agree with those of Berger et al. (2009) and Turk-Ariss (2010).  
Table 5.9: Estimation results of the main model, dependent variables: Z-score, NPLs 
  Main model Model with 
NPLs 
Main model 
(collapsed number 
of instruments) 
Model with 
NPLs(collapsed 
number of 
instruments) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Z-score NPLs Z-score  NPLs  
     
Lerner index -0.923*** 6.526*** -0.702** 9.940*** 
Lerner index squared -0.273* 3.586*** -0.0160 5.207*** 
Bank size 0.130*** 0.0846 0.255*** -0.414 
Loans to assets -0.241 9.815*** -0.403 10.83*** 
Fixed assets to total assets 2.884* 8.751 2.561 36.22** 
Legal rights  0.0714*** 0.232 -0.00179 0.518** 
Supervision 0.0548*** -0.0721 0.0179 -0.0295 
Log GDP growth 0.343*** -2.704*** 0.107 -2.033*** 
Lag of NPLs   0.724***   0.729*** 
Lag of Z-score 0.158***   0.0769**   
          
Observations 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 
Number of banking firms 333 333 333 333 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first 
differences  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences 
0.356 0.474 0.962 0.442 
Hansen test of overidentification restrictions𝝌𝟐  0.565 0.153 0.909 0.512 
     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
In the other model (column (2)) we use the non-performing loans to total loans ratio as a 
measure of stability. This analysis allows us to decide whether there are measurement issues 
in our main finding of significant and negative association between Z-score and the Lerner 
index, and to examine whether competition in the banking sector is associated with higher 
portfolio risk undermining financial stability in transition countries. The results in column (2) 
corroborate those obtained from the main regression. The findings indicate that with a rise in 
competition the non-performing loans decrease, thus mitigate the risk of financial instability. 
This finding may well be consistent with the view that it is more likely that in uncompetitive 
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markets banks pursue high-risk profile with negative consequences for systemic stability 
(Caminal and Matutes, 2002).  
We now discuss the impact of the other control variables on bank stability. Larger banks have 
a more positive impact on bank stability than smaller ones. The result agrees with our 
expectations because larger banks tend to be more diversified and engage in non-traditional 
banking activities giving rise to economies of scope. This diversification is also justified by 
our finding that the loans to total assets ratio, which represents traditional banking, negatively 
influences banks’ stability and increases the amount of non-performing loans, which in turn 
has negative consequences for the overall risk position. Although in our main regression the 
coefficient for loans to total assets ratio is not significant it is yet negative, and this result is 
mirrored in our regression with non-performing loans as a dependent variable where an 
increase in loans exposure in the CISs increases the non-performing loans undermining 
systemic stability.   
Our results on environmental variables are all highly significant, which is consistent with the 
views expressed in previous studies that showed that institutional and regulatory environment 
affects financial system stability (Beck et al., 2004, 2013; Barth et al., 2007, 2013). The result 
on Legal rights of lenders and borrowers as presented in the Table 5.5 is that the 
improvement of these rights enhances stability. Our finding indicates that countries with 
more efficient legal systems in facilitating legal rights have greater stability in their financial 
systems. The institutional and regulatory environment is important in influencing financial 
stability in the region. Most countries made efforts to advance their business regulation and 
particularly in to introduce credit legislation between 2008 and 2014 (See Appendix D, Table 
D4), and this may contribute to the reduction of overall bank risk exposure. Countries in the 
region improved their credit information systems, strengthened secured creditor rights, and 
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strengthened their secured transactions systems, which significantly improved borrowers and 
lenders rights. Thus, the financial authorities in these countries believe that the presence of 
clear collateral and bankruptcy laws are the key element in the institutional environment that 
affects banking system soundness.   
The supervision indicator has a positive and significant relation to stability in transition 
countries as expected. It can be argued that supervisory power has a significant impact on 
bank stability and consequently on financial system resilience. The expectation, therefore, is 
that supervision may compensate for market failure in monitoring and may prevent riskier 
behaviour by banks. The supervisory practices, which force accurate information disclosure, 
and foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate control, lead banks to reduce risk-
taking behaviour. Accordingly, most of the countries gave the positive answers to the 
questions: ‘Does the Banking Law give authority to the supervisory agency to intervene – 
that is, suspend some or all ownership rights – in a problem bank?’ and  ‘Can the supervisory 
agency order the bank’s directors or management to constitute provisions to cover actual or 
potential losses?’ This supervisory power gives the supervisory agency the right to intervene 
swiftly in a problem bank and strengthens the institutional environment and thus the stability 
of the banking system.   
The theoretical framework for assessing bank supervision is provided by the general theories 
of regulation and supervision policies. If private agents’ abilities and incentives to monitor 
banks are motivated by government policies, and by information and transaction costs, then 
proper official supervision of banks can enhance the corporate governance of banks (Stigler, 
1971). This view of ‘supervisory power’ stresses the market failures in banking and presumes 
that private agents often do not have enough incentives and capabilities to survey powerful 
banks. In this light a powerful agency with supervision and regulation authority, which is able 
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to directly control and discipline non-compliant banks, can improve the corporate governance 
of banks, decrease corruption in lending and so encourage banks’ intermediation and stability 
(Beck et al., 2006c).   
Taking into account that the banking system in the CISs went through different stages of 
development including periods when the law on the regulation and supervision of the banking 
sector were underdeveloped or practically non-existent, our finding also indicates the 
necessity for transition countries to strengthen their supervision authorities so as to enhance 
bank discipline and mitigate market failures, with positive implications for the stability of the 
banking sector.  
Finally, bank stability is positively correlated with the GDP growth, which means that the 
GDP growth increases bank stability in the CISs. As the economy grows, banks have more 
investment projects to screen and fund more feasible ones. Moreover, improved economic 
conditions contribute to the creditworthiness of business borrowers. This result is also robust 
when the non-performing loans to total loans measure is used as an alternative indicator of 
bank soundness. The negative sign of the GDP growth coefficient illustrates an inverse 
relation between GDP growth and the non-performing loans to total loans ratio.  Our finding 
is consistent with Berger et al. (2009) and Schaek and Cihak (2009). 
The main results are robust to a number of sensitivity checks with alternative samples, 
alternative dependent variable, inclusion of alternative regulatory and institutional variables, 
and, finally dropping and adding control variables.  
5.5. Robustness tests 
We perform our first robustness check by reducing the number of instruments. The similar 
findings to our main model findings obtain (Table 5.9, columns (2) and (4)).  
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Table 5.10: Robustness tests: different sample specification, dependent/independent variables 
 No big banks in the sample  Without Lerner index quadratic term Time dummies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Z-score Z-score (collapsed) NPLs NPLs (collapsed) Z-score NPLs Z-score NPLs 
         
Lerner index -0.663** -0.518 3.922 10.74*** -0.775*** 4.688** -0.479** 6.922*** 
Lerner index squared -0.173 0.0246 2.210 5.574***   -0.158 3.809*** 
Bank size 0.184*** 0.248*** -0.110 -0.531 0.145*** 0.149 -0.128*** 0.536** 
Loans to assets 0.0863 -0.257 5.940* 10.38** -0.202 9.496*** -0.638** 12.12*** 
Fixed assets to total assets 0.396 0.193 15.84** 39.03** 2.871* 8.402 -1.458 8.930 
Legal rights  0.0416* 0.00921 0.381* 0.622** 0.0616** 0.148 0.00657 -0.0476 
Supervision 0.0352** 0.0123 0.0474 -0.0464 0.0405** -0.0265 -0.00904 -0.0528 
Log GDP growth 0.236*** 0.174* -1.344** -1.642*** 0.303*** -2.571*** -0.00633 -0.627 
2006       5.632*** -14.43** 
2007       5.739*** -14.24** 
2008       5.795*** -12.46** 
2009       5.578*** -9.804* 
2010       5.759*** -10.44* 
2011       5.860*** -11.97** 
2012       5.849*** -13.25** 
2013       5.834*** -13.00** 
Lag of  NPLs   0.684*** 0.677***  0.728***  0.695*** 
Lag of  Z-score 0.111*** 0.0664*   0.153***  0.0810***  
         
Observations 1,788 1,788 1,788 1,788 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 
Number of banking firms 297 297 297 297 333 333 333 333 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences 0.610 0.985 0.342 0.279 0.333 0.508 0.897 0.479 
Hansen test of  
overidentification 
restrictions 𝝌𝟐 
0.760 0.804 0.596 0.428 0.487 0.0443 0.719 0.165 
       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
Note: 2005 time dummy is omitted due to collinearity.  
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Furthermore, we ran a number of other robustness tests (Table 5.10). We changed sample 
specification and ran the regression on a subsample omitting large sized banks (Table 5.10, 
column 1-4). We excluded the Lerner Index’s quadratic term from specifications following 
the literature (Turk-Ariss, 2010) (Table 5.10, columns 5-6); added time dummies into the 
equation (Table 5.10, columns 7-8); in each case the main results are largely unchanged. We 
also did other checks (not reported here) by including other business environment variables 
such as strength of legal rights, which were provided by the World Bank database Doing 
Business, and entry restriction as calculated in Barth et al. (2007), also foreign ownership 
dummies available from our database, and a deposit protection scheme dummy, a dummy 
variable set to 1 when a country introduced deposit insurance scheme based on information 
obtained from national central banks’ websites. The results remain robust to those from 
estimation of the main model.  
We also tested the competition stability nexus by using another measure of competition, 
Boone’s indicator (for calculation and Boone’s indicators see Appendix D1, Table D7). The 
results are comparable with our main regression showing a positive relationship between 
competition and stability in the CIS banking sectors.   
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5.6. Conclusion  
The complex relationships between competition and stability are relatively untested and 
different theoretical approaches lead to contradictory implications concerning the impact of 
competition on stability. This study empirically examines interaction between competition 
and stability for the banks which operate in the quickly changing environment of the 
transition countries. Using bank level data of 333 banks from CIS countries over the period 
2005-2013, we constructed competition indicator, stability ratio and bank level control 
variables, while we used country level environmental data to account for the regulation and 
supervision environment and differences in economic growth. We instrumented the 
competition indicator with three instruments namely activity restriction, banking freedom and 
government ownership to deal with the endogeneity problem, and used a GMM estimator.  
We found that competition has a highly significant positive affect on bank stability in the CIS 
countries. This result contributes to the competition-stability nexus literature for transition 
countries. In support of our finding in the main regression, the negative relationship between 
the non-performing loans to total loans ratio as a measure of systemic risk and market power 
also verifies competition-stability nexus. 
We also find that the coefficients on environmental variables are significant for the variables 
representing borrowers’ and lenders’ legal rights and bank supervision. We find these 
variables contributing to banking system stability. These results provide suggestions for 
policy makers and practitioners in transition countries on what is important for financial 
stability and how to reduce the risk of systemic crisis. Again, we found that there is no trade-
off between increasing competition among CIS banks and stability. The CIS countries 
financial authorities need to take competition in banking sectors seriously to promote 
financial stability, and strive to improve environmental conditions through enhancing the 
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legal rights of lenders and borrowers. Additionally we may conclude that supervision policies 
have benefits for financial stability if they drive imprudent banks out of business in an 
orderly manner. Moreover, the findings may have important policy implications for 
developing countries where bank stability and competition issues are critical in a quickly 
changing banking sector environment, and where the banking sector is vulnerable to the 
stresses on the international level such as the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009.   
Concluding policy remark 
The challenge for financial regulators is to develop and apply a regulatory framework that 
would support financial system stability and would not impede competition. On one hand, 
tight regulation may shrink competition and lead to a drop in financial system efficiency and 
profitability, which in turn may contribute to instability. On the other hand, if the financial 
sector remains inadequately supervised, it can become unstable mainly because banks are 
themselves inherently fragile due to having short-term liabilities, which can be withdrawn on 
demand, and long-term risky assets. The instability can be contagious and lead to financial 
crises, which have high fiscal and social costs. However, certain degree of risk-taking is 
necessary for economic growth. In attempt to preserve stability and soundness of the financial 
systems, policymakers need to design somewhat that would balance between financial 
institutions and markets operating as intended and together not allowing critical problems to 
accumulate. This balance is the key issue in banking sector regulation, which also affects 
competition (OECD, 2011).  
With that in mind, we tentatively conclude that well-tailored policies facilitating competition 
among banks can contribute to financial system stability in the CIS banking systems. As well, 
financial authorities have to send financial market participants including bank’s owners, 
managers and investors, a clear message that fraudulent, inefficient and indiscipline financial 
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institutions will be effectively closed. Additional instruments of financial supervision 
authorities could be enforcement of accurate information disclosure and encouragement of 
private-sector corporate control of banks.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
Chapter 2 focused on issues related to banking in transition countries such as the massive 
changes in the financial systems of the former soviet bloc countries in the last decade of the 
20th century and their influence on the countries’ banking system landscape at the present 
time. After more than 20 years of transition the financial systems in the CIS countries have 
features to different extents, which are the legacy of the former system of finance. Banking 
sectors remain the key form of financial intermediation in the CIS countries. The CISs’ 
banking sectors can be distinguished into the most developed, medium developed and 
underdeveloped groups. The first group includes the Russian, Kazakh and Ukrainian banking 
systems, while the last group consists of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. However, even in Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, the banking sectors remain 
underdeveloped. 
Nevertheless, there were achievements of the banking sectors in the CISs. In general, the 
banks in the CISs were transferred into commercial banks and adopted the concept of 
conventional banking though to different degrees across countries. Most of the CIS countries 
introduced international standards of financial statements, which contributed to transparency 
and a better monitoring of risks. Introduction of Basel standards had a positive impact on the 
capitalisation of banking sectors of the CISs (Kazakov, 2007). Banking sectors in the CISs 
had very high growth rates of their assets and credits to the economy before the world 
financial crisis 2007-2009 and slowly recovered after that (Banks of the CISs, 2008-2014).  
We note a continuous consolidation of the banking sectors in the CISs. There has been a net 
decrease in the number of commercial banks in the region by 280 (18.8%) banks between 
2007 and 2014 (Banks of the CISs, 2008-2014). The consolidation in the number of banks 
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takes place against a drop in concentration, which is the regional tendency over the period 
from 2005 to 2013. The decline in concentration despite the consolidation process suggests 
that consolidation has not involved many mergers among very large banks. 
The most important changes in the CISs banking sectors are in ownership structure, which 
differs across countries and provides fertile testing grounds for the analysis of ownership 
impact on efficiency; in the transformation of banks’ risk-taking behaviour; and in stability 
which is another concern of our study.  
There is a trend of financial integration among the CIS countries, which is most intensive in 
the banking sector. The priority for banks cross-border entry is towards those CIS countries 
with a relatively lower level of financial intermediation, where banks can compete and realise 
their economies of scope and scale. This is because the level of development even of the most 
developed banking sectors in the CISs does not permit competition on an equal basis with the 
financial institutions in developed countries; and the CIS region became one of the most 
attractive locations for the CIS own banks expansion. 
Chapter 3 investigated the impact of bank ownership and risk taking behaviour as well as 
environmental variables on bank performance in the CIS countries taking a technical 
efficiency perspective.  
Our findings provide empirical evidence that ownership structure matters for banks technical 
efficiency in the CISs. Using state-owned banks as a benchmark we found that private banks 
are less technically efficient than state-owned banks in the CIS countries. State-owned banks 
in the CISs may encounter wider and less costly access to deposits; the former is because 
state-owned banks have been present in the market for a long time and are usually trusted and 
the latter is due to lower switching costs. Besides, the state-owned banks may invest in large 
scale government projects due to the ‘development’ objective, thus having high output levels. 
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Banks with foreign majority ownership are also less technically efficient than state-owned 
banks, which supports the home field advantage hypothesis (Berger et al., 2000; 2005). 
Foreign-owned banks may have difficulties in processing ‘soft’ information about the host 
country market conditions, which may result in comparative disadvantages in technologies 
involving this kind of information (Berger, 2007). The CIS-owned banks are more efficient 
than other banks in the region. In contrast to the foreign banks from out of the region, the 
CIS-owned foreign banks are familiar with the environment and can more easily process the 
‘soft’ information regarding the market conditions in the country of entry46. The CIS-owned 
banks, which pursue policy of expansion abroad, enter other CIS countries with less 
developed financial sectors. This provides them with more advantageous environment 
conditions (limited advantage hypothesis). Risks-taking behaviour has different impact on 
performance in the CISs countries. There is positive association between capital, credit and 
market risk and performance, but a negative association of liquidity risks with bank 
performance in the CISs. Technically inefficient banks hold more capital (low capital risk). 
Credit risk-taking behaviour results in higher efficiency because riskier loans produce higher 
interest income. Moreover, ‘skimping’ on selection and monitoring of loans allows banks to 
economise time and other resources resulting in higher output of asset loans. More efficient 
banks can produce more output of liquid and other assets, thus they can be considered as 
‘liquidity efficient’ banks (lower liquidity risk). Higher market risk (borrowing from other 
banks) results in higher technical efficiency, which suggests that the CIS banks that rely more 
on interbank loans may produce more output, are subject to more market discipline and able 
to observe other banks. By monitoring and screening market risk they enhance technical 
efficiency.  
                                                          
46 This is the legacy of the soviet times and centralised policy to unify all the nations, which is very 
beneficial for Russia economic and other policies.  
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Chapter 4 extended efficiency analysis of the CISs banking sector by investigating the impact 
of banking sector ownership, risk-taking behaviour and environmental factors on bank cost 
and profit efficiency.  
Regarding the influence of ownership on profit and cost efficiency, we again took the state-
owned banks as a benchmark. We found that privately owned banks are less cost efficient 
than state-owned banks. State-owned banks in the CISs have different activity sets than 
private banks and save on project screening, risk evaluation and customer monitoring costs, 
which make up most of private banks’ costs. Another reason that private banks are less cost 
efficient is that private banks are mostly ‘de novo’ compared to long present state-owned 
banks and encounter higher switching costs. Moreover, private banks are less trusted due to 
dishonesty in business and fraudulent behaviour compared to the public banks associated 
with ‘government’s stable hands’.  
Foreign banks are more profitable than state-owned banks. On the one hand, foreign banks 
have best-practice management and up-to-date banking technologies, which could be superior 
to those of the local banks. On the other hand, state-owned banks are less profitable than 
foreign banks because state-owned banks pursue developmental and economy 
industrialisation goals but not profit maximisation like privately owned banks. Although 
foreign banks may be superior in the above-mentioned expertise, they are no more cost 
efficient than the state-owned banks, which might be due to the lack of ‘soft’ knowledge 
imposing a liability of foreignness. The CIS-owned banks are less cost efficient than other 
banks. Again, entering the CIS countries with less developed banking sectors where local 
banks hardly can compete with newcomers, CISs-owned foreign banks face a weak 
competitive environment and enjoy a ‘quiet life’ not being pressured to reduce costs.  
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There are different impacts of risk-taking behaviour on bank cost and profit efficiency in the 
CISs countries. Banks with lower capital risk (high capital) are more cost efficient due to 
more shareholders’ control over costs and capital allocation; banks with capital strength need 
less external funding and this results in lower costs. Higher credit risk taking is associated 
with lower profitability of a bank due to unpaid loans accumulation, which could be a result 
of trading-off between risk and expected return by skimping on loans selection and 
monitoring. Banks taking lower liquidity risk are more profit efficient. This implies that the 
more liquid is the bank, the more profitable it is, because efficient banks, which may produce 
more output, also produce more liquid assets as a part of output. However, higher liquidity is 
negatively associated with cost efficiency. This is because holding more liquidity results in 
higher opportunity costs of these low-yield assets and costs from poor management. On the 
other hand, banks that produce more output including liquid assets encounter higher costs. 
Higher market risk is associated with less cost efficiency, which possibly can be a result of 
borrowing in interbank markets increasing costs for banks. Interbank markets volatility 
during financial turmoil can undermine the performance of banks with greater interbank 
market exposure. 
Various control variables shed light on the economic and institutional environment impact on 
efficiency. The CIS banks benefited from the relatively high GDP growth in terms of profit 
efficiency; nevertheless they encountered higher costs as GDP grew. The 2007-2009 Global 
financial crisis and credit crunch had a significant negative impact on banks’ cost efficiency 
as banks encountered high borrowing costs. At the same time, there was a positive 
association between the crisis and profit efficiency, which mainly can be explained by the 
increased interest rate spreads in the wake of the crisis. The establishment of a custom union 
positively affected cost efficiency possibly because the increased expectations of the entrance 
of competitors into the markets pushed banks to reduce costs; it led to a decrease in banks’ 
231 
 
profit efficiency due to increased competition and worsened economic conditions in two 
customs union member-countries.   
Finally, there is a convergence in the cost and profit efficiency scores of banks across the CIS 
countries suggesting an ongoing process of re-integration among CIS financial systems. 
Chapter 5 examined the competition-stability nexus in the CIS countries. The literature 
provides different views on possible impacts of competition on stability. There has been a 
conventional wisdom that there is a trade-off between competition and stability (Keeley, 
1990; Carletti and Hartmann, 2002). However, the counter-argument states that competition 
contributes to financial stability (Caminal and Matutes, 2002; Beck et al., 2004; Allen and 
Gale, 2004; Schaeck and Cihak, 2014).  
We concluded that competition is good for stability in the CIS countries and verified the 
competition-stability nexus. This is in line with other studies supporting competition-stability 
nexus (De Nicolo et al., 2004; Boyd et al., 2006; and Schaeck et al., 2009; Allen et al., 2011; 
Schaeck and Cihak, 2014). This study also confirmed that the improvement of legal rights of 
borrowers and lenders and bank supervision in the CISs would contribute to banking system 
stability.  
Policy implications 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 created high fiscal and social costs. It called into 
question the sustainability of the western financial system, which now cannot be simply taken 
as a model for transition countries.  
The results from empirical estimations offer some insights on micro and macro level policies. 
On micro level, the results might inform bank managers and financial regulators on 
improving technical and allocative efficiency. Banks may improve technical efficiency by 
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increasing their liquidity levels (Chapter 3). The credit and again liquidity risk’s negative 
association with bank profit efficiency show that managers need to adopt strategies 
improving credit and liquidity risk management (Chapter 4). At the same time cost efficiency 
(Chapter 4) can be improved if bank managers would reduce capital and market risks, i.e. 
improve capitalisation and borrow less in interbank markets.  
On macro level, regarding banking sector ownership structure, the analysis show that private 
banks are less technical and cost efficient than public banks indicating that state ownership in 
the CISs banking sectors is not necessarily the only reason for lower levels of financial 
intermediation or relative inefficiency. Because the main inefficiency is inherent in domestic 
private banking, the banking systems’ efficiency may be enhanced via increased competition 
in financial sectors of the CISs. At the same time, drawing on the conclusion of competition-
stability nexus analysis that competition is good for stability (Chapter 5), it can be concluded 
that financial policies facilitating competition can contribute to both efficiency and financial 
system stability in the CISs.  
Policymakers need to design regulatory framework that would support financial system 
stability and would not hinder competition. On one hand, tight regulation may reduce 
competition and lead to a decline in financial system efficiency and profitability, and this in 
turn may contribute to instability. On the other hand, if the financial sector remains 
inadequately supervised, it can become unstable.  That is the regulatory framework should 
balance between financial institutions and markets operating as intended and not allowing 
critical problems to accumulate (OECD, 2011). This balance is the key issue in banking 
sector regulation.  
Additionally, although we found that there is convergence in profit and cost efficiency scores 
among the CISs banking sectors (Chapter 4), concerns about financial integration such as 
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importing financial and economic instability, and trade-diversion with high-technologies 
exporters have been raised. In this regards, it is important to ensure that each country can 
defend its interest and efforts should be directed towards mutually beneficial policies and 
regulations in the region. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix to Chapter 2 
Table A1: Assets, credits and their growth rates (10 largest banks in each country) 
Panel A: Assets, bln. US$  
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Armenia 293.8 1114.8 1907.5 2511.7 2711.6 
Azerbaijan 1733.6 3582.4 5905 9801.9 10833.2 
Belarus 8981.4 13027.1 18609.9 28482.9 27937.2 
Kazakhstan 30492.01 63527.7 88948.5 89062.5 68847 
Kyrgyzstan 338.1 564.5 872.5 1092.9 1253.2 
Moldova 1311.2 1609.1 2590.8 3418.2 3083.8 
Russia 155750.1 254955.5 411328.9 520593.7 524482 
Tajikistan 789.5 993.8 1208.8 1096.2 845.3 
Ukraine 20057.8 33581.4 57078.7 62193.7 58177.7 
Uzbekistan 3214.4 4652.3 5749.2 6199.2 6641.7 
Average assets, bln US$ 222.96 377.61 594.20 724.45 704.81 
Panel B: Credits, bln. US$ 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Armenia 107.3 399 1038.9 1504.5 1375.1 
Azerbaijan 1110.1 1796 4043.2 6934.8 8065.7 
Belarus 5867.2 8845.9 13835.4 21132.1 22222.9 
Kazakhstan 21097.2 45074.7 64168.8 61677.6 36133.5 
Kyrgyzstan 121.3 270.6 470.2 580.9 457.9 
Moldova 705.1 941.3 1634.4 2079.8 1570.2 
Russia 102462.4 166116.6 281783.6 339135.9 318725.1 
Tajikistan 290.7 459.2 622 688.1 455.7 
Ukraine 12013.8 24503.5 40939.2 49165 44240 
Uzbekistan 2317.8 2488.7 2985.6 3578.4 3764 
Average credits, bln US$ 14.61 25.09 41.15 48.65 43.70 
Panel C: Growth rates of assets and credits by country, % 
 Assets' growth rate Credits' growth rate 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Armenia 279.44 71.11 31.67 7.96 271.85 160.38 44.82 -8.60 
Azerbaijan 106.65 64.83 65.99 10.52 61.79 125.12 71.52 16.31 
Belarus 45.05 42.86 53.05 -1.92 50.77 56.40 52.74 5.16 
Kazakhstan 108.34 40.02 0.13 -22.70 113.65 42.36 -3.88 -41.42 
Kyrgyzstan 66.96 54.56 25.26 14.67 123.08 73.76 23.54 -21.17 
Moldova 22.72 61.01 31.94 -9.78 33.50 73.63 27.25 -24.50 
Russia 63.70 61.33 26.56 0.75 62.12 69.63 20.35 -6.02 
Tajikistan 25.88 21.63 -9.32 -22.89 57.96 35.45 10.63 -33.77 
Ukraine 67.42 69.97 8.96 -6.46 103.96 67.07 20.09 -10.02 
Uzbekistan 44.73 23.58 7.83 7.14 7.37 19.97 19.86 5.19 
Average growth rate, % 83.09 51.09 24.21 -2.27 88.61 72.38 28.69 -11.88 
Source: Banks of the CISs (2008 - 2014), in Russian, own calculations 
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Table A2:  Total assets, equity and their growth rates of the CISs banking system (2008-
2014) 
Panel A: Total assets, mln. US$ 
Country/Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 1st half 
2014 
Russia 824,611 953,400 973,100 1,109,200 1,292,900 1,630,100 1,758,300 1,813,800 
Ukraine 118,692 126,400 110,200 118,300 132,000 141,000 159,900 98,400 
Kazakhstan 97,119 98,400 77,900 81,700 86,400 92,000 100,700 94,700 
Belarus 19,991 28,809 29,467 43,729 30,823 37,124 41,286 42,305 
Azerbaijan 7,957 12,826 14,525 16,657 18,130 22,476 25,985 27,306 
Uzbekistan 7,191 8,649 10,373 12,646 15,057 18,016 19,935 20,723 
Moldova 2,825 3,762 3,245 3,481 4,072 4,833 5,835 5,700 
Armenia 2,470 3,339 3,509 4,292 5,357 6,122 7,257 7,167 
Tajikistan 1,635 1,785 1,121 1,552 1,912 2,210 2,650 2,548 
Kyrgyzstan 1,185 1,393 542 1,244 1,436 1,699 2,245 2,362 
Total by year 1,088,205 1,244,079 1,224,982 1,392,801 1,588,087 1,955,580 2,124,092 2,115,010 
Panel B: Equity, mln. US$ 
Country/Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 1st half 
2014 
Russia 108,835 129,700 152,800 155,300 154,100 194,600 203,000 198,800 
Ukraine 13,842 15,800 17,000 17,300 19,500 21,200 24,100 12,600 
Kazakhstan 11,860 12,300 –6600 9,000 8,800 13,300 13,500 11,500 
Belarus 3,036 5,143 5,178 5,843 4,308 5,329 5,764 5,731 
Azerbaijan 1,300 2,128 2,497 2,719 3,087 3,255 4,319 4,358 
Uzbekistan 1,165 1,509 2,048 2,500 2,970 3,137 2,952 2,849 
Moldova 488 641 561 565 649 582 876 865 
Armenia 536 768 738 877 925 975 1,124 1,160 
Tajikistan 191 315 246 247 420 482 543 441 
Kyrgyzstan 252 325 316 267 289 287 380 360 
Total by year 142,428 169,540 174,784 194,619 195,048 243,147 256,558 238,664 
Panel C: Annual growth of total assets, % 
Country/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 1st half 
2014 
Russia 15.6 2.1 14.0 16.6 26.1 7.9 3.2 
Ukraine 6.5 -12.8 7.4 11.6 6.8 13.4 -38.5 
Kazakhstan 1.3 -20.8 4.9 5.8 6.5 9.5 -6.0 
Belarus 44.1 2.3 48.4 -29.5 20.4 11.2 2.5 
Azerbaijan 61.2 13.2 14.7 8.8 24.0 15.6 5.1 
Uzbekistan 20.3 19.9 21.9 19.1 19.7 10.7 4.0 
Moldova 33.2 -13.7 7.3 17.0 18.7 20.7 -2.3 
Armenia 35.2 5.1 22.3 24.8 14.3 18.5 -1.2 
Tajikistan 9.2 -37.2 38.4 23.2 15.6 19.9 -3.8 
Kyrgyzstan 17.6 -61.1 129.5 15.4 18.3 32.1 5.2 
Total by year 14.3 -1.5 13.7 14.0 23.1 8.6 -0.4 
Panel D: Annual growth of equity, % 
Country/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 1st half 2014 
Russia 19.2 17.8 1.6 -0.8 26.3 4.3 -2.1 
Ukraine 14.1 7.6 1.8 12.7 8.7 13.7 -47.7 
Kazakhstan 3.7 -153.7 -236.4 -2.2 51.1 1.5 -14.8 
Belarus 69.4 0.7 12.8 -26.3 23.7 8.2 -0.6 
Azerbaijan 63.7 17.3 8.9 13.5 5.4 32.7 0.9 
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Uzbekistan 29.5 35.7 22.1 18.8 5.6 -5.9 -3.5 
Moldova 31.4 -12.5 0.7 14.9 -10.3 50.5 -1.3 
Armenia 43.3 -3.9 18.8 5.5 5.4 15.3 3.2 
Tajikistan 64.9 -21.9 0.4 70.0 14.8 12.7 -18.8 
Kyrgyzstan 29.0 -2.8 -15.5 8.2 -0.7 32.4 -5.3 
Total by year 19.0 3.1 11.3 0.2 24.7 5.5 -7.0 
Source: Banks of the CISs (2008 - 2014), in Russian, own calculations 
 
Table A3: Percentage change of the state ownership 
 Year to Year Over the period 
Country/Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2005-2013 
Armenia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
Azerbaijan 0.0 -28.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -19.0 0.0 0.0 -41.7 
Belarus 0.0 1.6 0.0 5.1 -10.1 -5.6 -3.0 -3.1 -14.9 
Kazakhstan 0.0 -60.0 2900.0 143.3 28.8 22.9 0.0 -13.4 3900.0 
Kyrgyzstan 0.0 -70.0 0.0 112.5 1.0 97.1 0.0 0.0 26.9 
Moldova 0.0 -41.2 -70.0 0.0 208.3 68.9 0.0 0.0 -8.1 
Russia -3.7 1.6 2.2 17.7 -15.8 13.0 1.9 3.8 18.5 
Tajikistan 0.0 110.9 11.3 10.2 8.4 8.5 0.0 0.0 204.3 
Turkmenistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ukraine 0.0 0.0 0.0 41.7 0.0 0.0 5.9 0.0 50.0 
Uzbekistan 0.1 0.1 0.1 -15.3 18.5 0.6 0.2 0.2 1.7 
Average by 
year 
-0.4 -8.5 284.4 31.5 23.9 18.6 0.5 -1.3 413.7 
Source: Barth et al. (2007, 2009, 2013), Banks of the CISs (2010), in Russian 
 
Table A4: Percentage change in concentration ratio, % 
 Year to year Over the 
period 
Country/Year  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2005-2013 
Armenia -8.0 -9.6 -16.2 -11.0 -0.1 -5.6 6.1 31.6 -18.3 
Azerbaijan -3.5 9.4 -12.4 1.8 9.3 47.9 -10.9 -12.8 18.1 
Belarus -13.1 17.4 -5.2 0.1 -4.4 0.6 -13.8 0.2 -19.6 
Kyrgyzstan 7.5 -7.9 4.6 3.8 0.0 -18.3 -1.7 0.0 -13.7 
Kazakhstan 9.6 -5.8 -7.5 7.4 -5.7 -10.5 -1.2 -13.5 -25.9 
Moldova -0.5 -17.9 6.9 3.7 2.6 8.8 -0.4 -15.4 -14.7 
Russia -8.9 -3.4 30.6 1.6 -6.0 14.8 9.8 31.1 81.4 
Tajikistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 
Ukraine -5.8 -9.6 6.0 -4.2 7.0 4.4 -38.9 -15.1 -49.9 
Uzbekistan 6.8 0.7 12.0 -4.6 -8.1 4.1 -17.2 -20.4 -27.4 
Region 
average 
-1.2 -2.4 0.3 -0.2 -1.2 1.8 -8.2 -2.8 -13.3 
Source: World Bank Financial Indicators (August 2014), Bankscope (2015), own calculations  
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Table A5: List of active banks, size of total assets and their ranks by country as of 
01.01.2014 
Banks/Countries Assets, 
millions US$ 
Place by 
total 
assets 
Banks/Countries Assets, 
millions 
US$ 
Place 
by total 
assets 
Azerbaijan Belarus 
AccessBank 1,026.7 4 Абсолютбанк 39.27 25 
AFB Bank 298.7 18 Альфа банк  671.58 9 
Amrahbank 191.3 21 Банк ВТБ (Беларусь) 958.02 8 
Atabank 523.6 10 Белагропромбанк 6795.60 2 
Azerbaijan Credit Bank 24.9 28 Беларусбанк 16835.38 1 
Azerbaijan Industry Bank 432.3 13 Белвнешэкономбанк 2137.42 5 
Azerigazbank 595.8 9 Белгазпромбанк 1626.02 7 
Bank Avrasiya 103.9 26 Белинвестбанк 2655.97 4 
Bank BTB 174.5 22 Белорусский банк малого бизнеса 37.99 26 
Bank Respublika 613.8 8 Белорусский народный банк 204.40 17 
Bank Silk Wey 279.0 19 БелСвиссБанк 145.90 20 
Bank Standard 1,289.3 3 БИТ Банк  27.35 29 
Bank Technique 664.9 7 БПС-Сбербанк 4329.48 3 
Bank VTB Azerbaijan 265.6 20 БТА Банк (Беларусь) 234.38 16 
Demirbank 516.5 11 Дельта Банк 301.35 12 
IBA 9,791.2 1 Евробанк 16.14 31 
Kredobank 161.3 23 Евроторгинвестбанк 28.83 28 
Melli Iran Bank Baku Branch 91.3 27 Идея Банк 287.68 13 
Muganbank 427.5 14 ИнтерПэйБанк 31.90 27 
NBC Bank 149.4 25 Минский транзитный банк 473.98 11 
Nikoil Bank 339.5 15 Москва-Минск 658.77 10 
Pasha Bank 897.5 6 Норд Европеан Банк 20.66 30 
Rabitabank 310.4 17 Паритетбанк 164.76 18 
Transcaucasus Development Bank 160.3 24 Приорбанк 1906.93 6 
TuranBank 311.5 16 РРБ-Банк 129.97 21 
Unibank 956.7 5 Технобанк 148.99 19 
Xalq Bank 1,613.7 2 ТК Банк 262.74 14 
Zaminbank 514.0 12 Трастбанк 86.46 23 
Armenia Франсабанк 99.30 22 
ArmSwissBank 172.2 14 Хоум Кредит Банк 234.38 15 
HSBC Bank Armenia 614.9 5 Цептер Банк 62.30 24 
UniBank 380.2 8 Kazakhstan 
АКБА-Кредит Агрикол Банк 659.9 4 Delta Bank 1,238.6 16 
Америабанк 776.7 1 ForteBank 249.4 30 
Анелик Банк 147.2 16 KASPI BANK 5,539.3 8 
Араратбанк 308.8 10 Kassa Nova 366.0 25 
Ардшининвестбанк 667.8 3 Qazaq Banki (б. Сеним-Банк) 316.7 29 
Армбизнесбанк 542.5 7 АзияКредит Банк 600.6 23 
Армянский банк развития 172.7 13 Альянс Банк 3,658.8 10 
Арцахбанк 216.2 12 Астана-финанс 517.9 24 
Арэксимбанк 575.7 6 АТФБанк 5,828.1 7 
Банк ВТБ (Армения) 738.9 2 Банк RBK 1,450.3 15 
Библос Банк Армения 105.1 18 Банк Позитив Казахстан 139.1 32 
Всеармянский Банк 17.9 20 БТА Банк 9,875.4 3 
ИНЕКОбанк 321.9 9 ДБ  HSBC Банк Казахстан 1,220.4 17 
Конверс Банк 300.0 11 ДБ  Сбербанк 6,743.2 5 
Меллат Банк 46.8 19 ДБ  ТАИБ Казахский банк 138.6 33 
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Banks/Countries Assets, 
millions 
US$ 
Place by 
total 
assets 
Banks/Countries Assets, 
millions 
US$ 
Place by 
total 
assets 
Прокредитбанк 130.1 17 ДБ PNB - Казахстан 89.9 37 
Прометей 154.9 15 ДБ RBS (Kazakhstan) 338.2 27 
      ДБ Альфа-Банк 1,113.4 18 Energbank 151.4 10 
ДБ Банк Китая в Казахстане 681.6 21 Eurocreditbank 24.6 14 
ДБ КЗИ БАНК 169.9 31 Eximbank 349.9 6 
ДБ НБ Пакистана в Казахстане 36.2 38 Fincombank 150.2 11 
ДО  Банк ВТБ (Казахстан) 937.2 19 Mobiasbanca 341.8 7 
Евразийский Банк 3,824.2 9 Moldindconbank 981.9 2 
Жилстройсбербанк Казахстана 2,312.1 11 Moldova Agroindbank 1,026.7 1 
Заман-Банк 94.8 36 ProCredit Bank 225.7 9 
Исламский Банк Al Hilal 110.9 35 Unibank 554.9 5 
Казинвестбанк 604.4 22 Victoriabank 892.1 3 
Казкоммерцбанк 16,281.4 1 Russian Federation 
Народный Банк Казахстана 15,895.9 2 Абсолют банк 3,538.9 51 
Нурбанк 1,645.7 14 Авангард 3,072.7 60 
Ситибанк Казахстан 2,114.2 12 Аверс 1,159.8 111 
ТЕМIРБАНК 1,970.0 13 АвтоВАЗбанк 867.4 141 
ТПБ Китая 322.0 28 Автоградбанк 170.8 369 
Хоум Кредит Банк 764.3 20 Автоторгбанк 317.4 260 
ЦентрКредит 6,981.4 4 Агрокредбанк 87.3 495 
Цеснабанк 6,013.1 6 Агропромкредит 953.8 131 
Шинхан Банк Казахстан 113.8 34 Агророс 89.4 489 
ЭКСИМБанк Казахстан 358.7 26 Агросоюз 232.7 302 
Kyrgyzstan Адмиралтейский 289.0 269 
Айыл Банк 150.1 5 Азиатско-Тихоокеанский Банк 3,485.2 53 
Аманбанк 60.6 11 Азия-Инвест банк 182.4 353 
Бай-Тушум и Партнеры 132.9 8 Айви банк 80.8 505 
Банк Азии 29.9 18 АйМаниБанк 592.6 177 
Банк-Бакай 51.3 13 АйСиАйСиАй Банк Евразия 138.4 415 
Бишкекский филиал НБП 51.1 14 Ак Барс 10,979.7 21 
БТА Банк (Кыргызстан) 72.8 9 АкадемРусБанк 42.3 647 
Демир Кыргыз Интернэшнл банк 234.3 3 Акибанк 779.2 150 
Дос-Кредобанк 35.2 15 Аккобанк 109.7 455 
Казкоммерцбанк Кыргызстан 25.1 19 Акрополь 47.2 625 
Капитал Банк 8.2 22 Аксонбанк 102.2 466 
КБ Кыргызстан 139.2 7 Актив банк 177.4 358 
КИКБ 284.6 2 Активкапитал Банк 590.2 179 
КыргызКредит Банк 9.7 21 Акцент 46.2 628 
Манас Банк 10.3 20 Акцепт 389.0 229 
Оптима Банк 317.7 1 Александровский 469.4 205 
Росинбанк 144.0 6 Алеф-банк 574.0 183 
РСК Банк 219.7 4 Алмазэргиэнбанк 635.9 168 
Толубай 30.5 17 Алор Банк 71.2 539 
ФинансКредитБанк 34.1 16 Алтайкапиталбанк 100.9 467 
Халык Банк Кыргызстан 55.7 12 Альба Альянс 209.6 325 
ЭкоИсламикБанк  61.6 10 Альта-банк 683.8 162 
Moldova Альфа-банк 45,144.2 7 
Banca de Economii 653.5 4 АМБ Банк 868.7 140 
Banca Sociala 340.3 8 Америкэн Экспресс Банк 53.8 603 
BCR Chisinau 66.5 13 Анкор Банк Сбережений 186.0 350 
Comertbank 75.2 12 Анталбанк 376.0 235 
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Banks/Countries Assets, 
millions 
US$ 
Place by 
total 
assets 
Banks/Countries Assets, 
millions 
US$ 
Place by 
total 
assets 
Апабанк 78.5 513 Булгар банк 43.5 641 
Аресбанк 626.6 170 Бум-банк 59.4 584 
Аспект 65.4 562 Бумеранг 50.5 613 
Ассоциация 215.2 322 БФГ-Кредит 976.1 127 
АФ Банк 198.9 336 БыстроБанк 1,061.8 119 
Байкалбанк 426.0 220 Ваш личный банк 115.2 445 
БайкалИнвестБанк 138.9 413 ВБРР 2,548.9 67 
Балтийский банк 2,794.9 65 Вега-банк 243.5 291 
Балтика 620.4 171 Век 165.7 376 
Балтинвестбанк 1,947.1 80 Венец 92.4 481 
Банк БФА 2,673.0 66 Верхневолжский 124.5 430 
Банк БФТ 163.6 380 Веста 138.3 416 
Банк БЦК-Москва 188.3 348 Викинг 50.1 614 
Банк ВТБ 160,617.6 2 Витабанк 105.0 463 
Банк ВТБ 24 61,931.3 4 Витязь 86.4 496 
Банк Интеза 1,976.6 78 ВКАбанк 76.3 522 
Банк Казани 191.0 344 Владбизнесбанк 61.6 578 
Банк Китая (Элос) 410.8 224 Владпромбанк 90.8 486 
Банк Москвы 50,736.5 6 Внешпромбанк 5,094.6 39 
Банк Натиксис 616.3 174 Возрождение 6,309.9 33 
Банк ПСА Финанс Рус 343.9 249 ВОК-Банк 203.1 332 
Банк Санкт-Петербург 12,677.6 14 Волга-Кредит 225.5 307 
Банк Сбережений и Кредита 465.9 206 Вологжанин 83.9 500 
Банк СГБ 888.0 137 Воронеж 83.0 502 
Банк Уралсиб 11,418.7 17 Восточный экспресс банк 6,883.5 30 
Банк Фининвест 517.4 191 Востсибтранскомбанк 153.7 394 
Банк24.ру 346.9 248 ВПБ 776.3 151 
Банкирский дом 65.3 563 ВУЗ-банк 367.4 239 
Банк-Т 202.0 333 Выборг-банк 67.8 554 
Банкхаус Эрбе 139.9 411 Вэлтон Банк 54.6 594 
Башкомснаббанк 321.2 258 Вятка-банк 530.4 189 
ББР Банк 848.3 143 Гагаринский 83.4 501 
Белгородсоцбанк 237.1 295 Газбанк 911.7 134 
Бенифит-банк 254.8 289 Газнефтьбанк 56.7 591 
Бизнес для Бизнеса 46.3 627 Газпромбанк 108,859.8 3 
Бизнес-Сервис-Траст 56.7 590 Газстройбанк 133.0 423 
БИНБАНК 6,557.4 31 Газтрансбанк 74.5 528 
БКС-ИнвестБанк 680.1 163 Газэнергобанк 473.7 203 
БКФ 218.7 317 Гаранти банк-Москва 484.5 199 
БМВ Банк 698.6 160 Гарант-Инвест 266.1 281 
БНКВ 185.9 351 Геленджик-банк 52.9 605 
БНП Париба 2,977.3 62 Генбанк 238.4 293 
Богородский 77.9 517 Глобус 50.0 615 
Богородский МБ 75.2 525 Глобэкс 7,849.4 26 
Братский АНКБ 78.9 510 Голдман Сакс Банк 234.9 300 
БРиС 250.1 290 Горбанк 136.7 421 
БРТ 138.7 414 Город 462.7 207 
БТА-Казань 634.9 169 ГПБ-Ипотека 531.3 188 
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Banks/Countries Assets, millions US$ Place by 
total 
assets 
Banks/Countries Assets, 
millions US$ 
Place by total 
assets 
Гринкомбанк 45.1 631 Зенит 7,841.7 27 
Гринфилдбанк 84.8 499 Зенит Сочи 172.6 363 
ГУТА-Банк 652.1 165 Зернобанк 141.7 407 
Дагэнергобанк 166.4 374 Зираат банк 85.1 497 
Далена 54.6 596 Златкомбанк 51.1 611 
Дальневосточный банк 803.2 147 И.Д.Е.А Банк 114.5 446 
Данске Банк 365.8 240 Иваново 75.0 526 
Девон-Кредит 749.3 154 Ижкомбанк 229.8 305 
ДельтаКредит 3,020.4 61 Инбанк 159.7 386 
Денизбанк Москва 387.5 230 Инвесткапитал 503.3 195 
Держава 617.8 172 Инвестрастбанк 155.6 391 
Джей энд Ти Банк 237.5 294 Инвестсоцбанк 82.6 504 
ДжиИ Мани Банк 875.6 139 Инвестсоюз 192.8 341 
Дземги 112.5 447 Инвестторгбанк 3,782.5 46 
Диг-банк 82.9 503 ИНГ банк (Евразия) 7,079.1 29 
Дил-Банк 323.8 257 Инкаробанк 85.0 498 
ДНБ банк 191.1 343 Инресбанк 235.0 299 
Дойче банк 4,432.0 42 Интерактивный Банк 99.6 470 
Долинск 116.5 443 Интеркапитал-банк 47.2 624 
Дом-банк 62.0 577 Интеркоммерц 1,443.7 98 
Донинвест 95.8 476 Интеркредит 110.6 450 
Донкомбанк 174.1 361 Интерпрогрессбанк 1,062.0 118 
Донхлеббанк 68.8 550 Интерпромбанк 1,002.6 124 
Евразийский банк 64.1 566 Интехбанк 617.3 173 
ЕвроАксис Банк 87.7 494 Интрастбанк 425.3 221 
Евроальянс 109.8 454 Йошкар-Ола 76.5 521 
Еврокоммерц 208.6 326 ИпоТек Банк 70.3 546 
Еврокредит 118.7 439 Ирс 72.1 538 
Евромет 231.6 304 ИС банк 77.4 519 
Европейский 240.3 292 ИТБ 124.7 429 
Европлан 157.4 389 Итуруп 121.0 435 
Евроситибанк 284.2 272 Ишбанк 215.4 321 
Евротраст 524.4 190 Кавказпромстройбанк 66.3 558 
Еврофинанс-Моснарбанк 1,644.8 90 Калуга 45.1 632 
Единственный 61.4 579 Камский коммер. банк 172.3 365 
Екатеринбург 340.7 250 Камчаткомагропр. банк 110.2 453 
Екатерининский 62.8 572 Камчатпрофитбанк 193.0 340 
Енисей 88.3 492 Канский 56.0 592 
Енисейский объединенный 139.8 412 Капитал 73.4 534 
Ермак 124.0 432 Капитал-Москва 118.5 440 
ЕСБ 63.6 568 КБР 89.2 490 
Жилкредит 51.9 609 Кедр 882.5 138 
Жилфинансбанк 307.9 263 Кемсоцинбанк 46.2 629 
Замоскворецкий 182.0 354 Кетовский 42.8 645 
Западный 897.0 135 КИБ 109.7 456 
Запсибкомбанк 2,805.7 64 Кивибанк 380.7 233 
Заречье 122.9 434 Кизлярский 67.3 555 
Земельный 44.1 635 КИТ-Финанс 2,260.1 72 
Земский банк 119.6 436 Клиентский 387.1 231 
Кольцо Урала 1,067.1 117 МБА-Москва 997.6 125 
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Коммерцбанк (Евразия) 1,295.3 104 МБО Оргбанк 135.5 422 
Консервативный КБ 123.2 433 МБР 302.3 265 
Констанс-банк 75.8 523 МБСП 1,597.8 92 
Конфидэнс Банк 116.8 442 МБФИ 49.8 617 
Кор 54.2 600 МДМ Банк 9,010.8 24 
Королевский Банк Шотландии 1,284.3 105 Мегаполис 88.0 493 
Костромаселькомбанк 90.3 
487 
Международный 
комбанк 165.0 
377 
Кошелев-Банк 78.6 511 Межрегионпочтабанк 151.0 396 
Крайинвестбанк 1,122.2 114 МежСтройБанк 41.7 649 
Кранбанк 174.6 360 Межтопэнергобанк 1,396.8 101 
Креди Агриколь КИБ 1,509.7 96 Межтрастбанк 152.1 395 
Кредит Европа Банк 4,613.2 41 Межфинансклуб 1,962.6 79 
Кредит Свисс 1,039.0 
122 
Мерседес-Бенц Банк 
Рус 644.9 
166 
Кредит Урал банк 718.3 158 Металлинвестбанк 1,995.6 77 
Кредит Экспресс 60.5 583 Меткомбанк 1,442.7 99 
Кредит-Москва 265.2 282 Меткомбанк 1,265.6 108 
Кредпромбанк 61.3 580 Метробанк 400.0 226 
Кремлевский 149.5 397 МИА 496.7 196 
КРК 334.4 251 Милбанк 111.5 449 
Крокус-банк 78.5 512 Миллениум Банк 313.4 261 
Крона-Банк 70.6 541 МИнБ 6,381.5 32 
Кросна-банк 69.1 547 Мир Бизнес Банк 237.0 296 
Кроссинвестбанк 175.3 359 Мираф-банк 100.2 468 
Крыловский 145.9 405 Михайловский ПЖСБ 47.2 623 
Кс-банк 276.1 278 МКБ им. С. Живаго 99.5 471 
КУБ 63.3 570 МНХБ 205.8 330 
Кубань Кредит 1,720.7 88 Мой Банк 547.3 185 
Кубаньторгбанк 66.2 559 Мой Банк. Ипотека 146.7 404 
Кузнецкбизнесбанк 198.7 337 Монолит 350.0 246 
Кузнецкий 130.3 426 Мордовпромстройбанк 140.5 409 
Кузнецкий мост 185.6 352 Морской банк 580.0 182 
Курскпромбанк 482.2 200 Мосводоканалбанк 45.0 633 
Лайтбанк 105.8 462 Москва-Сити 158.1 387 
Ланта-банк 591.7 178 Московский вексельн. 62.2 576 
Левобережный 967.9 129 Московский кред. банк 13,591.2 13 
Легион 589.4 180 Московско-париж. банк 52.2 607 
Леноблбанк 106.4 460 Москомбанк 119.5 437 
Лесбанк 124.4 431 Москоммерцбанк 600.5 175 
Лето Банк 932.3 133 Москомприватбанк 1,518.5 95 
Липецккомбанк 797.5 148 Мособлбанк 1,816.1 84 
Локо-банк 2,400.9 69 Мосстройэкономбанк 783.8 149 
М2М Прайвет Банк 735.2 156 Мострансбанк 73.7 531 
МАБ 283.9 273 Мосуралбанк 155.2 392 
Майкопбанк 48.4 619 МСП Банк 3,892.8 45 
Мак-банк 232.2 303 МТС Банк 5,231.9 37 
Максима 49.8 618 МФБанк 69.0 548 
Маст-банк 417.6 222 Навигатор 224.8 309 
Мастер-Капитал 116.0 444 Нальчик 54.1 601 
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Наратбанк 59.0 586 ОРБанк 67.1 556 
Народный банк 43.3 644 Оренбург 325.6 256 
Народный Доверительный                             
банк 95.6 
477 
Открытие 6,084.7 
35 
Народный Кредит 1,270.8 107 ОТП Банк 4,311.1 43 
Нацбанк Сбережений 64.2 565 ОФК-банк 426.6 219 
Нацбизнесбанк 358.6 244 Первобанк 1,722.9 87 
Национальный космический 376.4 234 Первомайский 478.0 201 
Национальный стандарт 1,613.8 91 Первый инвест.  банк 90.9 485 
НацКлирингЦентр 12,533.2 16 Пересвет 3,101.4 59 
Нацкорпбанк 65.8 560 Пермь 68.8 551 
Наш дом 105.8 461 Петрокоммерц 7,232.5 28 
НБ ТРАСТ 5,899.0 36 Платина 213.1 323 
НБВК 59.4 585 Плюс-банк 427.0 218 
НБД-банк 490.9 197 Пойдем! 488.7 198 
НБК Банк 99.3 472 Почтобанк 52.5 606 
НВКБ 235.7 297 ПРБ 1,170.7 109 
Невский нарбанк 172.1 366 Преодоление 98.4 473 
Нейва 137.8 417 Приморье 735.1 157 
Нерюнгрибанк 43.4 643 Примсоцбанк 1,163.2 110 
Нефтепромбанк 260.9 286 Приобье 54.6 595 
Нефтяной Альянс 320.7 259 Прио-Внешторгбанк 288.6 270 
НЗ банк 167.4 373 Приоритет 93.6 478 
Нико-банк 277.1 277 Приско Капитал Банк 53.7 604 
НИПБ 440.8 213 Пробизнесбанк 3,144.9 58 
Новация 65.6 561 Проинвестбанк 77.9 516 
Новикомбанк 5,159.2 38 Проминвестбанк 111.6 448 
Новобанк 118.1 441 Проминвестрасчет 216.1 319 
Новое Время 108.6 458 Промрегионбанк 127.1 428 
Новопокровский 205.0 331 Промсбербанк 273.2 279 
Новосибирский МБ 257.5 287 Промсвязьбанк 22,536.0 10 
Новый кредитный союз 43.4 642 Промсельхозбанк 110.4 451 
Новый московский банк 177.7 357 ПромСервисБанк 137.7 418 
Новый символ 70.6 542 Промтрансбанк 262.8 285 
Нокссбанк 76.6 520 Промэнергобанк 159.7 385 
Номос-банк 28,463.9 8 Профессионал Банк 88.7 491 
Нордеа Банк 8,383.0 25 Профит банк 131.5 425 
НОТА-Банк 2,907.6 63 Профкредитбанк 73.9 529 
НРБ 664.3 164 ПСКБ 512.9 193 
НС-банк 1,298.2 103 ПТБ 47.1 626 
НФК 456.5 210 Пульс столицы 68.9 549 
Нэклис-банк 163.9 378 Пурпе 71.1 540 
ОБПИ 163.8 379 ПЧРБ 773.8 152 
Образование 956.8 130 Радиотехбанк 77.5 518 
Объединенный капитал 434.4 217 Развитие 215.7 320 
Огни Москвы 600.2 176 Развитие-Столица 411.2 223 
Океан Банк 106.9 459 Райффайзенбанк 21,093.8 11 
Окский 149.0 399 Расчетно-кредит. банк 444.0 212 
Онего 41.2 650 РБА 98.3 474 
ОПМ-банк 278.4 275 Региональный 43.9 637 
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Региональный кредит 809.6 146 Русюгбанк 477.4 202 
Регионбанк развития 157.9 388 РФК 72.6 536 
Резерв 70.6 543 РЭБ 50.0 616 
Резервные финансы 48.0 622 С.-Петербургский ИАБ 397.2 227 
Ренессанс 221.9 314 Саратов 42.6 646 
Ренессанс-Кредит 3,271.4 55 Саровбизнесбанк 1,095.9 115 
РЕСО Кредит 167.6 372 Сбербанк России 499,065 1 
РИА 144.6 406 Сберинвестбанк 79.3 509 
Риал Кредит 67.0 557 СВА 191.4 342 
Ринвестбанк 73.7 530 Связной Банк 2,093.1 74 
РКА 43.8 638 Связь-банк 10,617.6 22 
РН Банк 169.8 370 СДМ-банк 1,141.6 112 
РНКБ 58.4 587 Северный Кредит 190.4 345 
Росавтобанк 356.8 245 Северный народ. банк 171.5 368 
Росбанк 20,929.2 12 Сервис-резерв 44.3 634 
Росбизнесбанк 80.0 508 Сетелем Банк 1,878.2 83 
Росгосстрахбанк 3,500.6 52 Сибнефтебанк 160.3 384 
Росдорбанк 461.8 208 Сибсоцбанк 161.5 382 
Росевробанк 3,780.4 47 Сибэс 54.2 599 
Росинтербанк 1,325.3 102 Синко-банк 131.9 424 
Роспромбанк 255.8 288 Система 68.5 552 
Россельхозбанк 55,495.1 5 Сити Инвест банк 78.3 514 
Российский капитал 3,430.7 54 Ситибанк 11,183.5 19 
Российский кредит 2,199.4 73 СКА-банк 119.0 438 
Россита-банк 68.1 553 СКБ-банк 3,696.5 49 
Россия 12,633.0 15 Славия 234.7 301 
РОСТ Банк 2,071.2 76 Славянский кредит 223.0 312 
РостФинанс 48.2 621 Смартбанк 89.9 488 
Росэксимбанк 363.9 241 СМП 4,711.0 40 
Росэнергобанк 971.6 128 Снежинский 221.6 315 
РСКБ 61.1 582 Собинбанк 1,656.8 89 
РТС-Банк 92.8 479 Советский 996.5 126 
Рублев 439.5 215 Совинком 42.2 648 
Руна-банк 54.0 602 Совкомбанк 3,777.5 48 
Рускобанк 224.9 308 Соколовский 43.7 640 
Руснарбанк 293.1 268 Солид Банк 330.8 254 
Руснацбанк 73.5 533 Солидарность 538.2 187 
Русский земельный банк 386.4 232 Солидарность 367.9 238 
Русский ипотечный банк 372.3 236 Софрино 218.3 318 
Русский международный 1,059.5 120 Социнвестбанк 394.2 228 
Русский стандарт 11,211.4 18 Социум-Банк 50.9 612 
Русславбанк 1,034.4 123 Союз 2,473.6 68 
Руссобанк 201.0 334 Союзный 127.4 427 
Русстройбанк 840.8 144 Союзпромбанк 43.7 639 
Русторгбанк 211.5 324 СПб банк инвестиций 51.7 610 
РусТрастБанк 147.2 403 Спецсетьстройбанк 189.5 347 
Русфинанс Банк 3,210.1 56 Спиритбанк 63.9 567 
Русь 195.4 339 Спурт 636.9 167 
Русьуниверсалбанк 281.0 274 ССБ 54.5 597 
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Ставрополье 219.0 316 Унифондбанк 75.5 524 
СтарБанк 460.1 209 Уралприватбанк 45.4 630 
Старооскольский АПБ 54.4 598 Уралпромбанк 80.6 506 
Стелла-банк 55.8 593 Уралтрансбанк 506.6 194 
Столичный Кредит 72.4 537 Уральский капитал 222.9 313 
Стратегия 301.5 266 Уральский фин. дом 770.5 153 
Стройкомбанк 48.3 620 Ури Банк 189.6 346 
Стройкредит 688.8 161 Уссури 102.9 464 
Стройлесбанк 154.0 393 ФБИиР 208.5 327 
Судостроительный банк 1,936.4 81 ФДБ 165.9 375 
Сумитомо Мицуи Рус Банк 851.7 142 Ферробанк 110.4 452 
Сургутнефтегазбанк 1,770.3 86 Фиа-банк 581.7 181 
СЭБ Банк 331.1 253 ФИНАМ 223.0 311 
Таатта 206.7 329 ФинансБизнесБанк 147.4 402 
Таврический 1,416.5 100 Финансовый капитал 95.9 475 
Тагилбанк 56.9 589 Финансовый стандарт 181.2 355 
Тамбовкредитпромбанк 99.8 469 Финпромбанк 939.3 132 
Татагропромбанк 62.2 575 Финсервис 888.9 136 
Татинвестбанк 62.4 573 Финтрастбанк 52.2 608 
Татсоцбанк 278.2 276 Фольксваген Банк Рус 836.3 145 
Татфондбанк 3,677.5 50 Фондсервисбанк 2,088.5 75 
Таурус Банк 74.8 527 Фора-банк 1,127.4 113 
Тверской городской банк 91.7 483 Форбанк 65.0 564 
Тверьуниверсалбанк 178.8 356 Форус Банк 91.0 484 
Темпбанк 298.5 267 Форштадт 473.5 204 
Тендер-банк 63.4 569 ФПК 92.1 482 
Тихоокеанский ВТБ 264.7 283 Фьючер 70.6 544 
ТКС Банк 3,206.3 57 Хакасский МБ 148.1 401 
Тойота Банк 1,572.8 93 Ханты-Мансийс. банк 11,163 20 
Тольяттихимбанк 371.0 237 ХКФ Банк 9,931.9 23 
Томскпромстройбанк 224.8 310 Хлынов 440.2 214 
Торжокуниверсалбанк 62.9 571 Хованский 313.2 262 
ТПБ Китая 735.7 155 Холмск 61.2 581 
Транскапиталбанк 4,154.0 44 Центр-Инвест 2,299.0 71 
Транснациональный банк 516.9 192 Центркомбанк 358.7 243 
Транспортный 704.0 159 Центрокредит 2,392.2 70 
Трансстройбанк 200.8 335 Церих 148.9 400 
Траст Капитал Банк 73.5 
532 
Чайна Констракшн 
Банк 197.2 
338 
Тройка Диалог 264.3 284 Челиндбанк 1,051.0 121 
ТСБ 136.7 420 Челябинвестбанк 1,083.1 116 
Тульский промышленник 57.2 588 Чувашкредитпромбанк 163.4 381 
Тусар 347.1 247 Шумерлинский 108.8 457 
ТЭМБР-банк 410.3 
225 
Эйч-Эс-Би-Си Банк 
(РР) 1,806.6 
85 
Тюменьагропромбанк 149.1 398 Экономбанк 359.2 242 
УБРР 6,127.9 34 Экономикс-банк 173.6 362 
Углеметбанк 272.1 280 Экономический союз 140.0 410 
УМБ 187.0 349 Экопромбанк 331.3 252 
Универсальный кредит 92.8 480 Экси-банк 137.4 419 
Унифин 303.0 264 Эксперт Банк 156.9 390 
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Tajikistan БМ Банк 334.9 65 
AccessBank Tajikistan 48.5 4 Брокбизнесбанк 3,617.4 12 
Амонатбанк 234.7 3 БТА Банк 765.2 33 
Бонки рушди Точикистон 39.3 5 ВАБ Банк 2,634.9 17 
Ориенбанк 342.9 2 Велес 19.0 175 
Сохибкорбанк 20.9 6 Вернум Банк 60.1 143 
Точиксодиротбанк 587.6 1 ВиЭс Банк 277.4 75 
Uzbekistan Восточно-промышленный банк 21.0 172 
InFinBank 223.4 8 Всеукраинский банк развития 818.0 32 
ORIENT  FINANS 123.8 9 Гефест 15.1 180 
Азия Альянс Банк 505.5 6 Глобус 172.0 94 
Алокабанк 313.6 7 Городской коммерческий банк 589.6 44 
Асака 2,062.8 3 Грант 99.1 119 
Ипотекабанк 1,331.4 4 Грин Банк 70.9 132 
Народный банк 1,231.6 5 Даниэль 134.7 106 
Нацбанк ВЭД 5,125.0 1 ДБ Сбербанка России 4,390.7 8 
Туркистон 38.9 10 Дельта 6,918.4 4 
Узпромстройбанк 3,101.4 2 Демарк 278.7 74 
Универсал Банк 31.6 11 Держзембанк 18.4 177 
Ukraine Диамант 598.1 43 
Авангард 46.7 156 Диви Банк  748.6 36 
Авант-Банк 473.9 52 Дойче Банк ДБУ 231.4 84 
Banks/Countries Assets, millions US$ Place by 
total 
assets 
Banks/Countries Assets, 
millions US$ 
Place by total 
assets 
Экспо Капитал 70.3 545 Аксиома 129.5 108 
Экспобанк 1,446.7 97 АктаБанк 599.3 42 
Экспресс-Волга 1,272.7 106 Актив-банк 474.9 51 
Экспресс-кредит 226.5 306 Акцент Банк 268.7 76 
Эл банк 172.5 364 Альпари Банк 16.2 178 
Элита 102.4 465 Альфа-Банк 3,664.9 11 
Эллипс банк 548.1 184 Альянс 22.7 170 
Эльбин 77.9 515 Апекс-Банк 159.2 100 
Энергобанк 435.7 216 Аркада 262.2 80 
Энергомашбанк 287.7 271 Артем Банк 54.5 150 
Энергопромбанк 62.3 574 АСБИО Банк 59.4 147 
Энерготрансбанк 545.9 186 Астра Банк 126.4 110 
Эргобанк 168.8 
371 
Банк "Рыночные 
технологии" 71.1 
131 
Эсидбанк 44.0 636 Банк 3/4 536.4 49 
Ю БИ ЭС Банк 171.7 367 Банк Богуслав 66.4 138 
Юг-Инвестбанк 207.1 328 Банк Восток 384.6 58 
Югра 1,571.4 94 Банк ВТБ (Украина) 3,163.5 14 
Юниаструм банк 1,922.4 
82 
Банк инвестиций и 
сбережений 336.3 
64 
Юникор 141.6 408 Банк Кипра 325.3 67 
ЮниКредит Банк 27,599.4 9 Банк Первый 362.0 61 
Юнистрим 80.4 
507 
Банк Петрокоммерц-
Украина 154.4 
103 
Япы Креди Москва 235.2 298 Банк Портал 19.6 174 
Ярбанк 327.9 255 Банк СИЧ 59.8 144 
Яринтербанк 72.7 535 Банк Юнисон 168.9 95 
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АвтоКразБанк 194.8 90 Евробанк 164.1 99 
Агрокомбанк 76.8 129 Еврогазбанк 457.4 56 
Аккордбанк 83.2 128 Европромбанк 108.4 116 
Захидинкомбанк 98.3 120 Омега Банк 90.8 125 
Земельный капитал 38.0 161 ОТП Банк 2,342.3 18 
Златобанк 949.1 29 Ощадбанк 12,957.3 2 
Золотые ворота 206.4 87 Первый инвестиционный банк 155.6 102 
Идея Банк 358.6 62 Пивденкомбанк 938.8 30 
Имэксбанк 1,379.7 23 Пивденный 1,406.2 22 
Инвестбанк 69.5 134 Пиреус Банк 315.0 69 
Инвестиционно-трастовый банк 23.5 169 Платинум Банк 725.0 38 
ИНГ банк (Украина) 1,209.2 25 Поликомбанк 69.1 135 
Индустриалбанк 328.2 66 Полтава-банк 172.4 93 
Интеграл 116.5 112 Порто-Франко 164.8 98 
Интербанк 66.3 139 Правэкс-Банк 563.5 46 
ИнтерКредитБанк 55.8 148 Прайм-Банк 46.1 157 
Камбио 289.7 72 Премиум 105.9 117 
Капитал 262.5 79 Приватбанк 26,834.8 1 
Киев  265.1 78 ПроКредит Банк 310.9 70 
Киевская Русь 1,047.3 28 Проминвестбанк 4,971.5 7 
Классикбанк 146.0 104 Промфинбанк 29.1 165 
Клиринговый дом 489.4 50 Промэкономбанк 121.2 111 
Коминвестбанк 126.7 109 Профинбанк 50.3 154 
Коммерческий индустриальный банк 27.8 167 ПУМБ 4,154.6 9 
Конкорд 20.7 173 Радабанк 44.4 160 
Контракт 95.5 121 Радикал Банк 228.7 85 
Креди Агриколь Банк 1,769.4 19 Райффайзенбанк Аваль 5,437.3 5 
Кредит Европа Банк 194.6 91 Расчетный центр 54.8 149 
Кредит Оптима 32.9 163 Реал банк 559.1 47 
Кредитвест Банк 63.8 141 Регион банк 53.9 152 
Кредит-Днепр 737.1 37 Ренессанс Капитал 166.8 96 
Кредитпромбанк 135.7 105 Родовид-Банк 1,105.4 26 
Кредобанк  548.2 48 Русский стандарт 456.9 57 
КСГ Банк 44.9 159 СЕБ Корпоративный банк 115.3 113 
Легбанк 101.8 118 Ситибанк (Украина) 752.2 35 
Львов 113.7 115 Софийский 64.3 140 
Марфин Банк 316.6 68 Союз 579.3 45 
Мегабанк  680.3 40 Стандарт 90.2 126 
Международный Инвестбанк 217.1 86 Старокиевский банк 90.9 124 
Мелиор Банк  54.2 151 Столичный 69.8 133 
Меркурий 246.8 82 Таскомбанк 336.8 63 
Метабанк 93.3 122 Терра Банк 606.4 41 
Мисто Банк 197.7 89 ТК Кредит 198.0 88 
Михайловский 59.8 145 ТРАСТ 68.2 136 
Морской 158.9 101 Траст-Капитал 59.5 146 
Мотор Банк 48.6 155 Укоопспилка 36.3 162 
Надра 3,892.9 10 
Украинский банк реконструкции 
и развития 16.1 179 
Народный капитал  29.6 164 Украинский капитал 60.2 142 
Национальные инвестиции 473.3 53 
Украинский профессиональный 
банк 462.5 54 
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Banks/Countries Assets, 
millions 
US$ 
Place by 
total 
assets 
Banks/Countries Assets, 
millions 
US$ 
Place by 
total 
assets 
Национальный кредит 280.6 73 Украинский стр.-инв. банк 45.6 158 
ОКСИ Банк 52.4 153 УкрБизнесБанк 722.0 39 
Укргазбанк  2,976.8 16 
   Укргазпромбанк 166.4 97 
   Укринбанк 754.2 34 
   Укркоммунбанк 68.0 137 
   УкрСиббанк 3,016.6 15 
   Укрсоцбанк 5,386.8 6 
   Укрэксимбанк 11,804.0 3 
   Универсал Банк 822.1 31 
   Уникомбанк 114.8 114 
   Фамильный 22.3 171 
   Фидо Банк 1,429.4 21 
   Финанс Банк 28.9 166 
   Финансовая инициатива 1,629.6 20 
   Финансовый партнер 131.5 107 
   Финансы и Кредит  3,218.1 13 
   Финбанк 370.4 59 
   ФинексБанк 25.3 168 
   Финростбанк 249.6 81 
   Фортуна-банк 365.7 60 
   Source: Banks of the CISs (2013), in Russian 
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Appendix B 
Appendix to Chapter 3 
Table B1: Mean technical efficiency by country and by year (2005-2012), models (2 - 4) 
Panel A: Output distance function without country dummies in the frontier, model (2) 
Country/ Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average by country 
Armenia 0.823 0.870 0.831 0.848 0.890 0.886 0.881 0.883 0.866 
Azerbaijan 0.891 0.874 0.862 0.830 0.906 0.914 0.862 0.911 0.884 
Belarus 0.927 0.900 0.872 0.885 0.885 0.876 0.865 0.879 0.882 
Kyrgyzstan 0.850 0.820 0.814 0.837 0.870 0.872 0.865 0.840 0.847 
Kazakhstan 0.884 0.874 0.841 0.870 0.757 0.856 0.846 0.812 0.839 
Moldova 0.921 0.900 0.856 0.868 0.918 0.905 0.898 0.909 0.895 
Russia 0.881 0.877 0.878 0.906 0.905 0.906 0.903 0.904 0.896 
Tajikistan 0.915 0.898 0.899 0.910 0.906 0.918 0.927 0.890 0.909 
Ukraine 0.928 0.919 0.916 0.859 0.906 0.924 0.926 0.920 0.912 
Uzbekistan 0.920 0.912 0.900 0.889 0.909 0.908 0.886 0.914 0.903 
Average by year 0.885 0.879 0.873 0.893 0.895 0.902 0.896 0.897 0.891 
Panel B: Hyperbolic distance function with country dummies in the frontier, model (3) 
Country/Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average by country 
Armenia 0.888 0.908 0.879 0.894 0.928 0.938 0.937 0.940 0.916 
Azerbaijan 0.940 0.924 0.915 0.899 0.958 0.961 0.909 0.960 0.935 
Belarus 0.960 0.940 0.911 0.928 0.944 0.934 0.931 0.935 0.934 
Kyrgyzstan 0.923 0.909 0.917 0.931 0.952 0.954 0.954 0.945 0.938 
Kazakhstan 0.912 0.905 0.883 0.905 0.800 0.890 0.886 0.867 0.878 
Moldova 0.955 0.940 0.910 0.924 0.960 0.956 0.954 0.959 0.944 
Russia 0.920 0.914 0.915 0.941 0.950 0.948 0.947 0.949 0.937 
Tajikistan 0.960 0.945 0.951 0.958 0.958 0.961 0.963 0.945 0.955 
Ukraine 0.948 0.940 0.937 0.884 0.943 0.961 0.962 0.960 0.943 
Uzbekistan 0.971 0.969 0.964 0.965 0.970 0.972 0.964 0.975 0.969 
Average by year 0.924 0.917 0.913 0.932 0.941 0.946 0.942 0.945 0.934 
Panel C: Output distance function with country dummies in the frontier, model (4) 
Country/Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average by country 
Armenia 0.828 0.871 0.835 0.851 0.897 0.898 0.895 0.897 0.874 
Azerbaijan 0.896 0.880 0.870 0.838 0.917 0.923 0.871 0.920 0.892 
Belarus 0.930 0.904 0.873 0.889 0.896 0.884 0.875 0.887 0.889 
Kyrgyzstan 0.891 0.872 0.872 0.885 0.912 0.913 0.910 0.896 0.895 
Kazakhstan 0.888 0.880 0.842 0.869 0.767 0.859 0.850 0.816 0.842 
Moldova 0.924 0.903 0.857 0.870 0.924 0.913 0.907 0.917 0.900 
Russia 0.880 0.876 0.876 0.906 0.909 0.909 0.906 0.907 0.898 
Tajikistan 0.910 0.891 0.894 0.904 0.906 0.916 0.925 0.884 0.905 
Ukraine 0.917 0.903 0.900 0.822 0.888 0.915 0.918 0.911 0.897 
Uzbekistan 0.932 0.927 0.918 0.908 0.927 0.928 0.913 0.932 0.923 
Average by year 0.885 0.879 0.873 0.893 0.900 0.906 0.900 0.902 0.894 
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Appendix C 
Appendix to Chapter 4 
Table C1: Mean cost (Panel A) and profit (Panel B) efficiency by country and by year 
without Russia in the sample (2005-2012) 
 Panel A 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average by country 
Armenia 0.80 0.82 0.86 0.95 0.87 0.92 0.93 0.90 0.88 
Azerbaijan 0.83 0.80 0.88 0.93 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.88 
Belarus 0.88 0.91 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.84 0.87 0.91 
Kyrgyzstan 0.74 0.77 0.73 0.78 0.73 0.71 0.70 0.72 0.74 
Kazakhstan 0.87 0.84 0.90 0.93 0.85 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.87 
Moldova 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.86 
Tajikistan 0.97 0.90 0.93 0.99 0.97 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.93 
Ukraine 0.92 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 
Uzbekistan 0.83 0.71 0.68 0.88 0.78 0.78 0.81 0.78 0.78 
Average by year 0.85 0.84 0.87 0.92 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.86  
 Panel B          
Armenia 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.90 0.89 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.92 
Azerbaijan 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.86 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92 
Belarus 0.65 0.74 0.79 0.78 0.83 0.81 0.46 0.62 0.71 
Kyrgyzstan 0.93 0.95 0.76 0.78 0.96 0.96 0.89 0.87 0.89 
Kazakhstan 0.88 0.90 0.86 0.85 0.89 0.84 0.88 0.82 0.87 
Moldova 0.89 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.82 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.89 
Tajikistan 0.67 0.83 0.85 0.75 0.89 0.85 0.87 0.91 0.83 
Ukraine 0.84 0.88 0.89 0.78 0.70 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.84 
Uzbekistan 0.81 0.89 0.92 0.85 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.89 
Average by year 0.83 0.88 0.87 0.83 0.87 0.89 0.85 0.86   
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Appendix D  
Appendix to Chapter 5 
Table D1: Banking sector development in five CIS countries (2000-2006) 
Year  Belarus Kazakhstan Russia Ukraine Uzbekistan 
2000 New Banking Code enacted; 
September: unification of 
official with non-official 
exchange rates 
Credit boom; Minimum capital 
requirements raised 
– Economic recovery; Credit 
boom gathers momentum; 
Rehabilitation plan for 
Oshchadbank launched; New 
government strengthens 
macro- stabilization, 
presses ahead with structural 
reforms 
– 
2001 April–September IMF Staff-
monitored Program carried 
out: directed credits phased  
October: privatization of 
majority stake of Halyk bank; 
November: RZB, EBRD, IFC 
a.o. purchase minority stake in 
Bank TuranAlem 
End-2001: post- crisis 
profitability of sector restored  
January: Law on Banks and 
Banking Activity effective 
July: NBU shuts down Bank 
Ukraina; September: Fund for 
Guarantee of Deposits of 
Natural Persons created 
Government somewhat curtails 
loan guarantees; December: 
CBU officially terminates 
directed credits 
2002 January: minimum capital 
requirements raised, banking 
supervision tightened; 
Directed credits re-emerge; 
December: 
RZB acquires majority 
stake of Priorbank  
– – – April: Deposit Guarantee Fund 
introduced 
2003 Early 2003: revocation of one 
bank’s license due to non-
fulfilment of capital 
requirements; Mid-year: 
NBRB instructs banks to cut 
January: asset classification and 
loss provisioning rules 
tightened, IAS compulsory for 
all banks, minimum capital 
adequacy lifted to 12%  
December: limited deposit 
insurance scheme enacted; All 
banks applying for 
participation in scheme 
undergo special BR 
– Banks asked to provision for 
guaranteed credits; State sells 
minority shares in seven 
medium-sized banks; October: 
reunification of exchange 
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non-performing loans to 5% 
of total loans  
inspections  rates, current account 
convertibility, but new 
administrative trade 
barriers set up 
2004 Early 2004: NBRB instruction 
on cutting bad credits 
reportedly fulfilled, but largely 
through “evergreening”; Some 
large SOBs continue to flout 
regulations; Late 2004: 
liquidity crunch, subsequently 
defused  
January: limited household 
deposit insurance mandatory, 
banking supervision shifts from 
NBK to Agency of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan on Regulation 
and Supervision of Financial 
Markets and Institutions; 
Kazakhstani banks buy stakes in 
IAS Russian, Ukrainian, 
Belorussian and Kyrgyz banks 
April: revised general 
regulation “On banks’ 
mandatory norms” enters into 
force; July: banking mini-
crisis, Gutabank illiquid, sold 
to VTB, interim guarantee for 
all existing private deposits 
granted, foreigners acquire 
some medium-sized Russian 
banks; introduced alongside 
RAS (for banks)  
March: NBU raises minimum 
capital adequacy ratio from 8% 
to 10%; Nov.–Dec.: mini- 
banking panic triggered by 
political instability related to 
government change  
– 
2005 – From mid-2005: to rein in 
banks’ foreign borrowing 
capital adequacy regulations and 
reserve requirements repeatedly 
tightened; Late 2005: 
Consolidated supervision of 
financial-industrial 
conglomerates introduced 
June: law on credit bureaux 
enters into force; 
September: BR announces that 
924 banks (holding 99% of 
private deposits) have passed 
inspections, are admitted to 
deposit insurance; Late 2005: 
Deposit insurance scheme 
starts operations  
Early 2005: mini-panic 
overcome; October: RZB takes 
over Bank Aval for EUR 850 
million; December: BNP 
Paribas purchases 51% of 
Ukrsibbank  
March: Biznesbank shut down; 
April: policy driven merger of 
Uzzhilsberbank and 
Zaminbank creates 
Ipotekabank 
2006 
 
July: amendments to Banking 
Code strengthen NBRB 
supervisory authority and 
streamline licensing 
procedures 
– February: Raiffeisen purchases 
Impeksbank  
February: Banca Intesa buys 
Ukrsotsbank for EUR 900 
million; June: OTP acquires 
Raiffeisenbank Ukraine  
– 
Note: The table is based on Barisitz (2008), pp.150-152. 
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Table D2: Macroeconomic and banking sector-related indicators (1991–2005)* 
Indicator/Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Belarus                
GDP growth (real, %)  – 9.6 7.6 12.6 10.4 2.8 11.4 8.4 3.4 5.8 4.7 5.1 6.9 11.4 9.2 
CPI inflation (%) – 1,559.0 1,996.00 1,960.0 244 39.3 63.4 181.7 251.3 107.5 46.2 34.8 25.4 14.4 8 
Exchange rate** – – – – – – – – 295.1 739.2 1,271.90 1,704.6 2,346.6 2,685.5 2,677.0 
Broad money (M2, % of GDP)  – – – 39 15 14.8 15.8 30.9 16.5 17.7 15.2 15.1 16.9 17.8 19.7 
Number of banks (of which foreign-owned)  – – – 48 42 (1) 38  (2) 38 (2) 37 (2) 36 (4) 31 (6) 29 (9) 28 (12) 30 (17) 32 (19) 30 (18) 
Financial intermediation (assets/GDP %)  – – – – – – – – – 29.5 25.5 25.7 27.7 29.5 32.2 
Asset share of state-owned banks (%)  – – – 69.2 62.3 54.1 55.2 59.5 66.6 65.2 63.9 61.9 61.6 70.2 75.2 
Asset share of foreign-owned banks (%)  – – – – – – – – 2.9 4.5 7.5 8.1 20.4 19.9 16.2 
Deposit rate (% p.a.)  – – 65.1 89.6 100.8 32.3 15.6 14.3 23.8 37.6 34.2 26.9 17.4 12.7 9.2 
Lending rate (% p.a.) – – 71.6 148.5 175 62.3 31.8 27 51 67.7 47 36.9 24 16.9 11.4 
Domestic credit (% of GDP) – – – 17.6 6.2 6.7 8.3 16.1 9.3 8.9 – – – – – 
Deposits (volume of deposits/GDP %) – – – – – – – – – – 11.9 12.1 13.6 14.9 16.3 
Credit (credit volume/GDP %) – – – – – – – – – 18.6 15.9 14 15.3 18.4 19.6 
Return on equity (ROE, %)  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 
Capital adequacy (capital/risk-weighted assets %)  – – – – – – – – – 24.4 20.7 24.2 26 25.2 26.7 
Kazakhstan 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP growth (real, %)  13 2.9 9.2 12.6 8.2 0.5 1.7 1.9 2.7 9.8 13.5 9.8 9.3 9.6 9.4 
CPI inflation (%) 137 2,984.0 2,169.0 1,158.0 60.4 28.6 11.2 1.9 17.8 9.8 6.4 6.6 6.8 6.7 7.5 
Exchange rate** – – – – – – – – 127.9 130.9 131.6 144.6 169.1 169 165.3 
Broad money (M2, % of GDP)  – – 27.9 13.1 11.4 9.5 10.3 8.6 13.6 15.3 17.1 19.2 20.3 27.1 36.6 
Number of banks (of which foreign-owned)  72 (1) 155 (1) 204 (5) 184 (8) 130 (8) 101 (9) 81 (22) 71 (20) 55 (18) 48 (16) 44 (15) 38 (17) 36 (16) 35 (15) 34 (14) 
Financial intermediation (assets/GDP %) – – – – – – – – 16.9 20.3 25.1 30.6 37.7 45.8 60.6 
Asset share of state-owned banks (%)  – – – – 24.3 28.4 44.8 23 19.9 1.9 3.5 5.2 5.1 3.7 3.1 
Asset share of foreign-owned banks (%)  – – – – – – – – – – – – 5.5 7.3 – 
Deposit rate (% p.a.)  – – – – 44.4 29.3 12 14.5 13.5 15.6 12.8 11 10.9 9.3 9.1 
Lending rate (% p.a.) – – – – 58.3 53.6 22.8 17 20.8 18.8 15.3 14.1 14.9 13.7 13 
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Domestic credit (% of GDP) – – 49.3 26.6 7.1 6.3 4.3 5.4 7.4 10.6 – – – – – 
Deposits (volume of deposits/GDP %) – – – – – – – – 8.5 11.3 13.5 16 15.9 22.6 – 
Credit (credit volume/GDP %) – – – – – – – – 7.6 10.9 15.3 18.1 21.3 25.9 35.6 
Return on equity (ROE, %)  – – – – – – – – 13.8 7.9 5.4 13.8 14.2 11.2 14.1 
Capital adequacy (capital/risk-weighted assets %)  – – – – – – – – 27.6 25.7 18.6 17.2 16.9 15.9 15 
Russian Federation 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP growth (real, %)  5.0  14.5  8.7  12.7 4.1  3.6 1.4  5.3 6.4 10 5.1 4.7 7.3 7.2 6.4 
CPI inflation (%) 161 2,506.0 840 204.4 128.6 21.8 10.9 84.5 36.8 20.1 18.6 15.1 12 11.7 10.9 
Exchange rate** – – – – – – – – – – 26.13 29.65 34.69 35.81 35.22 
Broad money (M2, % of GDP)  68 37 21.4 16 13.9 14.4 16 17 14.6 15.7 18 19.6 24.3 26 27.9 
Number of banks (of which foreign-owned)  1,360 1,747 2,009 2,456  2,297 (21)  2,029 (22)  1,697 (26)  1,476 (30)  1,349 (32)  1,311 (33)  1,319 (35)  1,329 (37)  1,329 (41)  1,299 (42)  1,253 (52) 
Financial intermediation (assets/GDP %) – – – – – –  30.1  39.8 33.3 33.4 35.3 38.3 42.3 42.6 45.1 
Asset share of state-owned banks (%)  – – – – – – 37 41.9 – – – 37.5 36 38.1 – 
Asset share of foreign-owned banks (%)  – – – – – – – 6.7a 10.6 9.5 8.8 8.1 7.4 7.6 11.2 
Deposit rate (% p.a.)  – – – – 102 55.1 16.8 17.1 13.7 6.5 5.2 4.3 4.4 3.8 3.6 
Lending rate (% p.a.) – – – – 320 146.8 32 41.8 39.7 24.4 16.5 15 12.4 10 11.1 
Domestic credit (% of GDP) – – 11.8 12.1 8.7 7.4 9.5 12.6 10.9 11.9 – – – – – 
Deposits (volume of deposits/GDP %) – – – – – – – – – – 10.7 12.6 14.5 15.6 17.7 
Credit (credit volume/GDP %) – – – – – – – – – – 16.5 17.7 21.7 23.1 25.7 
Return on equity (ROE, %)  – – – – – – – – – 24.9 19.4 18 17.8 20.2 23.9 
Capital adequacy (capital/risk-weighted assets %)  – – – – – – 23.4 19.8 26.7 – 24.3 22.2 19.1 17 16 
Ukraine 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP growth (real, %)  11.6 13.7 14.2 22.9 12.2 10 3 1.9 0.2 5.9 9.2 5.2 9.4 12.1 2.6 
CPI inflation (%) 161 2,730.0 10,155 401 181.7 39.7 10.1 20 19.2 25.8 6.1 –0.6 8.2 12.3 10.3 
Exchange rate**  – – – – – – – – 4.393 5.029 4.814 5.03 6.024 6.609 6.389 
Broad money (M2, % of GDP)  – – 33.9 26.7 12.6 11.5 13.4 15.3 16.6 18.5 22.1 28.5 35.3 36.4 43.4 
Number of banks (of which foreign-owned)  – 133 211 228 (1) 230 (1) 229 (6) 227 (12) 175 (12) 161 (15) 154 (14) 152 (16) 157 (15) 158 (19) 160 (19) 164 (23) 
Financial intermediation (assets/GDP %) – – – – – – – – 19.6 21.8 23.3 28.3 37.9 43.5 51.1 
Asset share of state-owned banks (%)  – – – – – – 13.5 13.7 12.5 11.9 11.8 12 9.8 8 – 
254 
 
Asset share of foreign-owned banks (%)  – – – – – – – 10.5 11.1 12.1 12.3 12.1 13 21.4 – 
Deposit rate (% p.a.)  – – 160 209 70 33.6 18.2 22.3 20.7 13.7 11 7.9 7 7.8 8.5 
Lending rate (% p.a.) – – 184 250 123 79.9 49.1 54.5 55 41.5 32.3 25.4 17.9 17.4 16.2 
Domestic credit (% of GDP) – – – – 1.5 1.4 2.5 7.8 8.6 11.2 – – – – – 
Deposits (volume of deposits/GDP %) – – – – – – – – 9.6 11.4 12.8 16.9 23.4 24.1 31.7 
Credit (credit volume/GDP %) – – – – – – – – 9 12.4 14.5 19.4 26.6 27.1 35.3 
Return on equity (ROE, %)  – – – – – – – – 8.7 0.5 7.5 8 7.6 8.4 10.4 
Capital adequacy (capital/risk-weighted assets %)  – – – – – – – – 19.6 15.5 20.7 18 15.2 16.8 15 
Uzbekistan 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP growth (real, %)  0.5 11.1 2.3 4.2 0.9 1.6 2.5 4.3 4.3 3.8 4.1 3.1 1.5 7.4 7 
CPI inflation (%) 169 910 885 1,281.0 116.9 64.3 27.6 26.1 26 28.2 26.4 24.4 7.7 15.5 18.8 
Exchange rate**  – – – – – – – – 274 332.3 578.9 833.4 1,124.40 1,231.90 1,333.70 
Broad money (M2, % of GDP)  – 69.4 53.5 34.7 18.2 21 17.5 15.4 13.6 12.2 12.4 10.6 10.3 12.2 15.1 
Number of banks (of which foreign-owned)  – 21 21 (1) 29 (1) 31 (1) 29 (2) 30 (4) 33 (4) 35 (5) 34 (6) 38 (6) 35 (6) 33 (5) 31 (5) 29 (4) 
Financial intermediation (assets/GDP %) – – – – – – – – – 39.7 48.7 44 37.8 – 30 
Asset share of state-owned banks (%)  – 21.7 15.9 46.7 38.4 75.5 70.6 67.3 65.8 77.5 80.4 73.7 70 67.6 – 
Asset share of foreign-owned banks (%)  – – – – – – – – 2 2.2 2.4 3.2 4.3 4.4 3.4 
Deposit rate (% p.a.)  7 10 30 60 90 28 14.8 13.1 13.5 18.8 21.2 26 20.3 16.1 15.5 
Lending rate (% p.a.) – – – 100 105 49.7 28 33.1 32.7 27.6 27.6 33.4 23.9 21.2 19.9 
Domestic credit (% of GDP) – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 
Deposits (volume of deposits/GDP %) – – – – – – – – – 8.6 9.1 8 7.8 8 – 
Credit (credit volume/GDP %) – – – – – – – – 22 28.4 36.9 34 27.5 24.5 20.4 
Return on equity (ROE, %)  – – – – – – – – – 12.5 9.4 7 7.3 8.2 – 
Capital adequacy (capital/risk-weighted assets %)  – – – – – – – – – 44.5 40.5 38.6 32.7 28 – 
Note: *The table is based on Barisitz (2008). Sources: various EBRD Transition Reports,  IMF, Raiffeisen Zentralbank, Bank Rossii, WIIW (Wiener Institut für internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (Vienna Institut for 
International Economic Studies); **National currency/EUR, annual average.
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Table D3: Correlation matrix of the variables used in the main regression 
 Lerner 
Index 
Bank 
size 
Loans to 
assets 
Fixed assets to 
total assets 
Depth of credit 
information 
Log GDP 
growth 
Supervisory 
power 
Activity 
restriction 
Banking 
freedom 
Government banks 
assets share 
           
Lerner Index 1          
Bank size 0.1948 1         
Loans to assets -0.4983 -0.046 1        
Fixed assets to total 
assets 
-0.0594 -0.2249 -0.0059 1       
Depth of credit 
information 
-0.0576 0.1884 -0.066 -0.0136 1      
Log GDP growth 0.0962 -0.071 0.013 0.0011 -0.2545 1     
Supervisory power 0.0878 -0.2104 0.0489 -0.0371 -0.6244 0.1119 1    
Activity restriction 0.1717 -0.1426 0.0474 0.1201 -0.0912 0.1879 0.2496 1   
Banking freedom -0.0391 -0.0211 -0.0112 -0.0164 0.2286 -0.119 0.0699 0.2251 1  
Government banks 
assets share 
-0.0477 0.0286 -0.0677 0.0003 0.1673 -0.0179 -0.3899 -0.386 -0.74 1 
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Table D4: The questionnaire used in construction of the Legal rights and Supervision 
indicators 
Indicator/ 
Description 
Description Questions 
Supervision 
(Higher values 
indicate 
greater 
power.) 
Range: 0—14 
 
Source: Barth et 
al. (2013) 
Whether the 
supervisory 
authorities have the 
authority to take 
specific actions to 
prevent and correct 
problems. 
1. Can supervisors meet external auditors to discuss report without 
bank approval? 
2. Are auditors legally required to report misconduct by 
managers/directors to supervisory agency? 
3. Can legal action against external auditors be taken by supervisor for 
negligence? 
4. Can supervisors force banks to change internal organizational 
structure? 
5. Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? 
6. Can the supervisory agency order directors/management to 
constitute provisions to cover actual/potential losses? 
7. Can the supervisory agency suspend director's decision to distribute: 
1. dividends. 2. bonuses. 3. management fees 
8. Can the supervisory agency supersede bank shareholder rights and 
declare bank insolvent? 
9. Does the Banking Law give authority to the supervisory agency to 
intervene-that is, suspend some or all ownership rights-a problem 
bank? 
10. Regarding bank restructuring & reorganization, can supervisory 
agency or any other govt. agency do the following: 1. supersede 
shareholder rights. 2. remove and replace management. 3. remove and 
replace directors 
Depth of credit 
information 
(Higher values 
indicate better 
access to credit 
information.) 
Range: 1-6 
Source: Doing 
Business-World 
Bank, 
http://www.doingbu
siness.org/Methodol
ogy/getting-
credit#legalRights 
The depth of credit 
information index 
measures rules and 
practices affecting 
the coverage, scope 
and accessibility of 
credit information 
available through 
either a credit 
bureau or a credit 
registry 
1.   Are data on both firms and individuals distributed?  
2. Are both positive and negative credit data distributed?  
3. Are data from retailers or utility companies - in addition to data 
from banks and financial institutions - distributed?  
4. Are at least 2 years of historical data distributed? (Credit bureaus 
and registries that distribute more than 10 years of negative data or 
erase data on defaults as soon as they are repaid obtain a score of 0 for 
this component.)  
5. Are data on loan amounts below 1% of income per capita 
distributed?  
6. By law, do borrowers have the right to access their data in the credit 
bureau or credit registry?  
Source: World Bank 
 
  
257 
 
Table D5: Business reforms for Getting credit in the CISs (2008-2014) 
Country Year Business Reforms  / * 
Armenia 2012 Armenia improved its credit information system by introducing a requirement to 
collect and distribute information from utility companies. 
 
  2010 Armenia improved its credit information system through a new law establishing a legal 
and regulatory framework for the activities of credit bureaus, including collecting 
credit information and preparing credit reports. 
 
  2008 In Armenia a private credit bureau started operating that distributes credit information 
on firms and individuals, has no minimum threshold for loans included in its database 
and guarantees all borrowers access to their credit reports. 
 
Azerbaijan 2011 Azerbaijan improved access to credit by establishing an online platform allowing 
financial institutions to provide information to, and retrieve it from, the public credit 
registry. 
 
  2010 Azerbaijan’s public credit registry improved the credit information system by 
providing banks with online access to its database, increasing the data available on 
borrowers and introducing penalties for banks that send information that is late or 
incorrect. 
 
  2009 Azerbaijan improved access to credit information by eliminating the minimum 
threshold for loans reported to the public credit registry. 
 
Belarus 2011 Belarus enhanced access to credit by facilitating the use of the pledge as a security 
arrangement and providing for out-of-court enforcement of the pledge on default. 
 
  2009 Belarus improved access to credit information by eliminating the minimum threshold 
for credits reported to the public credit registry’s database and guaranteeing borrowers’ 
right to inspect their own data in the credit registry. 
 
Kazakhstan 2013 Kazakhstan strengthened secured creditor rights by introducing new grounds for relief 
from an automatic stay during rehabilitation proceedings. 
 
  2009 Kazakhstan’s private credit bureau increased its sources of credit information by 
adding retailers such as furniture companies and utilities such as the gas company. 
 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
2010 The Kyrgyz Republic strengthened its secured transactions system through 
amendments to its civil code and pledge law making secured lending more flexible, 
allowing a general description of encumbered assets and of debts and obligations and 
providing for the automatic extension of a security right to proceeds of the original 
asset. 
 
Moldova 2014 Moldova strengthened its secured transactions system by introducing new grounds for 
relief from an automatic stay during insolvency and restructuring proceedings. 
 
  2012 Moldova improved its credit information system by establishing its first private credit 
bureau. 
 
  2009 Moldova improved its credit information system through a new credit bureau law to 
facilitate the creation of a private credit bureau. 
 
Russian 
Federation 
2008 In Russia access to credit information was improved by the launch of a private credit 
bureau, the National Bureau of Credit Histories (NBKI), and by a requirement that 
banks submit credit data to the credit bureau. 
 
Tajikistan 2015 Tajikistan improved access to credit information by beginning to provide credit scores.  
  2014 Tajikistan improved access to credit information by establishing a private credit 
bureau. 
 
  2012 Access to credit using movable property in Tajikistan became more complicated 
because the movable collateral registry stopped its operations in January, 2011. 
 
  2010 Tajikistan improved its credit information system through a new law allowing the 
creation of a private credit bureau. 
 
Ukraine 2014 Ukraine improved access to credit information by collecting data on firms from 
financial institutions. 
 
  2009 Ukraine improved access to credit information by creating a new private credit bureau.  
Uzbekistan 2014 Uzbekistan improved access to credit information by expanding the scope of credit 
information and requiring that more than 2 years of historical data be collected and 
distributed. 
 
  2013 Uzbekistan improved access to credit information by guaranteeing borrowers’ right to 
inspect their personal data. 
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  2009 In Uzbekistan a private credit bureau (Inter Bank Kredit Bureau) started collecting 
information on the repayment patterns of individual borrowers as well as firms. 
 
Source: World Bank. Note: *  means positive developments in rules on regulation and supervision, and  means 
worsening of regulation and supervision legislation. Source: http://www.doingbusiness.org/reforms/overview/topic/getting-
credit 
 
Table D6: Coefficients estimated and used for estimation of marginal costs by country 
Coefficient/ 
country 
Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan Moldova Russia Tajikistan Ukraine Uzbekistan 

-4.036 -0.0159 1.413 -17.29 1.98 1.5 0.125 4.399 1.535 1.109 

0.43 0.089 -0.037 1.748 -0.076 -0.0421 0.0672 -0.299 -0.0379 -0.00711 
 0.11 -0.0751 -0.00266 0.0499 -0.161 -0.0336 -0.00495 0.0391 -0.00557 -0.0335 

-0.0258 -0.0156 0.00534 -0.361 0.00698 0.00897 -0.0114 0.0468 -0.00475 0.0107 
Obs 80 131 80 23 130 72 1,847 24 94 54 
R-sq 0.877 0.989 0.990 0.993 0.979 0.992 0.975 0.999 0.989 0.998 
N. banks 10 18 12 3 18 11 234 4 14 9 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
 
 
D1: Boone indicator 
Boone indicator of competition (Boone, 2008) calculated using Schaeck and Cihak (2014) 
specification for banking firms. 
𝜋𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘1 
𝑇
𝑘=1
𝑑𝑘𝑡 ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) + ∑ 𝛽𝑘2
𝑇−1
𝑘=1
𝑑𝑘𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where 𝜋𝑖𝑡  are the profits of banking firm i at time t divided by total assets, T is the total 
number of years under consideration; 𝑑𝑘𝑡 are time dummies, where 𝑑𝑘𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑘 = 1 and 0 
otherwise; 𝑐𝑖𝑡 are average variable costs; and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is the error term. Average costs are 
calculated as a ratio of interest and non-interest expenses over total interest and non-interest 
income.  The larger the ß in absolute terms, the stronger is competition. I.e., the lower the 
marginal cost (𝛽 < 0) the more profitable is a bank, which leads to higher profits for more 
efficient banks. Table A2.1 shows the Boone’s indicators obtained by year and country.  
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Table D7: Boone indicator by country and year   
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
AM -0.290*** -0.282*** -0.200*** -0.130*** -0.143*** -0.981 -0.214* 0.0263 0.0750** 
AZ . -0.142 -2.123 -7.744 -0.618 -0.811*** -1.031*** -1.031*** -0.964*** 
BY . -0.249 -0.145 -0.0640 0.0226 0.970 1.515 1.988 0.348 
KG . . -0.170 -0.130** . . . -0.0132 . 
KZ 14.14* -0.776*** 0.398*** -0.706*** -0.788*** -2.072* 0.687 -0.756*** -0.655** 
MD -0.617*** -0.144*** 0.00560 0.0639** 0.0847 -0.0779*** -0.0546*** -0.0378** -0.0411 
RU -1.049*** -0.937*** -0.830*** -1.022*** -0.917*** -0.918*** -0.870*** -0.896*** -0.921*** 
TJ . .  . -0.0553 . . 0.184 -0.0907** -0.127*** 
UA 0.0343 0.512*** 1.803*** 1.004*** 0.795*** -0.306** 0.393 -0.203 0.971*** 
UZ . . 0.0351*** 0.0866** 0.166*** 0.259*** -1.880*** -1.000*** 0.150*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
Note: AM - Armenia; AZ – Azerbaijan; BY – Belarus; KG – Kyrgyzstan; KZ – Kazakhstan; MD- Moldova; RU –Russia, TJ 
– Tajikistan; UA – Ukraine; UZ – Uzbekistan.  
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